

THREE

The Word of Reconciliation¹

Why should East Europeans be asked to forgive before a reckoning with the past, including a legal one, is undertaken? . . . How is it possible to attain reconciliation—a term that calls for close scrutiny—in the absence of repentance? . . . How can one ask the former victims to remain silent?²

. . . the word of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:19).³

INTRODUCTIONS

On 21 November 2014, both in Ukraine and in the now globalized Ukrainian Diaspora, many people remembered in different ways the first anniversary of the Maidan Revolution in Kyiv. This anniversary was also the date of the Orange Revolution. In Paris, the President of the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in Lviv and the Eparch of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church for Ukrainians in France, the Benelux countries, and Switzerland, Bishop Borys Gudziak, convoked an informal colloquium.⁴ The theme was “Conversations about Questions That Have No Simple Answers: War in Ukraine and Peace-Making in Light of the Millennial Legacy of the Princes and Martyrs Borys and Hlib +1015.” And, of course, there were disagreements. A brief description of the colloquium will prove helpful since in a moment, we will need to draw on several of its salient features.⁵

I. Another Conference?

The conference’s invited speakers were the then newly appointed Ukrainian ambassador to France, Oleh Shamshur; the Eparch

for Ukrainian Catholics in England and Ireland, Bishop Hlib Lonchyna; the vice-rector of UCU, human rights activist, and former dissident and Gulag prisoner, Professor Myroslav Marynovych; and Professor Antoine Arjakovsky, historian and Director of Research at the *Collège des Bernardins* in Paris.⁶ In his introduction, the Chair, Bishop Gudziak, focused on the difficult idea of reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia. He stressed the spiritual dimension of fraternal reconciliation in the light of the lasting, although tragic, legacy of Ukraine's earliest saints from the eleventh century, Borys and Hlib. By contrast, Ambassador Shamshur focused on the limitations of the pacifist protests at Maidan. He stressed the necessity for any diplomatic success at reconciliation of not only having an interlocutor genuinely interested in reaching peace, but of backing diplomacy with a reorganized, freshly armed, and newly efficient Ukrainian military. In turn, Bishop Lonchyna evoked the mysterious, and finally not completely understandable, character of the basis for hope, the spiritual reality of God's being love. But Professor Marynovych, in a particularly well prepared paper, went on to stress the impossibility of reconciliation without repentance. The perpetrators, he claimed, are incapable of repentance. Only the suffering churches, he said, can accomplish such repentance. And they can do so only in the spirit of Isaiah's Suffering Servant.

Finally, before offering three practical recommendations for reconciliation, Professor Arjakovsky, concluded the invited presentations. He first recalled the necessity for the long patience of the historians, and the central role in Ukrainian history of a moral consciousness. He then suggested, as urgent tasks today, the development of a common Ukrainian and Russian historical account, like the consensus accounts that both French and German historians, as well as German and Polish historians, have already reached.⁷ Similarly, he called for active collaboration in France between the two immigrant communities of the Ukrainian and Russian diaspora.⁸ And finally, he insisted on the importance of Ukrainian and Russian journalists being able to work together on the institution and operation of a new joint

French-Ukrainian TV channel on the model of the very successful French-German TV channel, Arte.

Bishop Gudziak then commented very briefly on each of the presentations. He went on to open up the floor to comments and questions, including those from France's former ambassador to Ukraine, M. Philippe de Suremain. The ensuing discussion included several instructive comments on the especially complicated situation of the Crimean Tatar communities, some of whose members are in exile at the UCU; the role of younger Ukrainian journalists in the immediacy of the 21 November 2013 Maidan events in Kyiv; as well as earlier rather unsuccessful attempts in Paris to bring the Ukrainian and Russian diaspora communities together.

One important element in the lively discussion was whether the very notion of reconciliation was finally—although the word was not used—equivocal. That is, was it in fact the case that some speakers were using the word “reconciliation,” at least in English, to mean one thing when taken in mainly religious contexts and quite another when taken in mainly secular contexts? And, if so, then would such verbal equivocation be a genuine obstacle in achieving not just verbal but real reconciliation? This particular issue, namely, the meaning, the sense, and the signification of the word and the reality of reconciliation in the actual contexts of Ukraine and Russia today, may repay further critical examination, for things have moved on appreciably since Maidan. What follows, then, is intended to be, if possible, no more than a small contribution to further constructive discussion. Such discussion is necessary because Ukraine has become a “test case.”⁹

II. Reconciliations: Two Suggestions

Before pursuing our reflections, recalling just how persons ordinarily use the English word “reconciliation” is useful. Native speakers of English today ordinarily use the word “reconciliation” mainly to denote two rather different matters. The first main use takes “reconciliation” to denote “the action or an act

of reconciling a person to oneself or another, or estranged parties to one another . . . ,” or of “settling or causing an agreement in a controversy, quarrel, etc.”¹⁰ A dictionary example of this first usage occurs in a sentence from E. Young-Bruehl’s biography of Hannah Arendt. “There were peace treaties,” she writes, “but no fundamental reconciliation.” Perhaps we may not unduly call this first main kind of reconciliation “interpersonal reconciliation.”

The second main use of “reconciliation” denotes “the action or an act of making . . . [two things] consistent or compatible,” or of “regarding [them] as consistent or compatible,” or of “showing” them to be consistent or compatible. A dictionary example of this usage occurs in a sentence from the English newspaper *The Observer*: “A reconciliation of Marxism and political democracy,” the newspaper reads, “is possible.”¹¹ Perhaps we may call this second main kind of reconciliation “impersonal reconciliation.”

Thus, on this linguistic account, reconciliation is mainly either impersonal or interpersonal. But exactly what do these two kinds of reconciliation have in common? Both the interpersonal and impersonal senses of reconciliation share the property of connecting one thing or set of things with another thing or set of things. That is, in using the word “reconciliation,” whether in talking about persons or not, we are talking about connecting things that were either previously linked together or subsequently can be linked together. But what seems obvious here is nonetheless often overlooked, namely, the importance of specifying just what is to be connected or re-connected. For it is one thing to show that two clearly different impersonal things, like two ideas of state sovereignty (see Chapter One),¹² despite perhaps some appearances, are not logically incompatible. And it is quite another to show that two clearly different persons or groups of persons are not socially incompatible. Thus, the idea of impersonal reconciliation has to do mainly with logical or rational incompatibility, a matter that can keep two things from being rightly connected. But the idea of interpersonal reconciliation has to do mainly with non-logical incompatibility, a matter that can also keep two things from being properly connected.

Accordingly, a first suggestion that arises here is the necessity for any successful process of reconciliation to start by specifying as precisely as possible just what are the two things that need to be rightly or properly reconnected. For example, in the case of the ongoing conflicts between Ukraine and Russia, we do well to ask what is the main question at issue. Is the main question just how to reconcile two opposed polities, two political systems, two leaders—Mr. Putin and Mr. Poroschenko? Or is the main question just how to reconcile two social systems, two societies, two peoples, two mentalities?¹³ And if a preliminary response is two societies, then exactly what in these societies needs reconciling—their opposed legal, moral, and spiritual values? And again if so, then exactly which ones in particular—their senses of justice, of obligation, of the secular? And so on.¹⁴

Specifying precisely what needs reconciling is important. For depending on the nature of what needs reconciling, just what effective means are available for achieving reconciliation vary considerably. For example, if reconciling Russia and Ukraine practically means re-initiating a relation of interpersonal trust between the two respective leaders, then one set of particular strategies may well recommend itself. And in that set of particular strategies, the relative independence of the multi-media in contrast to other issues is not that important. But if reconciling Russia and Ukraine practically means re-initiating a relation of interpersonal trust between groups living in appreciably different societies, then in the set of particular strategies to be adopted, the independence of the multi-media from almost complete government control is indeed critically important.

Experiences not only in the Donbass but also in the Baltic countries show just how critical complete government control of the media can be with regard to inciting or diminishing latent social antipathies. For, in the first case, whether the media are totally subordinate to Mr. Putin or not has little to do with overcoming Mr. Poroshenko's deeply seated distrust of Mr. Putin (as the protracted arguments at the Second Minsk accords discussions clearly demonstrated).¹⁵ In the second case, however,

whether the media are totally subordinate to Mr. Putin or not has everything to do with overcoming Russian society's deeply seated distrust of Ukrainian society.¹⁶

Now, if both impersonal and interpersonal reconciliation share the key property of connecting apparently opposed elements, what notably distinguishes these two main kinds of reconciliation? Interpersonal reconciliation, while sharing a linguistic root with impersonal reconciliation, unlike its kin, derives much of its signification from that root. That is, while each of the two main kinds of "reconcile" basically means to *re-concile,¹⁷ that is, to conciliate again, interpersonal reconciliation seems to embody that notion, while impersonal reconciliation does not. More specifically, only for interpersonal, and not for impersonal, reconciliation do we find the implication that, before reconciliation is possible, conciliation must already have taken place. Interpersonal, but not impersonal, reconciliation requires conciliation.

What, then, is conciliation? Conciliation generally denotes pacifying, placating, overcoming distrust and hostility between persons.¹⁸ However, in the case of industrial conflicts, conciliation denotes in particular "seeking agreement in an industrial dispute without recourse to arbitration." In this particular usage, then, and unlike in its general usage, conciliation does not mean arbitration; it means something prior to arbitration.

Accordingly, a second suggestion arising here is that this particular use of the word "conciliation" might be applied to some fresh understandings of interpersonal reconciliation. To speak of interpersonal reconciliation, then, would signify a renewed effort, prior to any formal arbitration, to re-initiate processes for seeking agreement by overcoming, let us say, pervasive distrust.¹⁹

Here then are two initial suggestions about how we may talk in English less misleadingly of the strongly ambiguous expression, "reconciliation." The first is that we need to specify quite exactly just what it is that calls for reconciliation. And the second is that we need to recognize that, practically speaking, there can be no interpersonal reconciliation without prior conciliation.

III. Impersonal Reconciliation: A Dilemma?

Suppose we focus more sharply first on the nature of any impersonal reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine, and in the next section on the nature of interpersonal reconciliation between just the Donbass Ukrainians who reject the new Ukrainian government and all the other Ukrainians who accept that government. When viewed from the impersonal vantage point, what exactly is it that opposes the present Russian government to the present Ukrainian government?²⁰

We recognize immediately, of course, that many issues separate these governments. But for our purposes, perhaps we may first underline the quite basic ideological issues and then try to make, at last, one of those underlying ideological issues explicit. Note, however, that we will be using the word “ideology” not in any derogatory, ordinary usage, but in the more precise philosophical sense of “any wide-ranging system of beliefs, ways of thought, and categories that provide the foundations of programs of political and social action: an ideology is a conceptual scheme with a practical application.”²¹

Unlike those of many much better informed persons, my own sources of information are quite limited. For I am not a citizen of either Russia or Ukraine, nor do I live in either country, nor do I speak either Russian or Ukrainian. Moreover, properly articulating the opposed ideologies requires the particular analytic skills of historians, political scientists, political theorists, social theorists, and others, and I have none of these necessary abilities.

Nonetheless, several of both Mr. Putin’s and Mr. Poroshenko’s more important public declarations have been widely reported. And these may provide ordinarily reflective persons with some indications of at least two basically opposed ideologies at issue.

Consider, for example, Mr. Putin’s eleventh traditional address to the nation. On 4 December 2014, in the historic St. George Hall of the Kremlin, and before the Russian Prime Minister and former Russian President, Dimitri Medvedev, and Msgr. Kiril, Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir

Putin explained to the assembled 1,000 dignitaries the most basic cause of Russia's current economic crises.²² That cause was "the West."

The West, Mr. Putin elaborated, was at the root of Russia's serious problems. In particular, the West had imposed on Russia heavy sanctions after what Mr. Putin called "the Crimea Spring," that is, Russia's illegal formal annexation of Crimea on 16 March 2014. Mr. Putin added that, even without "the Crimea Spring," the West would have found some other expedient to block "Russia's growing possibilities." For the goal of the West was to "drag Russia towards a Yugoslavian scenario of disintegration and dismemberment with all the tragic consequences for the Russian people." This was just like what Hitler wanted to do, Mr. Putin claimed, namely "to destroy Russia and to push [what was left of] Russia back behind the Ural mountains."²³ He claimed, further, that the illegal *coup d'état* in Ukraine on 21 February 2014, when Mr. Yanukovitch abandoned Kyiv, and the situation in the east of Ukraine, was the "exact confirmation of our position [that is, of the present Russian analysis]." The fundamental problem of the West, and especially of the Europeans,²⁴ Mr. Putin said, was their "long ago having forgotten their national pride" and their having understood their "sovereignty as too great a luxury." For Russia, however, "the question of sovereignty is an absolute necessary condition for its existence." From this analysis, Mr. Putin continued, it follows that Crimea is "a sacred cause." Moreover, a city like Sebastopol, where the Tsar Vladimir converted to Christianity, can be compared, he claimed, to "the Temple Mount for Jews and Muslims." After sketching a number of measures designed to counter the disastrous effects of the sanctions on the Russian economy, Mr. Putin returned to what he considered the finally most effective measure of all to stop the worsening of the crises. That measure is the exaltation of patriotic sentiment.

Now, much has been written about just what Mr. Putin's current ideology might be, that is, his beliefs, ways of thinking, and programmatic categories. But before trying to articulate a short description of that ideology, we do well to turn

immediately to an opposed set of beliefs, the ways of thinking, and programmatic categories of Mr. Poroshenko.

On 19 January 2015, Mr. Poroshenko delivered an important address at the University of Zurich. Pro-Russian supporters interrupted his lecture on numerous occasions with cries of “I am Donbass,” in allusion to the “I am Charlie” cries in France after the tragic events in Paris less than two weeks earlier. Immediately after the lecture, Mr. Poroshenko gave an interview to journalists from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Le Monde*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. The interview was then published on 21 January 2014. The title was “The Frontline for Defending Europe’s Values is Ukraine.”²⁵ Although brief, this interview provides us with some initial indications of Mr. Poroshenko’s set of beliefs at the time, his ways of thinking, and programmatic categories, which, if necessary, could be elaborated with help from Ukrainian specialists in political theory and political science.²⁶

Thus, at the very beginning of his interview Mr. Poroshenko made a point of saying that he believes in God. Indeed, he seemed to imply that, although having no confidence in Mr. Putin, he himself not just believes in God; he has confidence in God. What exactly Mr. Poroshenko meant by this juxtaposition between his belief and confidence in God and his lack of confidence in Mr. Putin, I do not know. Mr. Poroshenko went on to deplore the fact that the first Minsk accords were being regularly violated. He noted nonetheless that the relative success of the sanctions imposed on Russia were keeping Russia at the negotiating table. But a journalist intervened and reported that, according to Moscow media, despite Mr. Putin’s constructive propositions a few days prior, Mr. Poroshenko had rejected these propositions. Mr. Poroshenko immediately interrupted to say that this Moscow story was “false.” He then went on to give his own, much more nuanced account of how his Ukrainian government had responded positively but with requests for more detail.

This detail is worth recalling because it underlines a very important difference in the two opposed ways of thinking of Mr. Putin and Mr. Poroshenko. On the evidence of a number of different

events since the start of the subversion of Crimea, Mr. Putin has repeatedly quite categorically asserted one thing, and then, not much later, just as categorically asserted the opposite. One result has been the realization on the part of many experienced Western diplomats that not just Mr. Putin but his Secretary of State, Mr. Lavrov, and the most important members of the extremely well-trained Russian diplomatic service as a whole, appear to have no hesitations about lying again and again if lying seems to them to be in the state's best interests. Lying seems to be part of their ideological and professional formation.²⁷ By interrupting his interlocutor in the interview to expostulate immediately, and without any preamble, "That's false," Mr. Poroshenko seemed not just to have been concerned by the regular disinformation practices of Russian diplomacy. He also seemed to have been very much concerned by Mr. Putin's overly frequent and completely unashamed apparent recourse to lying.

Besides some of Mr. Poroshenko's salient beliefs and ways of thinking, the basic categories he made use of in this interview and elsewhere are also revelatory. One key concept is that of what Mr. Poroshenko explicitly calls "territorial integrity." This expression refers to the nature and extent of state sovereignty. For Mr. Poroshenko, state sovereignty for Ukraine is exactly the same thing as state sovereignty for nation states making up the European Union today. That is, state sovereignty is not absolute as such—it does allow of external intervention for humanitarian reasons under certain international rules enforced by the United Nations—but it is certainly not otherwise to be limited by other nation states. Mr. Putin's idea of state sovereignty is that of an absolute state sovereignty that does not allow of external intervention even for humanitarian reasons. The evidence for this view includes Russia's repeated vetoes at the UN Security Council of very strongly supported resolutions to allow intervention on humanitarian grounds in Syria.

Another key concept for Mr. Poroshenko is his insistence on a rule of law entrenched by a properly elected constitutional majority. His announcement in this interview that, after his own legal election as president, he was organizing, by anticipation,

legislative elections so as to have, he hoped, what he called a “constitutional majority,” was evidence of this commitment to an independent legislature under the rule of law. He also explicitly stated: “I am ready for a national dialogue about the form of the state, whether unitary or federal, to be settled by a [properly conducted and observed] referendum.”

Finally, with regard to finances, Mr. Poroshenko also emphasized the following. The question of the survival of Ukraine he presented as a matter of constructing a law-abiding state and “a transparent financial system that will apply to oligarchs [himself included] just as much as to everyone else.” As evidence for the strength of his commitments to these views, Mr. Poroshenko cited his having signed an association agreement with the EU.

Not long after the interview, Mr. Poroshenko fired one of the most powerful Eastern oligarchs from a provincial governorship. He also ordered his then Prime Minister to replace an initial ten percent of all civil servants. He also pointed out that, from June 2014, Ukraine had no army, and hence at the time of the interview (January 2015), Ukraine had to build, as the new Ukrainian ambassador in Paris had already indicated, an army to defend itself.

Mr. Poroshenko closed the interview by saying that he was proud to have been in Paris on the occasion of the 11 January 2015 march after the terrorist attacks to demonstrate in the Paris streets for republican values. He said that “he needed a Ukraine that is free, independent, and democratic.” And he said finally that “values are more important than money.”

With these details in hand, perhaps we can now raise a challenge to the idea of impersonal reconciliation. We might put that challenge in the form of a dilemma. Either the goal of an impersonal reconciliation between these two ideologies as represented by Mr. Putin’s and Mr. Poroshenko’s sets of basic beliefs, ways of thinking, and programmatic criteria, may be mainly pursued by means of sustained and consequential reflection on basic ethical values; or an impersonal reconciliation may be mainly

pursued by means of sustained and consequential reflection on basic non-ethical values, whether political, economic, sociological, and so on. If impersonal reconciliation is pursued mainly through reflection on other kinds of basic values than basic ethical values, then, at least in the short and mid-term, such reconciliation can only fail, for the structures of the opposed ideologies in this case are such that conflicting ethical values are their most fundamental elements. That is, much empirical evidence is available to support the claim that there is no consensus on just what specific ethical values are most fundamental, whether in today's deeply fragmented Ukrainian post-Soviet society, or in Russia's deeply damaged post-Soviet society.

If, by contrast, impersonal reconciliation is pursued mainly through reflection on basic ethical values rather than on other kinds of basic values, then at least in the short and mid-term, such reconciliation must also fail. For properly philosophical understandings of ethical values, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe, appear today to be rather rare. In other words, in Ukraine's deeply relativistic intellectual circles, or in Russia's deeply fatalistic intellectual circles, no general consensus seems to be on hand concerning the nature, the kinds, the objectivity, and the roles of basic ethical values. But either the impersonal reconciliation of such opposed ideologies must be pursued through sustained and consequential reflection on basic ethical values, or it must be pursued by sustained and consequential reflection on other kinds of values, political, sociological, economic, and so on. In either case, however, at least in the short and mid-term, the impersonal reconciliation of these opposed ideologies can only fail. Something like this kind of dilemma is one basic challenge to the very idea of being able to reconcile such opposing ideologies as those of Mr. Putin and Mr. Poroshenko by articulating a consistent, fully compatible set of consensual basic ethical values.

IV. Interpersonal Reconciliation: Another Dilemma?

But suppose we turn aside from the idea of reaching an impersonal reconciliation of opposed ideologies. Suppose we focus more sharply now on the nature of interpersonal reconciliation. And suppose we also narrow the scope of our reflection from the larger problem of reaching a highly implausible impersonal reconciliation between leading Russian and Ukrainian ideologies, to the smaller one within Ukraine itself, of reaching reconciliation among Ukrainians regardless of native language, whether Russian or Ukrainian, and religion, whether Ukrainian Orthodox Christianity or Russian Orthodox Christianity. That is, suppose our subject now is reconciliation between mainly just those Ukrainian citizens who have accepted to continue to live in Ukraine, and just those Ukrainian citizens who have rejected living in Ukraine any longer and now want to live in the separatist Donbass. Within this restricted scope, what then still seems to call for further critical reflection about the nature of interpersonal reconciliation?

To begin, recall the mutually respectful, but also opposed, conceptions of interpersonal reconciliation at the November 2014 Paris meeting on the first anniversary of the Maidan event. On the one hand, as we noted above, Bishop B. Gudziak, as the convener of the meeting, spoke first. He spoke mainly of what we might loosely call here a religious or a theological or a spiritual form of interpersonal reconciliation. On the other hand, Ambassador O. Shamshur spoke mainly of what we might call here, again rather loosely, a secular or a laicized or a diplomatic form of interpersonal reconciliation. In turn, both Bishop H. Lhyna and Professor M. Marynovych returned mainly to Bishop Gudziak's religious perspective. And Professor A. Arjakovsky returned mainly to a secular perspective.²⁸

Is there, then, some tension between these two viewpoints on interpersonal reconciliation, between the religious and the secular perspectives? At first glance, perhaps, what makes for differences here is another dilemma. Perhaps this second dilemma is but an apparent one only, or perhaps it is overly

simplified. But what is this further dilemma? Here is one way that dilemma might go. The goal of a major reconciliation between these two large and opposed groups of Ukrainian citizens may be pursued either through secular, non-religious means or through parochial, religious ones. If major reconciliation is pursued mainly through non-religious means, then, at least in the short and mid-term, major reconciliation can only fail. For the structures of Ukrainian society—legal, political, and economic—whether in Ukraine without the Donbass or in the Donbass itself, remain demonstrably unreliable. If, by contrast, major reconciliation is pursued mainly through religious means, then at least in the short and mid-term, major reconciliation must also fail. For after ca. 70 years of Soviet rule, practicing religious Ukrainians are in the minority both in Ukraine and in the Donbass. And even where the Christian religion is sincerely practiced, the Christian religion in Ukraine remains often bitterly divided between Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Russian orthodoxy. But major reconciliation must be pursued by either secular, non-religious means or by religious, non-secular ones. In either case however, at least in the short and mid-term, the pursuits of major reconciliation can only fail.

Now, such a dilemma may remain, of course, just one more schoolboy exercise. For as I said a moment ago, this dilemma with reconciliation may be an apparent one only. However, when we look more carefully at the dilemma's structure, we will find that the dilemma as formulated, far from being an apparent one only, is a real one indeed. But then, as I also said a moment ago, perhaps this real dilemma is an overly simplified one. That is, perhaps it is based on misleading generalizations, or questionable assumptions, or basic ignorance of highly relevant factual elements. However, since I can only be an external observer, I am unable to answer the objection that such a dilemma is overly simplified. So I am constrained to leave the informed judgments about such a matter to others with far more competence and experience than mine.

V. The Point about Reconciliations

After some reflections, then, on what reconciliation is, and about the kinds of reconciliation, and now about two reconciliation dilemmas, just what is the main point about interpersonal reconciliation, whether religious or non-religious? Or at the very least, what is the apparent point? The apparent point would seem to be that, however desirable, the feasibility of interpersonal reconciliation requires, for its eventual even partial success, prior successes in the different areas of conciliation. Reconciliation depends on conciliation. That is, just as in the resolution of industrial disputes, reconciliation efforts are more or less successful as a function of prior successes in such conciliatory strategies as the building of trust through numerous practical measures.

But what would be some examples of such prior successes of conciliation that might properly support later sustained efforts at interpersonal reconciliation proper? Just here, it seems to me, is where some of the November 2014 suggestions come back into the discussion. Recall, then, my mentioning above four suggestions of Antoine Arjakovsky. He suggested the development of a common Ukrainian and Russian historical account, a consensus account that both French and German, as well as Polish and German, historians have already reached. He suggested the necessity today for making historically explicit the central role in Ukrainian history of a moral consciousness. Specifically, with respect to Ukrainian and Russian relations in France, he also suggested much more active collaboration in France between the two immigrant communities of the Ukrainian and the Russian diasporas.²⁹ And finally, he suggested the importance of Ukrainian and Russian journalists being able to work together on the institution and operation of a new joint French TV channel, on the model of the very successful French-German Arte channel.

Such practical measures, and other similar ones, concerning especially fiscal matters,³⁰ strike me as, among other things, just the kinds of conciliatory measures that might properly

support later concerted efforts, both secular and religious, to bring about reconciliation among those who still are and wish to remain Ukrainian citizens, whether Ukrainian or Russian speakers, whether non-religious or religious, whether Ukrainian Orthodox Christians or Russian Orthodox Christians. As for those who no longer wish to be Ukrainian citizens, the possibilities for successful conciliation and reconciliation may, however necessary eventually, right now be simply highly unlikely.

ENVOI: RECONCILIATION AND CONCILIATION

In concluding, I would like to call attention to two puzzling epigraphs I placed at the beginning of this paper. The first, from a review of a book by Adam Michnik,³¹ reads, “Why should East Europeans be asked to forgive before a reckoning with the past, including a legal one, is undertaken? . . . How is it possible to attain reconciliation—a term that calls for close scrutiny—in the absence of repentance? . . . How can one ask the former victims to remain silent?” And the second, from St. Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians, is but a phrase. It reads, “. . . the word (the *logos*) of reconciliation,” a phrase I have used as the title of this chapter. In asking how former victims can remain silent, we need to remember that, before Paul’s Greek *logos* is interpreted, it must, at least partly, be understood philosophically. That is, the Greek *logos* is a natural philosophical word, the churches tell us, for what anything whatever is, way before any human standpoint; it is the Word, the Son of God. But the truth is that, at least in the contentious case of interpersonal reconciliation, many of us do not seem to be able to gain access to one supernatural word of reconciliation without passing, however imperfectly, and tiresomely, by the many natural words of conciliation.

Endnotes: Essay Three

¹ A short version of this essay was presented as an invited paper at the international conference on “Ukrainian Reconciliation Projects and the Future of Europe” held at the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine in

- Kyiv on 21-22 April 2015. Neither that version nor this newly revised and much longer version has been previously published.
- 2 V. Tismaneanu, "Review of A. Michnik, *The Trouble with History*," *TLS* (13 March 2015).
 - 3 ". . . ton *logon tês katallangês*" (my italics).
 - 4 On the history of the religious backgrounds in Ukraine, see Gudziak 2001.
 - 5 For some of the larger historical backgrounds of Ukraine, see A. Kappler, *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine* (Munich: Beck, 2014).
 - 6 On the current historical tensions, see A. Arjakovsky, *Russie / Ukraine: De la guerre à la paix?* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2014).
 - 7 Cf. the three volumes of the *Histoire / Geschichte* manuals for the French lycées and the German gymnasia, co-published in French and German by Nathan in Paris and Klett in Stuttgart.
 - 8 See his recently translated book first published in French some ten years ago, *The Way: Religious Thinkers of the Russian Emigration in Paris and Their Journal, 1925-1940*, tr. J. Ryan (South Bend: IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).
 - 9 See *Testfall Ukraine: Europa und seine Werte*, ed. K. Raabe and M. Sapper (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2015).
 - 10 SOED 2007.
 - 11 Note that besides these two main uses, other uses of the expression "reconciliation" also occur, for example in accountancy, as in the reconciling of two different financial accounts; or, especially pertinent here, in theology, as in the reconciling of humanity with God.
 - 12 The two opposed ideas of political sovereignty are those of Mr. Putin's so-called "limited sovereignty" and of Mr. Poroschenko's state sovereignty entailing total territorial integrity. For an investigation of the different kinds of sovereignty, see McCormick 2014, 34-46; and P. McCormick, "Essential Sovereignities? Political, Ethical, Personal," *Eco-Ethics* 4 (2015), 93-106.
 - 13 See the reflections on the previous Ukrainian government of V. Yanukovych by the Yale historian of Eastern Europe, T. Snyder, "Ukraine: the New Dictatorship," in *The New York Review of Books* (20 February 2014, dated 23 January 2014); and Snyder, "Don't Let Putin Grab Ukraine," 2014.
 - 14 Cf. the observations of the historian and *Economist* journalist, T. Judah, in his two articles, "Ukraine: What Putin Has Won," *The New York Review of Books* (9 October 2014, dated 11 September 2014); and "The Specter Facing Ukraine," *The New York Review of Books* (23 October 2014, dated 24 September 2014).
 - 15 "*Ecoutez, je crois en Dieu*," Mr. Porochenko said in an interview with S. Kaufmann in *Le Monde* (21 January 2015), an interview also

published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and in *The Wall Street Journal*. “. . . Si vous demandez si j’ai confiance dans le président Poutine,” he continued, “je répondrai non.”

- ¹⁶ Cf. J.-P. Stroobants, “*La prudente réponse de l’UE à la propagande russe*,” *Le Monde* (28 March 2015). This well-informed article details the somewhat overlooked resolution of the 28 EU members states in their 19-20 March 2015 Brussels meeting to establish a well-staffed and well-funded “counter-propaganda” service to reply effectively to Russia’s enormous disinformation campaigns regarding Crimea and the Donbass interventions. (In 2014, Russia’s multi-language RT TV employed ca. 2000 people and had a budget of ca. 275 million euros).
- ¹⁷ An asterisked word marks word forms that linguists deem not acceptable or hypothetical, that is, one that “native speakers . . . see as contrary to usage” (P. H. Matthews, *The Oxford Dictionary of Linguistics*, 3rd ed. [Oxford: OUP, 2014], 30 and 5).
- ¹⁸ Cf. the various entries in the SOED 2007.
- ¹⁹ For one idea of the opposite of distrust, see B. Gudziak, “The Modality and Virtue of Trust,” in *Ethics in the Global World: Reflection on Civic Virtues*, ed. V. Turchynovskyy (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2013), 5-12.
- ²⁰ To situate the problem of this kind of reconciliation in a more global perspective, see M. Ignatieff, “The New World Disorder,” *The New York Review of Books* (25 September 2014, dated 27 August 2014); H. Kissinger, *World Order* (New York: Penguin, 2014), esp. 11-48 and 361-374; and F. Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay* (London: Profile Books, 2014), esp. 524-548.
- ²¹ Blackburn 2016, 235. Cf. the ordinary general sense of ideology as “a system of ideas or way of thinking pertaining to a class or individual, esp. as a basis of some economic or political theory or system, regarded as justifying actions and esp. to be maintained irrespective of events” (SOED 2007).
- ²² Besides reports on BBC World News and in *The Economist*, *Die Zeit*, *La Stampa*, *The New York Times*, and the English language edition of *Asahi Shimbun*, I rely here mainly on the article of 6 December 2014, “*M. Poutine impute la crise à l’Occident*” by *Le Monde*’s resident Moscow correspondent at the time, I. Mandraud. The direct citations are my translations of I. Mandraud’s translation of explicit passages from the official Russian text of Mr. Putin’s address. See also her two follow-up reports, “*Moscou accuse l’Occident d’hystérie antirusse*” and “*La nouvelle doctrine militaire russe et la théorie du complot*” in *Le Monde* (29 January 2015) together with *Le Monde*’s editorial on the same date, “*Ukraine: Poutine et la politique du pire*.”

- ²³ For a cogently argued opposing view of possible parallels between Hitler's policies some seventy years ago and NATO's policies today, see "De Dantzig à Donetsk, 1939-2014: Appel des intellectuels polonaise aux Européens," *Le Monde* (2 September 2014).
- ²⁴ On the European Union and not NATO as the main enemy of Mr. Putin's Russia, see B. Najman, "La Russie considère l'Union européenne son véritable ennemi," *Le Monde* (22-23 February 2015).
- ²⁵ See "La ligne de front pour défendre les valeurs de l'Europe, c'est l'Ukraine," in *Le Monde* (21 January 2015), which I rely on here.
- ²⁶ See, for example, the analyses of the Kyiv Mohyla Academy specialists, T. Ogarkova and V. Yermolenko, "Un combat pour l'Europe," in *Le Monde* (19 September 2014); and of the Ukrainian specialist on national identity, V. Kulyk, widely quoted in B. Vitkine, "Le nouveau visage de l'identité ukrainienne," *Le Monde* (22-23 February 2015).
- ²⁷ I am grateful to Dr. Klaus Bohr, a knowledgeable former high-ranking German diplomat, for discussions about Russian diplomatic training and practice with special respect to the current tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
- ²⁸ Throughout I say "mainly" because each set of views showed an experienced awareness of the alternative perspectives on view. Moreover, I also characterize these perspectives loosely as religious and secular because the oppositions here are not narrowly logical, but broadly intellectual.
- ²⁹ See Arjakovski, *The Way*, 2014. Cf. P. L. Gavrilyuk, *Georges Florovsky and the Russian Religious Renaissance* (Oxford; OUP, 2014).
- ³⁰ Cf. the detailed practical suggestions of George Soros in two of his *New York Review of Books* articles, "Wake Up, Europe!" (20 November 2014, dated 23 October 2014), and "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine" (5 February 2015, dated 7 January 2015). See also his article, "L'Europe doit sauver la nouvelle Ukraine," in *Le Monde* (24 October 2014).
- ³¹ A. Michnik, *The Trouble with History: Morality, Revolution, and Culture*, tr. I. Grudzinska Gross (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014). See his interview, "L'Ukraine est devenue un piège pour Poutine," in *Le Monde* (7 March 2015).