FIVE

# States and Migrants[1]

> [W]hat duties and what rights does a state have towards individuals seeking to enter the land over which it rules? The initial answer has to be that it must deal with them justly: it must give them their due. . . . To refuse help to others suffering from or threatened by injustice is to collaborate with that injustice, and so incur part of the responsibility for it.[2]

> When the river is not awake any more,
> the cloud above it, voices
> of the birds, calls:
> We shall not come any more—
>
> Then I'll kindle your light,
> that I cannot see, my hands
> I shall lay over it, close
> to the flame, that stayed
> upright reddened by so much night
> (like the castle that came down
> over the slope, in ruins,
> like a winged snake
> of light through the river, like the hair
> of the Jewish child)
> and did not burn me.[3]

## INTRODUCTION

Some central instances of twentieth-century European culture, I will be suggesting here, may provide resources for rearticulating several major problems in European societies today. Moreover, they may do so in just such ways as to incorporate, rather

than to exclude, the authentically spiritual dimensions of how things actually are.[4] We begin with some historical and empirical remarks about one of the central problems confronting the newly re-emerging Europe. We then consider several intermediate ethical principles that presumably must be part of any genuine solution to such a problem.[5]

When confronted, however, with the substantial political constraints that such philosophical terms and concepts inevitably encounter, difficulties with the contents and formulations of these perhaps overly general principles appear. Resolving these difficulties may benefit from retrieving certain linguistic and conceptual resources on hand in elements of twentieth-century European literary culture. Many such resources are to be found in "the distinctive European high modernist poetry of suffering and passage."[6]

Future European social policies, if they are to be cognitively reliable and politically acceptable, must derive from the fundamental historical, ethical, and spiritual values of persons in community.[7] Representing these values, however, to the now more than 500 million diverse people living in Europe[8] requires drawing on more than exclusively social scientific, juridical, administrative, and philosophical vocabularies for their proper articulation and adoption. And here, I will be suggesting, may be found a novel, fruitful role for some of the historically charged, richly figurative, cognitively significant, affectively moving, imaginatively liberating, and spiritually resonant expressions and concepts on view in certain masterpieces of twentieth-century European culture. Several of these include polyvalent terms[9] that may effectively allow us to rearticulate, not unsatisfactorily, for our own times several basic, true, ethical intuitions in sometimes figurative, and not just literal, idioms.

## I. Economic Immigrants in the European Union

Consider one question that continues to confront unsuccessful attempts to achieve sufficient political consensus about an eventually harmonized European social policy.[10] Do the basic human

rights of immigrants from economically less-developed European Union countries include the freedom to migrate to more developed EU countries, where they have far better chances for leading lives of greater fundamental well-being?[11] To take one concrete example, think of some of Romania's Roma children continuing to immigrate to France.[12] (Note that the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines "children" as, generally, all persons from their ages of birth up to their 18th birthday but not above.[13]) For now, however, we need to narrow our scope so as to exclude from our considerations not only non-European immigrants, but also immigrants from non-EU countries generally. And we need to put the emphasis on awarding persons their due, on justice.[14]

The diverse phenomena of European immigration are difficult to comprehend.[15] And very different and regularly changing immigration policies of most of the so far 28 EU states testify to the large differences of opinion as to how such an important question is to be answered. Yet any eventual consensus about, specifically, a harmonized EU social policy[16] cannot avoid including as an essential element not only a common EU policy on equitable access to health, education, employment, and to many other social dimensions of shared central concern, but also a common EU policy on immigration.[17] Achieving such a consensus will necessarily involve continuing the protracted current debates among various stakeholders about what social, moral, and ethical principles should form the bases of such a unified EU social policy.[18] Ultimately, many of those further debates will come to focus on just how we may properly be said to know such principles.[19] Given the nature of such issues, some philosophers should play a modest but continuing role in these debates.[20]

Sir Michael Dummett (1925-2011) argued cogently that the basic human rights of persons include the right to what he calls "first class citizenship." "The truth within the principle of national self-determination," he writes, "is that everyone has the right to live in a country in which he and others of a group to which he belongs are not persecuted, oppressed or discrimi-

nated against, in which his religion, language, race and culture are not reviled or held up to contempt and in which he can fully identify himself with the state under whose sovereignty that country falls. Whether that holds good of where he is living depends in part upon the conduct of that state, and in part on the behavior of its people: it is ultimately decided by whether that individual feels that he fully belongs. This may be called the right to be a first-class citizen."[21] But however applicable such a notion of first-class citizenship might be for those European immigrants seeking asylum, some critics of an eventual harmonization of specifically EU immigration laws as a necessary element in a common EU social policy would quickly retort. Their counter claim might be that this speculative notion of those said to be denied first-class citizenship does not apply to the majority of EU citizens immigrating to EU countries today on economic grounds only.[22] Further considerations than merely a so-called "right" to first-class citizenship, they would insist, are surely in order.

Dummett himself went on to address a related question about general European immigration today. "[W]hat duties and what rights," he asked, "does a state have towards individuals seeking to enter the land over which it rules?" And he continues, "The initial answer has to be that it must deal with them justly: it must give them their due."[23] That is, if immigrants have certain rights, some states have certain duties, and conversely. But, again, some critics might well reply that this assertion, while not incorrect, remains too general. In another passage, however, Dummett offered a more particular version of his perhaps overly general claim. "To refuse help to others suffering from or threatened by injustice," including those suffering from the economic injustices of what he describes as "savage inequalities of wealth and opportunity," is, he claims, "to collaborate with that injustice, and so incur part of the responsibility for it."[24] Others however may reasonably disagree on the grounds that making this claim is to move from strictly individual to communal concerns, and that such a move, especially in this particular case, remains controversial.

Dummett's own position is clear. "[I]f an individual has a duty to give help to those in need when they ask him for it," Dummett observes, "he also has a duty not to deny them the opportunity to ask. The same applies to states. They have an internationally recognized duty towards refugees: they therefore have a duty to do nothing to prevent refugees from reaching their borders."[25] Fine for refugees, someone might object, but what about economic immigrants?

Similarly, many EU parliamentarians today could argue effectively against such a position on at least three kinds of grounds. First, the determination of the precise relationships between natural rights and human rights still eludes professional consensus.[26] Moreover, any consensus about what constitutes the basic principles of distributive justice at the level of nation states remains elusive.[27] Furthermore, the nature of the responsibilities of nation states with respect to international justice is unclear.[28]

Note that the underlying issue in these kinds of ongoing debates today in the EU parliament about immigration is twofold. The first aspect of the actual immigration issue is whether some persons have a basic human right to immigrate to a place of their own choosing, whether that place be in Europe or elsewhere. And the second aspect is whether at least all member states of the EU should recognize EU member states as having not just a legal but a moral obligation to honor that right even when the grounds for that assertion are economic only.

## II. Collective Ethical Intuitions?

One of the most fundamental challenges here is to find the appropriate verbal and conceptual resources for rearticulating less unsatisfactorily common ethical intuitions in EU societies about the principled bases of an eventually harmonized EU social policy in such ways as to achieve consensus more readily. But what might such "principled bases" look like? Consider briefly a list of intermediate moral and ethical intuitionist principles. Some revised version of these kinds of middle-level principles (which de-

rive from very general principles of moral rightness and ethical goodness, and from which in turn many subordinate principles can be derived) might well make up what we have so far been calling all too generally "principled bases for an eventual common European social policy." By way of example only, here are ten rather particular "principled bases," listed in no intended hierarchy.[29]

1. Prohibition of injury and harm. We should not injure or harm people [or member states].

2. Veracity. We should not lie.

3. Promissory fidelity. We should keep our promises.

4. Justice. We should not treat people unjustly and should contribute to rectifying injustice and to preventing future injustice.

5. Reparation. We should make amends for our wrong-doing.

6. Beneficence. We should contribute to the good (roughly, the well-being) of other people [and member states].

7. Gratitude. We should express gratitude, in deed or at least in words of thanks, in a way that befits good things done for us by other people [and member states], where, other things being equal, our obligation is stronger if what was done for us was not owed to us.

8. Self-improvement. We should develop or at least sustain our distinctively human capacities [both as individual persons and as communities].

9. Enhancement and preservation of freedom. We should contribute to increasing or at least preserving the freedom of persons [and communities], giving priority to removing restraints over enhancing opportunities.

10. Respectfulness. We should, in the manner of our relations with other people [and member states], treat them respectfully.

Suppose we agree that an eventual common EU social policy must have principled bases something like the above. Then reaching political consensus about such principled bases requires clarity about just how one may properly come to know such principled bases. One common and generally understandable source of such knowledge is moral and ethical intuition. Nonetheless, serious disagreements arise about just what such intuitions are

and about their different degrees. Moreover, even with some clarity on these issues already on hand, at least in some ongoing work in contemporary moral epistemology, reaching an eventual political consensus on principled bases deriving from moral and ethical intuitions alone remains both very difficult and yet quite urgent.[30]

Among the key factors that make this difficult task urgent are the rapidly accelerating levels and different degrees of individual and social suffering in the EU.[31] For since the middle of the 1980's, many EU countries have already showed continuing increases in social inequalities in comparison with other states in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[32] What makes this task so challenging is the simple fact that no such harmonized social policy is possible[33] without achieving some not just philosophical agreement about the moral and ethical values that must lie at the basis of such policies, but effective political consensus as well.[34]

In short, the European Union faces many difficult challenges in the present tumultuous international geopolitical, economic, and social conjuncture. One of these challenges is forging a common EU immigration policy. And one of the EU's tasks today is constructing a common EU social policy for all persons living in the member states now and in the future that would include not just immigration policy, but other social issues as well, such as employment, health, poverty, and so on.[35]

## III. EU Immigration and Human Rights

Concerning the human rights of immigrant children in general, recall first the United Nations formulations. On 20 November 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in the General Assembly Resolution 44/25. The Convention included no fewer than fifty-four Articles. Despite persisting differences in the judicial treatment of children, the Convention nonetheless reinforced the widespread conviction in Europe and elsewhere that proper protection and promotion of children's freedoms and rights require regular exter-

nal intervention. Such protection and promotion could not be left entirely to the quite limited autonomy, if any, of the children themselves. Now, more than twenty years later, although much progress has been accomplished, very much remains to be done.[36]

The Convention covers both the material and the non-material well-being of children. It calls upon member states to provide children with a decent standard of living, education, health and housing. And it also calls upon them to pay special attention to disadvantaged and disabled children. Among a number of other common views concerning important matters, the Convention holds, for example, that "the states party to this convention take appropriate measures so that a child, who seeks to obtain the status of refugee or who is considered as a refugee in virtue of the rules and procedures of applicable international or national laws, whether the child is accompanied by parents or is unaccompanied altogether, benefits from the protection and the humanitarian assistance desired so as to allow him or her to enjoy the rights that the present Convention and other international instruments relative to human rights or of a humanitarian character to which the said states are parties recognize."[37] It also holds that states should, in case of need, provide material assistance and support programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.[38]

If these are examples of the prescriptions of the United Nations Convention, what is the present status of the EU countries' ongoing applications of these formulations? Despite the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, many EU states still do not necessarily provide for the effective guarantee of these rights. That is, although many EU states have indeed approved the UN Convention in affixing their signatures, almost as many have failed so far to implement the Convention fully. For example, increasing restrictions in France on the reunification of children with their parents and other family members do not appear to be in conformity with the relevant articles of the Convention. Moreover, very recent changes in French immigration laws have drastically reduced

the number of children eligible for legal entry into France on the grounds of family reunification. And yet, many children urgently requiring proper health care in France are illegal "residents," if that is the correct administrative term for many chronically sick street children sleeping every night around the *Gare du Nord*. Still more, these new laws also include a number of measures that increase the ease with which poor immigrant children who are in France illegally may be expelled, with or without their parents. All of these restrictions have a major impact on the health of children and on their supposedly guaranteed access to proper health services in full conformity with the 1989 Convention, to which France is a signatory nation.

The continuing incapacities of the United Nations and other international organizations have demonstrated repeatedly that achieving even partial consensus in ethical matters is extremely difficult. For, among other things, our common moral and ethical intuitions about the nature of these values all too often differ appreciably. With respect to children's human rights in the EU, leaders meeting at Laeken in Belgium in 2001 elaborated a first set of eighteen "indicators" of social performance. They designed these indicators to serve the EU member countries in their new attempts to develop so-called "multi-faceted approaches" to resolving deeply entrenched and quite serious persistent social problems. Child immigration is one such problem. This initial work drew on a substantial body of social science research over the previous generation of scholarship. Subsequently, various expert commissions carefully reconsidered and redefined the nature of the initial indicators. And these commissions have successively reformulated, multiplied, and substantially improved the indicators in many ways.

Subsequent European Council (EC) meetings confirmed the basic importance of the "Laeken indicators" for constructing an effective EU social inclusion policy.[39] These concerns for basing eventual common policies on reliable indicators became more urgent with the complications affecting European social policies that derived from the rapid expansion of the EU, as well as with the worldwide financial and economic crisis begin-

ning in the United States with the collapse of the huge Lehman Brothers New York investment bank in September 2008. A general concern emerged for developing child-focused indicators.

The evolving contexts for further meetings of the EC[40] have included the effects of globalization on the growing awareness for the necessity of concerted action among countries to solve certain transnational problems, the United Nations increasing difficulties to realize its September 2000 Millennium Development Goals, and the necessities for the EU to review the role specifically of the social dimension in the course of preparing its revised Lisbon Strategy, which heads of government and the EC of the EU had first adopted in Lisbon in March 2000.[41]

Given, however, all the political, social, and economic dimensions involved in properly designing a proper and common EU social policy that would incorporate specific concerns for safeguarding immigrant children's human rights, exactly to what extent should such concerns involve any reflections on relations between some twentieth-century European cultural works and some twenty-first century European social problems, between art then and life now?

## IV. Ethical Situations and Intuitions

Many genuine and important connections between art and life seem evident yet deeply puzzling. That is, both reasonably evaluating one's appreciative understandings of what some literary works of art may represent on the one hand, and, on the other, rationally making use of such representations in leading one's everyday life more satisfactorily—in more completely doing what is right and good—remains problematic. Work in social and cultural history continues to show how some literary representations—for example, representations of several Victorian fictional models for what counts as leading an exemplary young woman's life—indeed connect strongly with some Victorian young women actually having relied on such fictional models for leading their exemplary lives. Yet specifying just what kinds of sense and significance thoughtful readers may properly come

to see in fictional representations of particular literary states of affairs, and then to act on, remains elusive.[42]

Perhaps someone may indeed act rationally in choosing to imitate, in her own life, some of the admirable moral ideas and ethical ideals she has intuited in the actions of certain fictional characters on exhibit in some novels, poems, and plays. Today, we would probably also have to add: on exhibit in some popular songs and, especially, in films. But is it also reasonable for her to believe that what she has seen as morally and ethically exemplary in these fictional representations is indeed objectively the case?[43] This kind of question arises in acute form when what is at issue is dealing rationally and reasonably with different types of avoidable personal suffering, as, for example, in many cases of immigrant children in the EU today. For here, perhaps more than anywhere else, our grasp of what is at stake for us as persons in such, perhaps, vicarious human suffering is necessarily undermined by our unreliable individual and communal capacities to act on such apprehensions—our fragility, our vulnerability, our absences, our uncertainties—in a word, our contingency.[44]

Much of the twentieth-century's distinctive European high modernist poetry of suffering and passage, what I have called the poetry of "a negative sublime"[45]—think of some of the work of Celan, Mandelstam, Milosz, or, earlier, of Rilke, Akhmatova, Montale—present thoughtful readers with a deeply meditative evocation of the almost unbearable burdens even today of recent European history. More simply, this work presents its persistent readers with poetic and, hence, essentially verbal articulations of what we might call generally a particular kind of moral state of affairs, one that specifically insists on a personal response on the part of its readers.

But what makes a state of affairs moral? And just how, if at all, does the problem of child immigration in the EU today involve not just economic, political, and social states of affairs, but moral and ethical ones as well? Generally, most persons already have a good idea of what makes an actual state of affairs moral. For, while perhaps not being able to define such situations, most persons can readily give examples of them—my seeing a child

falling into a river, your hearing a pregnant woman at the supermarket crying out for help, some situations on view in documentary films about still unmastered, but today still all too ominously insistent, past evils.[46] After reflection, what would seem to make such states of affairs moral is the presence of certain salient intrinsic and objective moral elements.[47] Franz Brentano (1838-1917)—the teacher of both Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), who was the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw school of Polish analytical philosophy, and of Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), the founder of Polish realist phenomenology—termed such moral objective and intrinsic moral elements "moral substances."[48] When taken generally and not just in its technical Aristotelian senses, such talk of moral substance here may prove helpful.[49]

But how do we grasp what it is that makes such states of affairs moral? Some moral philosophers have argued that we grasp such moral substances, such objective intrinsic moral values, by directly and immediately intuiting them. Insight, as it were, enables persons to "see into" such states of affairs and, as it were, see their moral substance. This already partly-classical view (Brentano was both a distinguished Aristotelian scholar as well as a major figure in phenomenological psychology and ethics[50]) derives today mainly from eighteenth-century British work, especially by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), Adam Smith (1723-1790), and David Hume (1711-1776), on the so-called "moral sense."[51] According to the moral sense view, thanks to an inner capacity,[52] some persons usually come to admire and then to judge certain states of affairs as virtuous and morally good, and to despise and then to judge certain other states of affairs as vicious and morally bad. That is, most persons have the capacity to feel some things to be good or bad, whether the feeling be well-founded or not, rather than just to reason to a conclusion that these things are indeed good or bad.

Note that, in any particular case, the feelings of such a moral sense are well-founded when they arise from so-called "disinterested" reflections on the morally good or morally bad tendencies of things. And note, too, that the moral "sense" is not to be understood as analogous to any physical sense, like the sense

of vision or the sense of hearing, that delivers particular sensations. Rather the moral “sense” is said to be like, say, a sense of propriety or a sense of tact that results, not in particular sensations, but in particular attitudes that accommodate formulation as propositions.[53]

Not all moral states of affairs are like the examples we have just adduced. For some moral states of affairs, while genuinely incorporating objective intrinsic moral values, require no particular response on the part of those persons who are said actually to intuit these values. I recognize and respect the value of the life of a child anywhere without that value necessarily always imposing itself on me in a special way, as it does in the case of a child falling into a river and in just such a way as requiring of me an immediate response on my part to safeguard that value. So how does a person determine just when a moral state of affairs requires such an immediate response? Some would reply: by properly describing and then elucidating the situation at issue. These descriptions and elucidations can be direct and contemporaneous, or they may be indirect and after the fact. Distinguishing these different cases briefly proves useful.

In the case, let us say, of my neighbor’s child, Rachel, falling from her tricycle on the grassy path into the Vistula streaked with light at sundown, I may call out immediately for help, say, to a policeman standing nearby. I cry out “Help! Save the child who just fell into the river!” And the policeman jumps into the river and tries to save the child from drowning. That is, I don’t just wordlessly gesticulate towards the drowning child: I describe the situation verbally—a child has just fallen into the river. And I don’t just exclaim “Help!” I also elucidate the situation verbally—I call out to the policeman in such a way as to imply clearly that a child will lose its life unnecessarily by drowning if no one tries to rescue the child and preserve her life. And so on. This is the contemporaneous and direct case.

Perhaps the policeman in fact succeeds in saving Rachel’s life. Back at home after the dramatic event, let us now say that I try to explain to myself why I believed that the policeman was the one to attempt that rescue rather than me. I write down my

confused thoughts. I describe the situation as plainly, as completely, and as best as I can remember it. I spell out clearly what seemed so pressing in the situation. I distinctly separate my reaction from that of the policeman. Moreover, besides describing the situation distinctly, clearly, and plainly, I try to elucidate just what intrinsic and objective aspects of the child's situation seemed to impose themselves on me as requiring an immediate response, such that I would have imperatively felt obliged to jump in after the child myself if no policeman had been on hand. And so on. This is the indirect and after the fact case.[54]

In each case, we have to do with intuitions. That is, determining just which situations are genuine instances of moral and ethical situations entailing an immediate response depends very often on how we understand ethical intuitions. What then are ethical intuitions? In general, the notion of "intuition" is difficult to specify. Dictionaries do not help enough. For example, the latest *Oxford Dictionary of English* definition of intuition unhelpfully appeals to "instinct" and to the unclear distinction between the "conscious" and the unconscious: "intuition," the dictionary says confusedly, is "the ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning."[55]

Evidently, intuition is more than one thing. Today, many psychologists understand intuition generally as a capacity for "arriving at [reliable] decisions or conclusions without explicit or conscious processes of reasoned thinking."[56] For most philosophers now writing in English, intuition is understood more particularly as "an alleged direct relation, analogous to visual seeing, between the mind and something abstract and so not accessible to the senses."[57] In particular, most moral philosophers now writing in English take ethical intuition as the direct awareness of basic moral truths expressed in propositions arising from judgments, whose contents are unlike any empirical or other kind of judgment, and which are objectively true or false.[58] Such general views, however, require close critical scrutiny, for each turns out, on examination, to be problematic.

Some rather recent philosophical work, however, has taken up freshly many of the traditional problems affecting different

philosophical notions of moral intuitionism. A good sense of this recent work on moral intuitionism emerges from such representative summary remarks as the following: "Moral intuition has an authority of its own; but it can be refined, and must sometimes be corrected, by theoretical reflection. Intuition must also respond both to the pressure of obligation [i.e., what I suggest we call "moral intuitionism"] and to the incentive of ideals [i.e., what I suggest we call "ethical intuitionism"].[59]

Our central interest here lies in underlining the distinction of moral and ethical intuitions as "just seeing" moral obligations and ethical values, and such intuitions as also requiring "corrective reflection."[60] Perhaps these brief remarks on both moral situations and ethical intuitions may help clarify sufficiently for now just what we are talking about when we suggest retrieving from the twentieth-century European high modernist poetry of suffering and passage conceptual resources for rearticulating some of the most basic insights that must eventually inform any principled consensus about a common EU social policy. But return now to child immigration in the EU.[61]

## V. Rearticulating Philosophical Intuitions

"Our obligations require us to reach certain destinations on life's journey," one contemporary moral philosopher has written recently, "and they prohibit others; our ideals call us to take harder paths and to go further than we must. Along the way, the manner of our actions—their style, their timing, their sensitivity to others—is also governed by obligations and ideals that reflect the value of persons. A sound moral theory integrates these two kinds of normative sources, the obligatory and the ideal. It guides moral judgment, it stimulates moral imagination, and it clarifies the values that we seek to fulfil. In these and other ways, it can help us to achieve the good in doing the right."[62]

These philosophical reflections are thoughtful. At the same time, understanding such reflections implies knowledge of certain philosophical backgrounds that most ordinary Europeans completely lack. For example, the distinction here between

moral obligations and ethical ideals may prove quite helpful for moving thoughtful discussion towards consensus about the rights and responsibilities of EU countries with respect to EU child immigration.

But understanding satisfactorily the pertinence of such a distinction relies on properly grasping the uses of such elusive philosophical concepts here as "moral judgment," "moral imagination," moral and ethical values, "the person," "the right," and "the good." Yet without properly grasping such matters, how are EU parliamentarians to resolve their disagreements about just what should constitute an objectively principled basis for a common EU immigration policy? And for most EU parliamentarians, to arrive at such an understanding is practically impossible.

Now recall some of the central lines from one of the twentieth-century European high modernist poetic masterpieces, a work of great conceptual and linguistic accomplishment about many things including moral, ethical, and indeed spiritual values. In 1944, with the outcome of a world war still uncertain and the falling V-2 bombs driving strangers into forced intimacy in the subways and air raid shelters of London, the failed poetic dramatist, volunteer fire watcher, and church warden, T. S. Eliot, published, *Four Quartets*.[63] Eliot begins his long poem with a garden scene, a scene that indirectly evokes for most ordinary readers the Garden of Paradise. Earlier, Eliot had begun his modernist masterpiece, *The Waste Land,* with representations of the memory of a girl in a garden of hyacinths, "the hyacinth girl." Then, the poem's speaker averred, " . . . I knew nothing, / Looking into the heart of light, the silence." Now, Eliot begins his *Four Quartets* with the representation of a rose garden, whose door was never opened. And the speaker once again, as in *The Waste Land*, although in a very different sense, talks of knowing nothing, more exactly, of not knowing at all.

Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage which we did not take
Towards the door we never opened
Into the rose-garden. My words echo
Thus, in your mind.

But to what purpose
Disturbing the dust on a bowl of rose-leaves
I do not know.[64]

Now, we may notice the thoughtful character of these poetic and not just philosophical reflections. Unlike, however, the difficulties above with the philosophical reflection about moral ideas and ethical ideals that derive from quite technical and professional contexts, thoughtful readers here seem to be almost immediately at home with these less technical uses of language. Far from requiring a small library of books in contemporary moral philosophy for their understanding, ordinary readers and listeners would seem to find the language and notions here somehow profoundly familiar—“My words,” the poet says, “echo thus in your memory.”

Understanding satisfactorily such poetic expressions, of course, may well require further discussion—exactly what is the “purpose” the poet says that we are struggling to achieve? But were that purpose to include articulating the principled bases of a common EU immigration policy, then moving such discussion towards eventual consensus would seem much less problematic than in the former case. For here, such deeply resonant expressions as “the passage we did not take,” “the door we never opened,” “to what purpose,” and especially the concluding phrase “I do not know,” are but minor instances of so much of the ethically and spiritually charged diction and concepts that so many are already antecedently familiar with. Unlike the strictly philosophical expression, these more familiar expressions, however vague, require no determinate definitions, while being full of suggestiveness for conceptual innovation.[65] These definitions, with their necessary and sufficient conditions, we cannot do without in the social sciences. But experience demonstrates that often, with just such essential indeterminacies, even our most contentious EU parliamentarians can arrive at appropriate consensus about many of the most substantial of matters, like the principled bases for a common EU immigration policy.

I would like to conclude here with perhaps a more persuasive example of the speculative suggestion throughout this pre-

sentation. That suggestion has been that some central instances of European culture may provide still overlooked conceptual and linguistic resources for rearticulating several major problems in European societies today in just such ways as to incorporate, rather than to exclude, the authentically spiritual dimensions of how things actually are.

## ENVOI: DEALING JUSTLY

Here, once again, then, is one of the stringent philosophical reflections of Michael Dummett on immigration. "[W]hat duties and what rights does a state have towards individuals seeking to enter the land over which it rules? The initial answer has to be that it must deal with them justly: it must give them their due. . . . To refuse help to others suffering from or threatened by injustice is to collaborate with that injustice, and so incur part of the responsibility for it."

Dummett was surely right. EU citizens today, including EU parliamentarians, have a moral, ethical, and, indeed, spiritual obligation and responsibility to help others, including European child immigrants, such as Roma children from Romania and elsewhere in the EU. But granted that responsibility, just what are the uses of language and the range of concepts that might allow such culturally diverse EU politicians to reach effective consensus about principled common policies for helping at least those children?

Consider just one of the many texts we might recommend to their studious attention. And do not leave unnoticed the linguistic and conceptual resources of its deliberately open-ended notions and finally indeterminate descriptions. In October 1961, the German poet of Polish and Lithuanian ancestry, Johannes Bobrowski, composed his "Latvian Autumn." His poem, however, is not so much a poem but something much more indefinite—call it here "a piece," like a piece of burned and broken masonry. Bobrowski's piece is among the distinctive twentieth-century poems of suffering and passage that still resonate in the deeply troubled new century that now constitutes our own specifically European times.

More than ten years after his release in 1955 as one of the last-surviving German prisoners of war, still working forced labor in the Soviet coal mines of the Donets Basin in the deeply troubled Ukraine—and not far from what was then the Voronezh Front and the destruction of Operation Citadel at the Battle of Kursk that Osip Mandelstam unforgettably memoralized in his Voronezh poems—and less than four years from his premature death at the age of forty-eight in an East Berlin hospital—far from the shifting polyglot borders of his childhood and the classical and musical Baroque splendors of his youth amid the pre-war Koenigsberg cityscapes of Kant and Herder—, the poet, whose several works commemorate the sufferings of the eponymous Slavic peoples and settlements of the ancient region of Sarmatia between the Vistula and the Memel along the sandy, pine-streaked Baltic littoral, at last completed his still profoundly unsettling poem, "Latvian Autumn." The second part of his poem in one of its several English translations reads:

> When the river is not awake any more,
> the cloud above it, voices
> of the birds, calls:
> We shall not come any more—
>
> Then I'll kindle your light,
> that I cannot see, my hands
> I shall lay over it, close
> to the flame, that stayed
> upright reddened by so much night
> (like the castle that came down
> over the slope, in ruins,
> like a winged snake
> of light through the river, like the hair
> of the Jewish child)
> and did not burn me.[66]

Now even when we consider this piece as a whole, and even after many contextual readings against the complex backgrounds of Bobrowski's work and times, to which I have but alluded above, much here remains deeply evocative and profoundly enigmatic. What may perhaps be most important here

is the faint but real hope this masterpiece of European culture offers us of arriving at a fuller understanding of the meaning of the immensity of human suffering in the midst of, and in the terrible aftermaths of, what has been memorably called "the European civil wars,"[67] the wars that lie behind so much of today's continuing movements of people across Europe, a movement only partially to be understood in the truly impoverished political term of "immigration."

What seems promising is the hope of apprehending what has been at stake in the European twentieth-century, the bloodiest of centuries, and from now on in our new century being able to act accordingly. What is profoundly enigmatic is how we Europeans today might find another kind of liberation in breaking through to the fuller significance of such a vastness of evil that brought such suffering about and continues to do so without letting ourselves be opened out onto the spiritual dimension of how things truly are.

In the case of Johannes Bobrowski's poem, what are the appropriate uses of language for articulating such basic yet obscure moral and ethical matters apparently on view in this piece as the hazards of history, the indifference of nature, and the ineffaceable traces still among us of monstrous evils? Can such matters always be put plainly, clearly and distinctly? Can what is at stake in such matters always be put literally? Or, to capture what is essential in such matters, must we at times explore the insistent suggestiveness of our most persistent ethical intuitions with all the non-literal and the figurative resources of language as well? Central to argued yet meditative attempts to construe instances of the twentieth-century's distinctive poetry of suffering in such varied work as that of Yeats and Eliot, Valéry and Saint-John Perse, Rilke, Machado and Lorca, Mandelstam and Akhmatova, Ritsos and Montale, Celan and Milosz, Herbert and, as here, Bobrowski, is a basic ethical intuition. The ambiguous "subject" of pieces like these—what such pieces are about—is "a negative sublime," the still unthinkable immensities of suffering and of the overwhelming vastness of the forces that continue to wreak such suffering. Not improperly

"apprehending" such subjects—rightly fearing them but rightly grasping them nonetheless—would appear to require refashioning central connections between acting rightly and some basic construals of moral discourse, moral knowledge, and moral motivation. In particular, such connections would seem to require rethinking just what could even count in places like Europe and in times like ours for fashioning a rightly principled common way of doing justice, of rendering their due, to the so many displaced and wandering immigrants, like Rachel's children now so challengingly among us once again.

## Endnotes: Essay Five

1 This previously unpublished essay is a newly revised version of an invited paper first presented in shorter form at the European Congress of Philosophy on the theme "*Religion, Culture et Société: défi pour la philosophie aujourd'hui?*" held at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, 9-10 September 2010. The paper is previously unpublished

2 M. Dummett, *On Immigration and Refugees* (London: Routledge, 2001), 34.

3 J. Bobrowski, *Shadow Lands,* tr. R. and M. Mead (New York: New Directions, 1994), 148.

4 Cf. J. Cottingham, *The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value* (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 150-172.

5 For an alternative perspective from the standpoint of political theory, see Carens 2013, esp. 297-313.

6 I develop the sense and significance of this cardinal phrase in *Aspects Yellowing Darkly: Ethics, Intuitions, and the European High Modernist Poetry of Suffering and Passage* (Cracow: Jagellonian UP, 2010), where portions of these analyses also appear. For the empirical materials, I draw on some of the demographic and economic data and analyses assembled and analyzed in Bhalla and McCormick 2009.

7 See J. Macmurray's Gifford Lectures, "The Form of the Personal," delivered at the University of Glasgow in 1953 and 1954, and published later as *The Self as Agent* (London: Faber and Faber, 1957) and *Persons in Relation* (London: Faber and Faber, 1961).

8 The numbers are as of 1 January 2010, and were announced by the official European Office for Statistics, Eurostat, on 27 July 2010. For discussion, see M. Laronche, "*Le déclin démographique de l'Europe est-il inélucatable ?*," in *Le Monde* (5 August 2010).

9 I especially have in mind here the kinds of terms that often figure in such "deviant logics" as Brouwer's intuitionist logic. See for example,

L. E. J. Brouwer, "Historical Backgrounds, Principles and Methods of Intuitionism," *South African Journal of Science,* 49 (1952), 139-146; M. Dummett, "Truth," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* 59 (1959), 141-162; and the discussion in S. Haack, *Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1974), 91-108.

**10** See the papers in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016.

**11** On political and philosophical aspects of questions about human rights today, see C. R. Beitz, *The Idea of Human Rights* (Princeton: PUP, 2009); and J. Griffin, *On Human Rights* (Oxford: OUP, 2009). See also T. Pogge, "How Should Human Rights be Conceived?," in his *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002), 52-70. Cf. the collection *Les grands textes internationaux des droits de l'homme,* ed. E. Decaux (Paris: La Documentation Française, 2004).

**12** See, for example, M. Bran, "*Pressé par Paris, Bucarest promet de lutter contre les flux migratoires de Roms*," *Le Monde* (4 August 2010). For France's social model, see M. Fontanel, N. Grivel, and V. Saintoyant, *Le Modèle social français* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007). The 2017 French Presidential debates are featuring arguments for major changes to this model.

**13** For text and commentary with bibliography, see the UNICEF-France publication by F. Martinetti, *Les Droits de l'enfant* (Paris: E.J.L. / Librio, 2002), esp. the discussion of Art. 22 on the rights of refugee children, 20-23. For important backgrounds to the 1989 UN Convention on Children's Rights, see the discussion in Bhalla and McCormick 2009, 18-23. See also F. Dekeuwer-Défossez, *Les Droits de l'enfant,* 7th ed. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2006), esp. 77-121.

**14** For a thorough, critical discussion of this crucial yet problematic notion with respect to the specific contexts here, see C. W. Morris, "The Trouble with Justice," in *Morality and Self-Interest,* ed. P. Bloomfield (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), 15-30.

**15** See, however, the helpful general work, J.-P. Gourévitch, *Les migrations en Europe: Les realities du present, les défis du future* (Paris: Acropole, 2007), esp. 66-116.

**16** On the European social model, see especially the regularly updated, and generally quite reliable, statistics of the Statistical Office of the European Community accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/. See also C. Mathieu and H. Sterdyniak, "*Le modèle social européen et l'Europe sociale*," *Revue de OFCA (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques),* 104 (2008), 43-103; Y. Chassard and J.-L. Dayan, "*Le modèle social européen resiste*," *Problèmes économiques,* 2, 982 (11 November 2009), 23-28; C. Mathieu and H. Sterdyniak, "European Social Model(s) and Social Europe," Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Working Document, No. 10 (April

2009); A. Euzéby, "*Pour une approche éthique de la protection sociale dans l'Union européene*," *Revue du marché commun et de l'Union européene,* 530 (July-August 2009); *Union européenne,* (Paris: OECD, 2009), and the special issue, *L'Europe, of Alternatives Économiques, Hors-Série*, 81 (2009).

**17** For a more extended discussion, see "The European Immigration Debate," in Bhalla and McCormick 2009*,* 49-64. See also C. Wihtol de Winden, "*L'Immigration en débat(s)*," in *Le grand tournant. L'État du monde 2010,* ed. B. Badie and D. Vidal (Paris: La Découverte, 2009), 176-180.

**18** Cf. Wellman and Cole 2011.

**19** Different approaches to dealing with the necessary empirical bases of these discussions are usefully discussed in A. Rea and M. Tripier, *Sociologie de L'Immigration* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), especially "*Migrations de travail: exploitation et mobilité sociale*," 33-48; and Table 3, "*Population étrangère résidant dans quelques pays européens*," 94. In general, dealing critically with statistics in the domains of social policy requires some special knowledge. See, for example, S. Dupays, *Déchiffrer les statistiques économiques et sociales* (Paris: Dunod, 2008), especially "*Comment mesurer les inégalités et la pauvreté*," 70-86. For understanding the sense of many economic indicators, see, for example, R. Stutely, *The Economist Guide to Economic Indicators*, 6th ed. (London: The Economist / Profile, 2006), esp. 58-70. Note that the French national statistics office (*INSEE)* is not fully independent from government control. One consequence is that some French statistics for unemployment and poverty sometimes have been delayed, and at other times challenged for their accuracy. Cf. L. Data, *Le grand truquage: Comment le gouvernement [francais] manipule les statistiques* (Paris: La Découverte, 2009), esp. "*Les chiffres de l'emploi et du chômage: petits arrangements entre amis*," 23-45; and "*Réduire la pauvreté . . . en changeant d'indicateur*," 97-113. The name of the author is a pseudonym for a group of government statisticians. Still, cf. the recent, encouraging interview with the current *Directeur générale* of *INSEE,* in *LeMonde,* 18 November 2009. One needs to note that the general problem of guaranteeing political independence for national offices of statistics in EU member states is not limited to the French case.

**20** And EU parliamentarians, who already include among their numbers several philosophers, need to keep abreast of at least some current political and social philosophy.

**21** Dummett 2001, 10.

**22** Think of Polish immigrants to Leuven, Belgium**.** See M. Galent, I. Goddeeris, and D. Nietzwiedzki, *Migration and Europeanisation: Changing Identities and Values among Polish Pendulum Migrants and their Belgian Employers* (Cracow: Nomos, 2009), esp. 149-174.

23 *Ibid.*, 27.
24 *Ibid.*, 12 and 34 respectively.
25 *Ibid.*, 42-43.
26 Cf. T. Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation," in *Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor?* ed. T. Pogge (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 11-54.
27 Cf. J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999), esp. 113-120.
28 Cf. O. O'Neill, "Global Justice, Whole Obligations?," in *The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and Distant Need,* ed. D. K. Chatterjee (Cambridge: CUP, 2004).
29 R. Audi, *The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004), 88-195; my emphases. For a related but different set of basic principles, see Benedict XVI 2009, esp. §53-67.
30 Note for instance the acrimonious discussion in France currently of the practice of repatriating, with the help of a stipend, Roma children from France to Romania. As France's recent experience demonstrates, the very same children often try to immigrate to France all over again.
31 For the pertinent meanings of the cardinal word "suffering," its measurement, and its moral significance, I rely mainly on J. Mayerfield, *Suffering and Moral Responsibility* (Oxford: OUP, 1999), especially "The Duty to Relieve Suffering," 111-127. For the general notion of "social suffering," together with a series of multi-disciplinary essays, see the special issue, "Social Suffering," of *Daedalus: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* 125 (1996). For the reflections here on literary representations of suffering, see especially D. H. Morris's essay, "About Suffering: Voice, Genre, and Moral Community," in *Daedalus* 1996, 25-46.
32 See *Growing Unequal: Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Countries* (Paris: OECD, 2008), esp. 125-154. The main source for comparative statistical data on European levels of inequality and poverty is the Luxembourg Income Study. This data is regularly updated and is available online at . Cf. *LÉtat de l'Union 2009: Rapport Schuman sur l'Europe,* ed. T. Chopin and M. Foucher (Paris: Lignes de repères, 2009). For historical backgrounds on European social policies in European countries, see H. Kaelble, *Vers une société européenne 1880-1980* (Paris: Belin, 1988); and J.-Cl. Barbier, *La longue marche vers l'Europe sociale* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009). For a pessimistic view, see F. Denors and A. Schwartz, *L'Europe sociale n'aura pas lieu* (Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2009).
33 For some arguments, see, for example, some of the late twentieth century's historically most important papers in the recent two-volume

collection, *Global Justice: Seminal Essays,* ed. T. Pogge and D. Moellendorf, vol. 1 (St. Paul, MN: Paragon, 2008), esp. A. Sen's "Equality of What?," 61-82; and *Global Ethics: Seminal Essays,* ed. T. Pogge and K. Horton, vol. 2 (St. Paul, MN: Paragon, 2008), esp. D. Miller's "Distributing Responsibilities," 481-506. Both collections supplement a somewhat older collection of recent papers, *Global Justice,* ed. T. Pogge (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), including an important article for our specific concerns here with an eventual European common social policy, A. Føllesdal, "Federal Inequality Among Equals: A Contractualist Defense," 242-261.

**34** We will sometimes use the term "moral" as in the expression "moral intuitionism" to cover both of these distinct matters, but generally we shall try to restrict talk of the moral to duties, and the corresponding rights and talk of the ethical to values and ideals.

**35** See the outstanding and thoroughly documented work of E. Marlier, A. B. Atkinson, B. Cantillon, and B. Nolan, *The EU and Social Inclusion: Facing the Challenges* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2007). Marlier *et al.* provide an excellent critical overview of both the distinct phases in the development of European social policy from 1974 to the present, as well as of the evolution of the methods for coordination of the different policies among the gradually expanding number of member states and the mid-term reviews of the Lisbon Strategy and of the EU Social Agenda 2005-2010. See especially, "The EU Social Inclusion Process and the Key Issues," 17-57. For the general contexts, see B. Elissalde *et al.*, *"Société(s) Européenne(s) et Europe Sociale,"* in their *Géopolitique de l'Europe* (Paris: Nathan, 2006), 211-224. Cf. A. Lechavalier, "*L'Europe sociale demeure à construire,*" *Alternatives Économiques, Hors Série,* 81 (2009), 56-59.

**36** See the UNICEF twentieth anniversary report on children, published on 20 November 2009 in Paris. UNICEF reports that roughly 1 billion children worldwide continue to be deprived of their basic human rights, including about 150 million children who live in the streets.

**37** Article 22 §1; my translation.

**38** Article 27, *passim.*

**39** On the developments of the EU debates about a European social inclusion policy, see Marlier 2007, 1-11 and 17-57.

**40** For the conclusions of the regular European Council meetings, see the website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/.

**41** See the citations in Marlier 2007, 6.

**42** On what fiction may be able to indicate about what is not fictional, an important element in the considerations here about poetic language and moral intuitions, see M. Sainsbury, *Fiction and Fictionalism* (London: Routledge, 2009); and C. Crittenden, *Unreality: The Metaphysics*

*of Fictional Objects* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1991), esp. "Real Things in Fiction, Logical Completeness, and Other Forms of Representation," 129-157. Most recently, see S. Brock, "The Creationist Fiction: the Case Against Creationism about Fictional Characters," *The Philosophical Review,* 119 (July 2010), 337-364.

43 Although strongly connected in antiquity, the related and very important notions of rationality and reasonableness need differentiation. What remains controversial is just how to distinguish the two notions as distinct but not completely separate. Generally, I take the words "rational" and "rationality" mainly, but not exclusively, to denote formal and theoretical features, whereas I take the words "reasonable" and "reasonableness" mainly, but not exclusively, to denote material and practical features. Throughout, I use these expressions as largely, but not completely, interchangeable. Contrast, for example, S. Toulmin's remarks in his *Return to Reason* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), 24-28 and *passim*; with G. G. Granger's quite different views in his *La Raison*, 10th ed. (Paris: PUF, 1993), 41-88. For a recent philosophical and historical account of scientific rationality, see Saint-Sernin 2007, 199-260.

44 Consider the conceptions of what persons are in the context of much contemporary discussion of issues in bioethics. Cf. C. Pelluchon, *La raison du sensible: Entretiens autour de la bioéthique* (Paris: Artège, 2009). More generally, see the texts collected in *Person: Philosophische Texte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart,* ed. M Brasser (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1999), the recent essays collected in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 2007, esp. P. Quinn, "On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons," 237-260; and R. Sokolowski, *Phenomenology of the Human Person* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), esp. 7-96.

45 See McCormick 2003.

46 For example, some situations on view in the eighteen Polish documentary films presented in Paris, 12-24 November 2009, under the title, "*Po-lin—la mémoire de la Shoah dans le cinéma polonais aujourd'hui.*"

47 On the general notion of value here, see J. Raz's 2001 Berkeley Tanner Lectures, *The Practice of Value* (Oxford: OUP, 2002), with critical responses from C. Korsgaard, R. Pippin, and B. Williams; J. Griffin, *Value Judgement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and P. Grice's 1983 Carus Lectures, *The Conception of Value* (Oxford: OUP, 1991).

48 See especially F. Brentano, *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1969); F. Brentano, *Grundlegung und Aufbau der Ethik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1978); L. M. McAlister, *The Development of Brentano's Ethics* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982); and R. M. Chisholm, *Brentano and Intrinsic Value* (Cambridge: CUP, 1986).

49 Modern Polish philosophy contributed greatly to providing a more nuanced understanding not just of moral substance but of value theory

generally. For an excellent selection of texts in English from R. Ingarden, W. Tatarkiewicz, T. Czesowski, H, Elzenberg, and Maria Ossowska, together with a set of explanatory essays, see Porebski 1996. For more contemporary Polish reflection, see especially the distinguished work in value theory and philosophical ethics of A. Półtawski, W.Strózewski, and K. Woytila. The important general historical contexts of this work can be usefully surveyed in J. Lukowski and H. Zawadzki, *A Concise History of Poland* (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), esp. in "An Era of Transformation, 1864-1914" and "Independence Regained and Lost, 1914-1945," 155-249.

50 By privileging contemporary English language moral philosophy, I have not been able to take account here of many of the quite pertinent reflections and arguments from the phenomenological tradition in philosophical ethics generally and especially from Brentano. Cf. *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano,* ed. D. Jaquette (Cambridge: CUP, 2004); and the topics treated in the annual *Brentano Studien: An International Yearbook of Franz Brentano Forschung,* ed. W. Baumgartner, F.-P. Burkard, and F. Wiedmann (Würzburg, 1988-).

51 Two general surveys prove useful here: W. H. Schrader, *Ethik und Anthropologie in der Englischen Aufklärung: Der Wandel der Moral-Sense-Theorie von Shaftesbury bis Hume* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); and *Le sens moral: Une historie de la philosophie morale de Locke à Kant,* ed. L. Jaffro (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000).

52 See for example the recent discussions of capacities and capabilities in the contexts of especially Adam Smith's work, and generally in English eighteenth-century commonsense philosophies in A. Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 231-247. See also the closely related reflections in E. Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001), especially "A Fatherless World," 218- 252.

53 Consider a complication. After trying to put my confused thoughts in order, both to describe and to elucidate just those salient features of the dramatic situation that made it a moral situation of such an obliging nature as to require some kind of immediate action at least on my part, I fail to satisfy myself that I have succeeded in capturing what was essential in the situation. Some days later, I am still thinking of the situation and my continuing complicated reactions to it. I decide to try to capture what, in retrospect, seemed essential in the salient features of that situation, imposing themselves on me in such a way that it was not morally permissible for me to disregard them and not to act accordingly in some way. I write a poem about my complicated experience. And I call the poem, "Latvian Autumn" (after the poem of that name by Johannes Bobrowski, which I briefly discuss at the end of this presentation). On often

re-reading my poem later, I come to see that my poem certainly includes many descriptive elements. Remarkably, however, I chose to describe Rachel's almost drowning only very briefly. But I also described many other things—a candle's flame, and so on. I come to see, too, that my poem also includes elucidative elements. Notably, I drew on simile, metaphor, and symbol to evoke what I apparently had come to apprehend in retrospect about this deeply affecting incident of the child's threatened life, a candle's reddish flame like light on dark, crumbling, and ruined walls, like light snaking through the dark waters of a river, like light falling on the dark hair of a Jewish child. And then I think of Rachel and her children, and I remember myself holding a candle at dusk near the darkening creek in the overgrown fields outside the crumbling walls of Auschwitz. Here we have an indirect, after the fact case. But, unlike the previous case, the moral situation is not represented as factual, but as fictional, although life-like. The poem presents the situation with verisimilitude. The poetically represented state of affairs is not literally true; nonetheless, the represented situation gives the appearance of being true in the sense of being plausible. As described, the poetically represented situation never occurred. But as elucidated, it is not implausible that some actual situation—say, a particular state of mind—could very well have occurred in the past, a situation that could reoccur in the minds of its readers in the present and in the future.

54 See M. Richards, *Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them* (Cambridge: CUP, 1990), esp. "Structure," 7-57; and S. Schiffer, "Propositional Content," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language,* ed. E. LePore and B. Smith (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 267-294.

55 *Oxford Dictionary of English,* 2nd ed., ed. C. Soames and A. Stevenson (Oxford: OUP, 2003); hereafter cited "ODE 2003". Note that this latest Oxford Dictionary and new standard, whose evidence for "core meanings" derives for the first time from the 100-million-word British National Corpus, instead of from the overly stringent necessary and sufficient conditions of meanings, is not the same as the renowned multi-volume but now outdated *Oxford English Dictionary.*

56 R. L. Gregory, "Intuition," in Gregory 2004.

57 A. R. Lacey, "Intuition," in Honderich 2005.

58 Cf. S. Blackburn, "Intuitionism (ethical)," in Blackburn 2016. The notion of "objectivity" here is to be understood as a kind of minimal objectivity. "Some of our most important mental states and events have a minimal objectivity, in this intuitive sense," C. Peacocke reminds us; "a thinker's being in the state, or enjoying the event, does not in general make the content of the state or event correct" ("Objectivity," *Mind,* 118 [2009], 739).

[59] Audi 2004, 202. Audi provides a wealth of detailed references on both the histories of ethical intuitionism and the contemporary revival of philosophical interest in ethical intuitionism as compared and contrasted with varieties of utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and moral realism. See also Huemer 2005; M. R. DePaul, "Intuition in Moral Inquiry," in *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,* ed. D. Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 624-644; and the extensive work of F. M. Kamm, especially her *Intricate Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. 438-445.

[60] Cf. R. M. Chisholm, *Ethics and Intrinsic Values,* ed. J. R. White (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2001), esp. "The Things that are Intrinsically Good," 25-35; and M. J. Zimmerman, *The Nature of Intrinsic Value* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

[61] The quite extensive literature on the general international contexts of the particular immigration problems in Europe can be usefully surveyed in K. Koser, *International Migration: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: OUP, 2007), esp. "The Future of International Migration," 109-123. For the particular backgrounds, see *Atlas des migrants en Europe: géocritique des politiques migratoirs,* ed. O. Clochard (Paris: Armand-Colin, 2009). For immigration within the EU, see the discussions of recent Polish immigration to Belgium in Galent 2009, esp. 7-43.

[62] Audi 2004, 202.

[63] First appearing in separate sections from 1935 to 1942, this extraordinary instance of the twentieth-century European high modernist culture of suffering both catches up the meditative movements of *Ash Wednesday* (1930) and transposes into a new key the "foresuffered" pathos of many of the central thematic concerns in both *The Waste Land* (1922) and its coda, *The Hollow Men* (1925). Because of the complicated publishing history of Eliot's works, in what follows, to simplify, I italicize the titles of Eliot's poems regardless of whether they originally appeared in separate book form or as parts only of separate books.

[64] T. S. Eliot, *Collected Poems 1909-1962* (London: Faber, 1963), 189.

[65] See especially T. Williamson, *Vagueness* (London: Routledge, 1994), 248-269.

[66] Bobrowski 1994, 148.

[67] The phrase is that of H. M. Enzensberger.