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## Universalism and Diversity Reflecting on Features of Globalization – with Reference to *Caritas in Veritate*

A look at the terms alone suggests that ‘universalism’ and ‘diversity’ may take on new topicality within an increasingly globalizing world. In fact, experts from different disciplines in their reflections and discussion concerning respective societal, political, and socio-ethical contexts are dealing extensively with this issue or with significant aspects involved in it. This applies particularly with respect to addressing ‘global development’ and its wide-ranging implications and effects. In this context, universal thought and cultural distinctiveness, sociological universalism and cultural relativism resp. multi-culturalism, international political concepts and individual or communal participation, international political systems and local effects of development, pluriformity of cultures and cultural homogenization,<sup>1</sup> global significance of justice and particularism or individualism of specific interests,<sup>2</sup> universal ethical principles and ‘inculturated’ moral action etc. are a few characteristic keywords from a long list. Next to their more theoretical meaning some of these keywords clearly indicate also a kind of practical and moral connotation, at least in the sense of revealing their importance for any real process of humane development. Ample evidence about the latter with specific significance for the debate about ‘cultural globalization’ can be found in research on the

complexity of real processes of development and of change, especially as happened and as still is happening in so-called developing countries and in ‘countries in transition.’<sup>3</sup> Though as a text of Christian social teaching being a document of a ‘*sui generis*’ nature, the encyclical *Caritas in Veritate* can be seen as a specific contribution to the ongoing debate on global development – not just due to its topical focus on development in a rather broad sense and to its somehow global addressees.<sup>4</sup> It also provides an own view on the theoretical framing of the before-mentioned keywords and on their partly practical connotation as well.<sup>5</sup>

This essay intends to raise some select topics and to address a few specific aspects that seem to be of considerable interest in the larger context of universalism and diversity in regard to globalizing development, and for which the text of the encyclical can provide a number of revealing and perhaps sometimes challenging insights – in respect to significant dimensions both of global political theory and of the concept and process of global development. Consequently, in the following quite a number of questions, problems, and approaches, however important, are left out of consideration. For instance, no special attention will be paid to the rather differentiated studies and concepts on global political theory, nor to additional, multifaceted and partly broader notions of universalism and diversity within this theory and beyond, and even not to very enlightening in-depth analysis of the core terms – for example in regard of the revealing twofold and in a sense ambivalent meaning of ‘diversity.’<sup>6</sup> Moreover, rather important issues of universalism and diversity, which are taken up in different sectors of academic research and human action (like, for instance, in philosophy of language and culture<sup>7</sup> or in international business<sup>8</sup>) and which are specifically shaped by their respective contexts, are not pursued further.

Instead, the following reflections focus on features of globalization, and in this respect, on how dimensions of universalism and diversity are conceived and addressed within the specific theory and framework of ‘integral development’ as outlined in *Caritas in Veritate*. Given the significance of its particular idea and vision of human development, it can be expected that the encyclical would not just refer phenomenologically to elements of diversity and universalism within globalizing development, but would illustrate the challenging relation between a universal concept of humanity and diverse forms of socio-cultural identity. Accordingly, there is good reason to further elaborate on this with intensive reference to, and also quotation from the encyclical. As to its outline, this essay will more particularly shed some light on universal dimensions of human development, on aspects of diversity of participation and responsibility herein,<sup>9</sup> and also on the role of subsidiarity in the given context – complemented, finally, with a few remarks about informed consent as a basic requirement of real participation in global human development.

### I. Globalization and universal dimensions of human development

According to *Caritas in Veritate*, globalization – though by no means a new issue on the agenda of the Church’s social teaching and having been extensively addressed in *Populorum Progressio* some forty years earlier<sup>10</sup> – can be seen as one of the obvious characteristics of the contemporary world:<sup>11</sup> “the *explosion of worldwide interdependence*, commonly known as globalization,” is called the “principal new feature.”<sup>12</sup> Being a basic dimension within development, which itself represents a core issue of social ethics already over a long period of time, globalization is considered in the en-

cyclical as particularly important also in view of “*malfunctions and dramatic problems*”<sup>13</sup> that have contributed to a kind of crisis – like e.g. “the global interrelations, the damaging effects on the real economy of badly managed and largely speculative financial dealing, large-scale migration of peoples [...], the unregulated exploitation of the earth’s resources.”<sup>14</sup> In view of the global impact of such factors, not surprisingly any overcoming of the crisis will have universal effects too, particularly since the “different aspects of the crisis, its solutions, and any new development that the future may bring, are increasingly interconnected, they imply one another, they require new efforts of holistic understanding and a *new humanistic synthesis*.”<sup>15</sup>

At first glance, some of the encyclical’s wording as just quoted may create the impression of a somewhat critical and skeptical look at globalization, and also of a little distanced approach towards its implications – for instance, when the text emphasizes remarkable risks and particular challenges in the area of human dignity, social justice, and ‘effective’ “*interaction between cultures*”<sup>16</sup> as part of the world’s globalized development,<sup>17</sup> or when it refers repeatedly to “problems of development in this global era.”<sup>18</sup> However, the encyclical notes clearly “the *de facto* interdependence of people and nations,”<sup>19</sup> it considers today’s world as rather integrated, it talks about international duties and as its downside about international “political irresponsibility”<sup>20</sup> too, it also explicitly calls the globalizing “process [...] a great opportunity.”<sup>21</sup> Thus, globalization in fact is seen as a kind of ambivalent reality of universal significance, containing good and bad sides,<sup>22</sup> and in a positive perspective it is even considered as essential for the process of development. In this way, the encyclical expresses on the whole a prevailing positive view. In particular, the very concept of “integral human development” assumes, both in anthropological and theological respect, that “if it

does not involve the whole man and every man, it is not true development.”<sup>23</sup> Hence, integral human development is not at all an individualistic concept. Instead, it implies a universal perspective on all mankind, not the least in its cultural dimensions.<sup>24</sup> That’s why, as a kind of concretization and example, the encyclical recalls that actually “a complete re-examination of development was needed” once “the economic and political systems of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe”<sup>25</sup> collapsed, and it consequently asks for “a comprehensive new plan for development” which remains “a real duty that needs to be discharged.”<sup>26</sup> Regarding the ethical sources of global cooperation and encounter for the sake of human development it also refers to “examples of ethical convergence [...] as an expression of the one human nature [...]” which “the tradition of ethical wisdom knows [...] as the natural law.”<sup>27</sup> Here the problem of universal ethics as part of the debate on globalized development is taken up by explicitly adding that this “universal moral law provides a sound basis for all cultural, religious and political dialogue [...]”<sup>28</sup>

Not the least with respect to globalized development, the encyclical claims that its title *‘Caritas in Veritate’* – i.e. ‘charity in truth’ respectively ‘love in truth’<sup>29</sup> – indicates as such the basic and universal “principle around which the Church’s social doctrine turns.”<sup>30</sup> This ‘principle’ may perhaps more appropriately also be called the ‘formal object’ of the encyclical in terms of the ‘unique perspective’ it intends to present.<sup>31</sup> In any case, it gains practical and thus moral significance since it also provides “criteria to govern moral action.”<sup>32</sup> In terms of ethical theory, the precise meaning of these ‘criteria’ seems to remain a bit unclear. Though being considered as morally normative, they may not exactly be seen as moral norms in a proper sense, i.e. as a quite specific and morally binding requirement, or as a sort of specific ‘ought-to-do’ as criterion for the

morality of action. Ethically, ‘criteria’ of this type would rather have to be conceived as something between ‘general principles’ in the strict sense and ‘concrete norms,’ containing elements of both. This becomes obvious when looking at the two criteria for moral action which the encyclical considers as being “of special relevance to the commitment to development in an increasingly globalized society,” namely ‘justice’ and ‘the common good.’<sup>33</sup> There is some evidence that both of them have a political and an ethical significance since they are understood in a way as politically essential parts of global development and as meaningful elements of a kind of moral universalism as well. ‘Justice’ in this context means “recognition and respect for the legitimate rights of individuals and peoples”<sup>34</sup> and hence applies to the individual as well as to the societal and socio-economic dimension of human life.<sup>35</sup> The ‘common good,’ however, as “the good of *all of us*” which exceeds the mere individual good and as such is “linked to living in society”<sup>36</sup> focusses *per se* on the societal sector, containing a “national and global” dimension.<sup>37</sup> Thus, to commit oneself to the common good from a Christian perspective can be called the “institutional” or even “political path [...] of charity.”<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, though sometimes one might believe that speaking of ‘an increasingly globalized society’ would refer just to global ingredients of developments *within* a specific society,<sup>39</sup> the common-good perspective shows clearly and explicitly the worldwide connotation of globalization: “In an increasingly globalized society, the common good and the effort to obtain it cannot fail to assume the dimensions of the whole human family, that is to say, the community of peoples and nations.”<sup>40</sup> Obviously, from an ethical point of view this global approach contains implicitly the idea of universal applicability too, for which ‘charity’ in its Christian meaning forms the basis. This notion of ‘charity’ implies that it is

“to be understood, confirmed and practiced in the light of truth.”<sup>41</sup> That’s why “Charity is at the heart of the Church’s social doctrine,”<sup>42</sup> which also indicates its basic practical significance and moral importance since it “gives real substance to the personal relationship with God and with neighbor.”<sup>43</sup> And, even more importantly in regard to the vision of human development, charity is of moral relevance far beyond an individual level. Instead, again in a universal perspective, “it is the principle not only of micro-relationships (with friends, with family members or within small groups) but also of macro-relationships (social, economic and political ones).”<sup>44</sup> To insist on the normative role of justice and the common good for any truly human development fits quite well to this notion of a guiding principle, hence this normative role should be seen as a kind of concretization of what charity resp. love as the core principle implies ethically, and in this respect it would have to be considered as an element of political theory of globalization and of universal developmental practice as well.

## II. Globalized human development and diversity of participation and responsibility

Concerning ‘diversity’ in the context of global development, again, *prima facie* one could take from *Caritas in Veritate* a tendency to a rather pejorative connotation. This may particularly be the case when, for instance, the encyclical states that “in some poor countries, cultural models and social norms of behaviour persist which hinder the process of development.”<sup>45</sup> But a closer look to its more specific argumentations discloses a perception of diversity in a rather multidimensional perspective, which in fact may be considered as quite balanced, not least in regard to *cultural* diversity as another essential feature of globalized development. Diversity

plays an important role in global development in at least two respects, namely on the level of personal responsibility and on the level of communal and societal participation – both levels being of importance in terms of political theory and of ethics.

In the first Chapter, which is dedicated to more general reflections, *Caritas in Veritate* deals intensively with some of the fundamental aspects of *Populorum Progressio*, the encyclical of Pope Paul VI from 1967. Following some of its core considerations, *Caritas in Veritate* comes up with a rather critical and at the same time quite challenging statement by saying: “In the course of history, it was often maintained that the creation of institutions was sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of humanity’s right to development [...]. In reality, institutions by themselves are not enough, because integral human development is primarily a vocation, and therefore it involves a free assumption of responsibility in solidarity on the part of everyone.”<sup>46</sup> To look at and perceive “development as vocation,”<sup>47</sup> which “is a call that requires a free and responsible answer,”<sup>48</sup> turns the focus on a close relationship of development on the one hand and personal freedom and responsibility on the other hand.

In view of this relation, the encyclical stresses rather strictly that personal involvement and responsibility represent a kind of necessary prerequisite of truly human development – i.e., in philosophical terms, quasi a ‘condition of its possibility.’ Since it is understood as a mutual relationship it leads as such also to a more comprehensive and actually to a more appropriate understanding of development. Thus *Caritas in Veritate* states very clearly: “*Integral human development presupposes the responsible freedom of the individual [...].*”<sup>49</sup> The focus of this statement concerns an essential dimension of diversity in assuming and exercising responsibility for whatever human development. This dimension of diversity turns out to be crucial both in regard to pragmatics and theory of human

development, which becomes particularly obvious if one takes into account another statement that is immediately adjusted to the first one: “No structure can guarantee this development over and above human responsibility.”<sup>50</sup> In addition to that, entering more directly the area of political theory again, in view of potential neglect of this multifold personal resource for any development, the encyclical points out its downside: “It involves reducing man to subservience, to a mere means for development.”<sup>51</sup> This is not just meant as a general statement, especially since remarkable problematic effects accompanying such development have become more and more obvious, not least in the economic and social sector – like for instance long-time unemployment that “undermines the freedom and creativity,”<sup>52</sup> or a new ‘powerlessness’ of citizens experiencing “cuts in social spending often made under pressure from international financial institutions,” or a “lack of effective protection on the part of workers’ associations.”<sup>53</sup> Consequently, the encyclical concludes: “Only when it is free can development be integrally human; only in a climate of responsible freedom can it grow in a satisfactory manner.”<sup>54</sup> Of course, freedom as a requirement of human development pertains to abilities and rights of individuals, communities, societies etc., and to respective political and structural conditions as well.

Hence there is more involved in ‘integral human development’ as envisaged in this encyclical, especially in regard to active participation. Exactly because the “development of peoples is intimately linked to the development of individuals,”<sup>55</sup> it relies not only on responsible freedom of the individual or of a limited group of individuals, but rather “presupposes the responsible freedom [...] of peoples”<sup>56</sup> too. Referring to the concept of *Populorum Progressio, Caritas in Veritate* also stresses the significance of participation of peoples, more precisely in three aspects: economically as “their active participation, on equal terms, in the international economic process,”

socially as “their evolution into educated societies marked by solidarity,” and politically as “the consolidation of democratic regimes capable of ensuring freedom and peace.” Hence, it is considered as particularly valuable if more countries would gain “the possibility of becoming effective players in international politics.”<sup>57</sup> As a kind of contrast to that, and then with a negative connotation, ‘limitations to sovereignty’ of the State are mentioned. In a positive way, based on seeing nowadays “the State’s *public authorities* directly involved in correcting errors and malfunctions,” the encyclical points at the demand for ‘remodeling’ the role of the states, ‘foreseeing’ as one of its outcomes “an increase in the new forms of political participation, nationally and internationally, that have come about through the activity of organizations operating in civil society.”<sup>58</sup> At this point, based on a broad notion of political participation and on the idea of a wide diversity of participants in development, the text is rather enlightening also in terms of a theory of civil society: “In this way it is to be hoped that the citizens’ interest and participation in the *res publica* will become more deeply rooted.”<sup>59</sup> More concretely, the “promotion of workers’ associations” may serve as an example for such improved involvement of civil society in a universal context, in particular since calling for this promotion is “a prompt and far-sighted response to the urgent need for new forms of cooperation at the international level, as well as the local level.”<sup>60</sup>

As indicated above, it is particularly revealing to notice the encyclical’s considerations about *cultural diversity*, especially in regard to the different levels of international cooperation. For instance, in view of so-called ‘evolving’ countries it values explicitly what “is truly human in their traditions.”<sup>61</sup> Moreover, while mentioning “religious and cultural attitudes” that may contribute to “retarding or even obstructing authentic human development,” it acknowledges at the same time that also non-Christian “cultures and religions



teach brotherhood and peace and are therefore of enormous importance to integral human development.”<sup>62</sup> In addition to that, despite some negative effects of globalization on certain forms of dealing with religious diversity,<sup>63</sup> and unlike any homogenizing ‘attempts’ regarding the diversity of cultures, a sort of “intercultural dialogue” is emphasized, “that, if it is to be effective, has to set out from a deep-seated knowledge of the specific identity of the various dialogue partners.”<sup>64</sup> While ‘cultural eclecticism’ with subsequent ‘relativism’ as well as ‘cultural levelling’ do not foster “cultural exchange” nor “authentic dialogue” and “true integration”, or even endanger them, specific attention should be paid to “the profound significance of the culture of different nations, of the traditions of the various peoples, by which the individual defines himself in relation to life’s fundamental questions.”<sup>65</sup> In a way similar to the significance of ‘acknowledgement’ in its broader sense as an issue of Political Philosophy,<sup>66</sup> the encyclical places strong emphasis on cultural diversity in respect of the current “new openings for intercultural dialogue,”<sup>67</sup> to the extent that its neglect is considered to finally run dehumanizing “new risks of enslavement and manipulation.”<sup>68</sup> Of course, this conclusion as well as its implications would need further discussion and in-depth reflection.<sup>69</sup> However, in the given context it should be noted that the encyclical considers both cultural diversity *and* cultural identity as indispensable elements of a universal intercultural dialogue that is worthy of the name.

### III. Globalization and subsidiarity

It emerges from the above that universalism and diversity, and also a certain relation between the two, represent characteristic features of globalized human development as addressed in *Caritas in Veritate*. However, beyond mere phenomenological description

the essence of the matter seems to concern the design of exactly the just mentioned relation of universalism and diversity, both in theoretical terms and in regard to the pragmatics of globalization. Therefore, it might be particularly interesting to elaborate a bit more on how this relation is conceptualized by the encyclical and in which way the shaping of this relation is conceived.

Despite its practice-orientation and its socio-ethical intention this document of Catholic social teaching pursues a rather basic approach: “As society becomes ever more globalized, it makes us neighbours but does not make us brothers.”<sup>70</sup> Precisely here the broad anthropological and theological understanding of ‘love’ as a theological virtue and of practiced ‘charity’ as a gift is of special importance to the proper meaning of *Caritas in Veritate*.<sup>71</sup> However, based on essential theological grounds and exceeding them at the same time, the encyclical underlines the significance of ‘*gratuitousness*,’ which in regard to the idea of fraternity is meant as another principle of universal human development. Yet, it “does not exclude justice,” but “on the other hand, economic, social, and political development, if it is to be authentically human, needs to make room for the *principle of gratuitousness* as an expression of fraternity.”<sup>72</sup> This principle has specific implications, especially by way of an indispensable mutual relation and cooperation of economy and politics,<sup>73</sup> which in a globalized world turns out to be even the more necessary and which should have its special focus on respecting the “canons of justice.”<sup>74</sup> Moreover, according to the encyclical it affects the complex web of economic activities resp. the ‘market as economic institution,’<sup>75</sup> of society, and of “individuals, their moral conscience and their personal and social responsibility.”<sup>76</sup>

This basic approach, however, is not at all meant just as a description of a rather abstract structural and ethical ideal. On the contrary, by no means coincidentally this approach ties up with

the before-mentioned views on universal dimensions of human development as well as on diversity in its participatory shaping. Viewed from this context and framed by the notion of ‘truly human development,’ this approach provides the key and constitutes the framework for fostering ‘subsidiarity’ to be applied to the process of globalized human development. Theoretically as well as in its practice-orientation, the Christian social teaching emphasizes subsidiarity as a so-called social principle according to which “a community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good.”<sup>77</sup> The encyclical addresses subsidiarity in a quite impressive manner; after having stressed the importance of “*fraternal collaboration between believers and non-believers*”<sup>78</sup> to the benefit of global development, it adds the following: “A particular manifestation of charity and a guiding criterion for fraternal cooperation between believers and non-believers is undoubtedly the *principle of subsidiarity*, an expression of inalienable human freedom.”<sup>79</sup> Content and significance of this principle are closely linked to the very fact, that next to widely interrelated “globalization [...] as a socio-economic process [...] humanity itself is becoming increasingly interconnected; it is made up of individuals and peoples to whom this process should offer benefits and development, as they assume their respective responsibilities, singly and collectively.”<sup>80</sup> Also in view of some remarkable misunderstandings of subsidiarity within the political debate, it is important to note, that subsidiarity concerns two components of social life, of shared responsibility and political activity, namely it stresses on the one hand the significance of the role of ‘communities of a lower order’ according to their abilities and rights, and on the other

hand it underlines the basically substitute role of ‘communities of a higher order.’ Thus, it sets limits to any attempt of institutions or states to claim comprehensive competence,<sup>81</sup> it also “tends toward the establishment of true international order.”<sup>82</sup> Of course development in a globalized world, and not least in the economic and social sector, requires an active role to be taken up by institutions that transcend the role of the individual and the function of small communities, like states or international organizations and entities with a more universal view on opportunities and challenges of globalization<sup>83</sup> – or, in the words of the encyclical, it needs basically a kind of “dispersed political authority, effective on different levels.”<sup>84</sup> Therefore the encyclical emphasizes a well-balanced and reasonably combined “articulation of political authority at the local, national and international levels [...]” for “giving direction to the process of economic globalization. It is also the way to ensure that it does not actually undermine the foundations of democracy.”<sup>85</sup> To point at democracy in this context is of utmost importance, since it indicates even in regard to an international order the importance of a decentralized and thus participatory notion of assuming and exercising ‘responsibility in diversity,’ which would include the individual level too.<sup>86</sup>

Focused on human development *Caritas in Veritate* suggests applying subsidiarity especially to the concept of an international economic order, the more since it would allow inclusion of “those countries that are excluded or marginalized from the influential circles of the global economy. In these countries it is very important to move ahead with projects based on subsidiarity, suitably planned and, since even there “the principle of the *centrality of the human person*, as the subject primarily responsible for development, must be preserved.”<sup>87</sup> Actually, it is exactly the universally oriented global strategy for development that needs “to be managed, aimed

at affirming rights yet also providing for the assumption of corresponding responsibilities.”<sup>88</sup> Similarly, the latter may also serve as a guideline for strategies of global development. As is said generally in the encyclical, “the principle of subsidiarity is particularly well-suited to managing globalization and directing it towards authentic human development.”<sup>89</sup>

Recalling diverse levels of active participation that is embedded in universal principles of action and opting for a subsidiary understanding of responsibility is not just born out of a theory of appropriate designing and structuring of communal and social life as it should be organized locally, regionally, nationally, transnationally and globally. To pay special attention to these characteristics of human development and to a kind of inspiring relationship amongst them is apparently motivated by an underlying ethical connotation too. The latter becomes particularly clear when one looks carefully at the moral aspects surrounding explicitly or implicitly concrete activities of development cooperation. For instance, the problems of food shortage, insufficient nutrition, and hunger, thought as rather urgent social and moral challenges to be addressed and tackled internationally, can be overcome through “the involvement of local communities in choices and decisions that affect the use of agricultural land.”<sup>90</sup> Another example for what is meant with this moral connotation is mentioned by the encyclical in regard to generating “true economic growth” through financial assistance, namely by pointing at “[...] support for economically poor countries by means of financial plans inspired by solidarity [...]” that enables them to “take steps to satisfy their own citizens’ demand for consumer goods and for development.”<sup>91</sup>

Also in a more general perspective subsidiarity represents an issue of ethical importance, in particular in view of its connectedness with ‘solidarity’ and ‘personality’ which, taken altogether, are clas-

sified by Christian social teaching as basic ‘social principles.’ As, in a sense, prime principles which are ingrained by a number of basic values like human dignity and justice, they are understood as essential orientation for the structure, the organization, and for the institutions of human living together, with a special focus on the relation between the individual person and society.<sup>92</sup> Thus they have to be considered as socio-ethical principles in a strict sense. *Caritas in Veritate* connects its view on subsidiary global human development explicitly with this basic concept of Christian social teaching: “Subsidiarity is first and foremost a form of assistance to the human person [...],” it “respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to others.”<sup>93</sup> And, in addition to that, “*subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of solidarity and vice versa [...]*.”<sup>94</sup> Therefore, the subsidiary approach does not fail to recognize the significance of “interaction among the peoples of the world.” On the contrary, the encyclical even emphasizes respective endeavors “so that integration can signify solidarity rather than marginalization.”<sup>95</sup> Viewed in this perspective, global development itself “can be identified with the inclusion-in-relation of all individuals and peoples within the one community of the human family, built in solidarity on the basis of the fundamental values of justice and peace.”<sup>96</sup> Of course, as regards development pragmatics subsidiarity would also have to be seen as universal principle and as a significant basis for coping efficiently and fairly with major global challenges, e.g. in the areas of cross-generational justice, energy distribution, water supply, and environmental protection etc.<sup>97</sup> In line with this subsidiary approach, in economic terms, *Caritas in Veritate* mentions the call of *Populorum Progressio* “for the creation of a model of market economy capable of including within its range all peoples and not just the better off.”<sup>98</sup>



In the light of that, it becomes obvious that the principle of subsidiarity, being a significant feature of the encyclical's views and argumentation, also concerns personal responsibility and commitment of all and everybody. These are considered core elements of what is meant by the principle of 'personality' which is based on a comprehensive understanding of the individual, of human community and of interpersonal relations.<sup>99</sup> According to *Caritas in Veritate* this principle is crucial in all sectors of global development as long as it is supposed to be *human* development. Not least it is to be applied to the rather important economic sector and particularly to entrepreneurial activities: "Business activity has a human significance, prior to its professional one. It is present in all work, understood as a personal action, an '*actus personae*', which is why every worker should have the chance to make his contribution [...]."<sup>100</sup> The mutual interrelation of the just mentioned three 'social principles,' and also the significance of this interrelation, become particularly evident when looking at economy in a globalized context: "In the global era, economic activity cannot prescind from gratuitousness, which fosters and disseminates solidarity and responsibility for justice and the common good among the different economic players. It is clearly a specific and profound form of economic democracy. Solidarity is first and foremost a sense of responsibility on the part of everyone with regard to everyone, and it cannot therefore be merely delegated to the State."<sup>101</sup> Instead, the mere focus on "the logic of the market and the logic of the State," especially when they "come to an agreement that each will continue to exercise a monopoly over its respective area of influence," would finally lead to a major loss regarding "solidarity in relations between citizens, participation and adherence, actions of gratuitousness, all of which stand in contrast with *giving in order to acquire* (the logic of exchange) and *giving through duty* (the logic of public obligation, imposed by State law)."<sup>102</sup>

This all shows that basic features of reflection on globalization as presented in the encyclical in the context of global integral development concern meaningful elements of the relation of universalism and diversity, both of which can phenomenologically and theoretically be characterized by a wide range of complexity and variety. In a sense, *Caritas in Veritate* on the whole is shaped by a strong effort to shed light on and thus to provide in-depth insight into this variety and complexity, also to illustrate problems and perspectives of relating universalizing moments and diverting tendencies of development, and finally to emphasize a kind of indispensable go-together of the two as prerequisite of truly integral human development.

#### IV. 'Informed consent' as a normative rule for real participation

From a systematic perspective, based on the above it can be stated that according to *Caritas in Veritate* all development, in particular as a global process shaped in different ways by elements of universalism and diversity, is depending on and aiming at participation. With an inherent intention of providing 'subsidiary assistance', whatever effort in development focusses on "individuals or groups [...]" and it is always designed to achieve their emancipation, because it fosters freedom and participation through assumption of responsibility."<sup>103</sup> In line with the principle of subsidiarity, this kind of participation is considered as extremely important for developmental theory and practice, especially "when addressing issues concerning *international development aid*,"<sup>104</sup> – because "above all there is need for the active mobilization of all the subjects of civil society, both juridical and physical persons."<sup>105</sup>

It is obvious that this participative concept turns out to be particularly significant in respect to the intended ‘integral human development.’ That’s why it should have remarkable impact on designing and implementing concrete development activities, which usually open up opportunities and thus become quite a challenge as well. This applies especially to a globalizing context because precisely there any broad participation in development – i.e. in shaping of political concepts, in decision making about specific programs, and in implementing concrete projects – requires a creative approach that is characterized by an efficient combination and reciprocity of universalism and diversity.<sup>106</sup> The latter, in line with the encyclical’s central arguments, should actually be seen as a decisive criterion of any real achievement since it shows itself as an indispensable part of the ‘conditions of possibility’ of truly human development. Therefore, the real subject of participation is not just the methodology of globalized development; what really matters, instead, is the appropriate notion of true participation of all and everybody involved in decision making and implementation – i.e. individuals, communities, institutions of civil society, and whatever social entities on the respective levels. Being a matter of political approach, concept, and strategy, this concerns above all the *idea* and the concrete *enabling* of participative involvement and of shared responsibility. Thus, next to respective political and social aspects also an ethical dimension has to be taken into consideration – namely, the possibility of real participation ought to be ensured, its conditions ought to be created and guaranteed.

The text of the encyclical refers to all these aspects by stressing that programs of aid “must increasingly acquire the characteristics of participation and completion from the grass roots.”<sup>107</sup> “Economic aid” in particular, “[...] must be distributed with the involvement not only of the governments of receiving countries,

but also local economic agents and the bearers of culture within civil society, including local Churches.”<sup>108</sup> Also by tying up to earlier demands for a “*true world political authority*,”<sup>109</sup> of course to be committed “to observe consistently the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity,”<sup>110</sup> the encyclical mentions “the urgent need to find innovative ways [...] of giving poorer nations an effective voice in shared decision-making. This seems necessary in order to arrive at a political, juridical and economic order which can increase and give direction to international cooperation for the development of all peoples in solidarity.”<sup>111</sup> Beyond this specific context, *Caritas in Veritate* in regard to development programs raises clearly and unequivocally the demand, that “people who benefit from them ought to be directly involved in their planning and implementation.”<sup>112</sup>

Serious implementation of this demand would not just require a kind of general ‘diversity management’ in the sector of globalized integral development.<sup>113</sup> Enabling ‘direct involvement in planning and implementation’ and thus concrete, subsidiarity-oriented participation in all aspects of development would above all require fostering the ability and capacity of a kind of ‘informed consent’ by all those who are involved in decision making. Of course, this would imply efforts to create the indispensable prerequisites of such consent – based on insight in the different matters, on communication and information about the broader context, on transparency about concepts, goals and resources etc. The encyclical as a document usually intended to present general lines and important features does not go too much into details in this respect. However, by stressing intensely the meaning of subsidiarity it sets clearly the framework within which concrete and active participation of all actors and levels involved reveals as a *conditio sine qua non* of integral human development in the given globalized world. In addition to that it highlights a rather fundamental

### Concluding remarks

factor of active participation and efficient exercising of responsibility when it favors generally a “*greater access to education*, which is at the same time an essential precondition for effective international cooperation.”<sup>114</sup>

What is meant here is actually the insight into basics of real participation in integral human development within a globalizing world – first of all in order to prevent the emphases on subsidiary participation from remaining merely a fashionable but empty phrase. Such insight requires not just theoretical competence; it is not a matter of knowledge only. Like in other areas concerning humanity, such insight from the substance of the matter needs also the readiness and willingness to acknowledge and even appreciate the significance of real participation, and in this case to take seriously notice of the underlying features marked by universalism and diversity and their complex relation.<sup>115</sup> For the realization and implementation of real participation ‘informed consent’ in theory and practice may serve as a kind of fundamental normative rule. Well-known from ethical reflection in other sectors of concrete morality, especially in medical ethics and bioethics, but conceptually applied in Christian social teaching too,<sup>116</sup> the concept of informed consent would have to be adapted, transformed and further developed in an analogue way as an element of political and ethical theory of integral human development. The encyclical as a document of Christian social teaching provides a larger context to this by referring to ‘charity resp. love’ being “at the heart of the Church’s social doctrine.”<sup>117</sup> Taking first of all a relational instead of an institutional perspective, thus using theological wording rather than philosophical terminology at this point, it calls ‘charity’ – as quoted before – “the principle not only of micro-relationships (with friends, with family members or within small groups) but also of macro-relationships (social, economic and political ones).”<sup>118</sup>

In “a world that is becoming progressively and pervasively globalized,” as stated at the time of publication, the encyclical shows itself specifically worried that the existing “interdependence of people and nations is not matched by ethical interaction of consciences and minds that would give rise to truly human development.”<sup>119</sup> Though the general conditions of worldwide development are changing rapidly, and the implied relation between elements of universalism and diversity is exposed to continuous modification too, there seem to be sufficient indications to remain continuously concerned about the humane character of global development. This applies specifically in terms of complying with important normative criteria like justice and the common good, which the encyclical together with the basic social principles – especially subsidiarity – emphasizes as in a way necessary for integral development, not least in view of the complex aspects of universalism and diversity as remarkable factors of globalization. Driven by the intention to recall and clarify Christian orientation for integral human development *Caritas in Veritate* is of course not in a position to “have technical solutions to offer [...]”, and is also not claiming “to interfere in any way in the politics of States.”<sup>120</sup> Rather, by both indicating certain challenges or risks of global development and recalling sustainable values of personal and societal human development, the encyclical reveals itself as being embedded in the Church’s “mission of truth”<sup>121</sup> – this way different from a sort of “empiricist and skeptical view of life” that presents itself “incapable of rising to the level of praxis because of a lack of interest in grasping the values – sometimes even the meanings – with which to judge and direct it.”<sup>122</sup> This specific approach to integral human development, shaped by a complex “correlation

between its multiple elements,<sup>123</sup> is meant as “a service to the truth” – and this in a quite concrete manner: “Open to the truth, from whichever branch of knowledge it comes, the Church’s social doctrine receives it, assembles into a unity the fragments in which it is often found, and mediates it within the constantly changing life-patterns of the society of peoples and nations.”<sup>124</sup> Hence, by no means accidentally, the encyclical also expresses its commitment “to foster the interaction of the different levels of human knowledge in order to promote the authentic development of peoples,” for which “the various disciplines have to work together through an orderly interdisciplinary exchange.”<sup>125</sup> Providing theological, philosophical and socio-ethical reflection on features of globalized human development, which are considered to be of a certain contemporary significance and yet somehow timeless too, *Caritas in Veritate* represents a theory-based and practice-oriented document within the Church’s tradition of social teaching.<sup>126</sup> As such, and despite its theological rooting, the encyclical intends argumentatively to offer also a kind of challenging corrective to the general debate on globalized development, which is common for that teaching too.<sup>127</sup>

This anchoring in the tradition of Catholic social teaching is explicitly mentioned in *Caritas in Veritate* – primarily with regard to the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum*, *Populorum Progressio* and *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* as well as to the Second Vatican Council’s pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes*.<sup>128</sup> Accordingly, the encyclical aims at serving to ‘revisit’ earlier “teachings on *integral human development* [...]” and “to apply them to the present moment.”<sup>129</sup> This is understood as part of a quite ambitious effort, which is deemed as being specifically illustrated by *Populorum Progressio*, to contribute to “shedding light upon humanity’s journey towards unity;”<sup>130</sup> as an overall Christian vision this unity is closely bound

to justice and peace<sup>131</sup> as central issues of Christian social teaching,<sup>132</sup> thus finally serving “the great task of upholding the fully human dimension of development and peace.”<sup>133</sup> As noted above, in its core this effort results from the Church’s ministry in “*promoting integral human development*,”<sup>134</sup> but also from its “mission of truth [...], in every time and circumstance, for a society that is attuned to man, to his dignity, to his vocation”<sup>135</sup> – both of which is intended as being “at service to the world.”<sup>136</sup>

Given the specific scope and the particular perspectives of *Caritas in Veritate*, it would certainly be inappropriate to consider this encyclical an elaborate or even comprehensive political theory. However, it shows clearly its rooting in and inspiration by quite a number of fundamental reflections and insights that altogether would serve as elements of a theoretical concept and as both a theory-based and practice-oriented approach to human life and society – and hence altogether as features of integral global development, not the least in regard to its enlightening dimensions of universalism and diversity, and also with respect to associated issues like subsidiarity and consent. A major part of its theoretical foundation concerns systematic philosophical and theological considerations about individual and society, respectively about personal and collective responsibility. In other words, it is an underlying notion of true humanity, which theologically is conceived as commission and promise too, that is continuously reflected and outlined in Christian social thought and social teaching, and that consequently runs like a thread through the encyclical’s text on human development in a globalizing world. Intended as a contribution to the general discourse about globalization, in particular the encyclical’s theoretical views and arguments may be taken up as an inspiring as well as challenging contribution to the respective multi- and transdisciplinary debate about global political theory.

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**Endnotes**

- <sup>1</sup> For more see Georg Glasze and Aika Meyer, “Das Konzept der ‘kulturellen Vielfalt’: Protektionismus oder Schutz vor Kultureller Homogenisierung?,” in *Facetten der Globalisierung: Zwischen Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur*, ed. Johannes Kessler und Christian Steiner (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), pp. 186-197; see also Joana Breidenbach and Ina Zukrigl, “Widersprüche der kulturellen Globalisierung. Strategien und Praktiken,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B12 (2002). With special reference to Catholic social teaching, ‘globalization’ – and in its context, issues of justice and cultural identity – has been addressed in several papers presented on occasion of the Padua Conference of Catholic moral theologians in 2006, see Linda Hoogan, ed., *Applied Ethics in a World Church. The Padua Conference* (New York: Orbis Books, 2008), esp. Part One: *Globalization, Justice and Environment*, pp. 13-82.
- <sup>2</sup> See Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate (CiV)* [32] and [58], especially also [42] and [43]: “Many people today would claim that they owe nothing to anyone, except to themselves. They are concerned only with their rights, and they often have great difficulty in taking responsibility for their own and other people’s integral development. Hence it is important to call for a renewed reflection on how *rights presuppose duties, if they are not to become mere licence.*” For more see Alois Joh. Buch, “Moral Particularism and Individualism. Challenging Reflection on Virtue Ethics,” in *Ethics in the Global World: Reflections on Civic Virtues*, ed. Volodymyr Turchynovskyy (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2013), pp. 82-116. *CiV* [5] indicates a similar topic by saying: “Without truth, without trust and love for what is true, there is no social conscience and responsibility, and social action ends up serving private interests and the logic of power, resulting in social fragmentation, especially in a globalized society at difficult times like the present.”
- <sup>3</sup> For more, with special reference to differences between OECD-countries and non-OECD-countries, see Dieter Senghaas, “Kulturelle Globalisierung – ihre Kontexte, ihre Varianten,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B12 (2002). See also Alois Joh. Buch, *Growing Interest in Religion? – Decreasing Impact of Christian Ethics? Inaugural Lecture at the Ukrainian Catholic University. Lviv, January 10, 2012* (Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2012). For some insight on similar issues in regard to Africa as one continent, focused on ‘change and identity’, see Richard Dowden, *Africa. Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), esp. pp. 540-542; a view on Asia Pacific and beyond is provided by Michael S. Dobbs-Higginson, *Asia Pacific: Its Role in the*

*New World Disorder* (London: Mandarin, 1994), esp. pp. 443-464; another perspective, globally oriented, was presented by Amin Maalouf, *Disordered World. Setting a New Course for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Bloomsbury 2012), esp. pp. 238-250.

- <sup>4</sup> The fact that the encyclical, next to special addressees as mentioned, finally is aimed at “all people of good will” (*CiV*, address), is quite enlightening since it obviously claims to present a text with reflections and argumentations that are considered to be applicable to the general and universal debate on human development. This illustrates the self-conception of the Church’s social doctrine, its specific pretension, and its intention as well. For more on applicability and communicability in this regard see Alois Joh. Buch, “Catholic Social Thought in Transition. Some Remarks on its Future Communicability,” in *Catholic Social Thought – Twilight or Renaissance?*, ed. Boswell et al. (Leuven: Leuven University Press/Peeters, 2000), pp. 141-147.
- <sup>5</sup> It must also be said that this essay will not reflect upon ‘relativism of truth’, to which *CiV* refers as a certain characteristic of “social and cultural context” (*CiV* [2]); its implications would indeed require some closer look, the more since even at first sight there is some evidence that such a characterization would reveal more problems than benefit in regard to the concept and perception of truth within the complex overlapping of universalism resp. globalization and cultural diversity (see also *CiV* [3] and [4]).
- <sup>6</sup> Just in order to point at the two aspects: for instance, ‘cultural diversity’ in its positive meaning may be connoted with a kind of richness, colorfulness etc. of ‘diverse’, i.e. manifold characteristics of cultures that basically may be conceived as complementary and inclusive to each other; or, in a more ‘negative’ meaning, it may be connoted with ‘diverse’ and thus difference-based realities, or as ‘disintegrated’ and to a certain extent as ‘diverse cultures’ that are contrasting and exclusionary to each other. Certainly, a lot will depend on the observer’s view too, but the term in its pragmatic dimension as such contains and offers apparently a kind of ambivalent connotation.
- <sup>7</sup> An issue of special importance within philosophical research would be the reflection on the ‘conditions of possibility’ of developing the idea of universalism and of establishing a kind of universal culture of life and of communication, particularly with respect to a basically cultural shaping of language, communication etc. Or, from a different perspective, one may reflect further on whether globalizing processes, which actually would tend to lead to a kind of concrete universalism, would rather hinder than foster intercultural dialogue and global communication.



- <sup>8</sup> Regarding business, one of the scopes of that debate would concern the attention to and the inclusion of diversity in international business; see e.g. Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, *Riding the Waves of Culture. Understanding Diversity in Global Business*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Irwin Mcgraw Hill, 1997).
- <sup>9</sup> Since, as mentioned, the focus is on ‘features of globalization,’ also in regard to *CiV* special attention is paid to underlying elements of theory of globalization – and thus less attention to the more economic statements within this document; reference to the latter will repeatedly be made just for reasons of exemplary clarification.
- <sup>10</sup> Cf. *CiV* [13], with special reference to *Populorum Progressio* [3], the encyclical by Pope Paul VI in 1967, which for her part precisely at this point refers to *Mater et Magistra* from 1961 by Pope John XXIII (see e.g. [200-204]).
- <sup>11</sup> See *CiV* [8].
- <sup>12</sup> *CiV* [33].
- <sup>13</sup> *CiV* [21].
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*; see also *CiV* [34] and [65].
- <sup>15</sup> *CiV* [21]; see also *CiV* [32] and [42].
- <sup>16</sup> *CiV* [26].
- <sup>17</sup> Cf. *CiV* [9]: “The risk for our time is that the *de facto* interdependence of people and nations is not matched by ethical interaction of consciences and minds that would give rise to truly human development.” See also *CiV* [25], [32] and [33].
- <sup>18</sup> *CiV* [36]; see also *CiV* [42].
- <sup>19</sup> *CiV* [9]. See also *CiV* [53]: “Today humanity appears much more interactive than in the past: this shared sense of being close to one another must be transformed into true communion. *The development of peoples depends, above all, on a recognition that the human race is a single family* working together in true communion, not simply a group of subjects who happen to live side by side.”
- <sup>20</sup> *CiV* [27].
- <sup>21</sup> *CiV* [33].
- <sup>22</sup> Cf. *CiV* [24]; see also *CiV* [42].
- <sup>23</sup> *CiV* [18]; see also *CiV* [51]. The encyclical underlines that ‘integral human development’ requires a broad view on human development which reveals different dimensions of the human being as a person as well as of the common good (e.g. in the areas of technology, biotechnology etc.). Thus, “*the social question* become a *radically anthropological question*” (*CiV* [75]; see also *CiV* [69-76]).

- <sup>24</sup> Cf. *CiV* [26].
- <sup>25</sup> *CiV* [23].
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*; see also *CiV* [32].
- <sup>27</sup> *CiV* [59].
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* In-depth studies on natural law, including its generalizing claims, its limitations, and its opportunities, are provided by Eberhard Schockenhoff, *Natural Law and Human Dignity. Universal Ethics in an Historical World* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003). Not least in regard to potentially ‘universal’ ethical grounds and moral norms, the *de facto* globalizing processes of development reveal some of the meta-ethical implications underlying (also) the concept of natural law as an issue still to be looked at more closely – in particular with respect to the problem of universal applicability of ethical principles and moral norms. As a part of such a closer look, we would most probably have to take up again the debate about the relation of secularized reason and the claim of rationality within the concept of natural law (the latter, though in a way remaining a bit unclear, is shortly mentioned by Heinz-Gerd Justenhoven, “Frieden durch Recht. Zur Relevanz des internationalen Rechtes in der Friedensethik der katholischen Kirche,” in *Friedensfähigkeit und Friedensvisionen in Religionen und Kulturen*, ed. Mariano Delgado, Adrian Holderegger and Guido Vergauwen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012), p. 265.
- <sup>29</sup> While at the beginning of the document, ‘*caritas in veritate*’ is translated as ‘charity in truth’ (see *CiV* [1]) one can also find the translation ‘love in truth’ (see *CiV* [9]).
- <sup>30</sup> *CiV* [6]; see also *CiV* [77].
- <sup>31</sup> This is a suggestion made by Ursula Nothelle-Wildfeuer, “Caritas in veritate. Globalisierung, Wirtschaft und Entwicklung,” in *Der Theologenpapst. Eine kritische Würdigung Benedikts XVI*, ed. Jan-Heiner Tück (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2013), pp. 83-96, esp. p. 83.
- <sup>32</sup> *CiV* [6].
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>35</sup> Cf. *CiV* [35]. Of course, ‘justice’ represents one of the core topics not only in Christian social teaching; it is also widely addressed in socio-political and socio-ethical debates. However, there are critical voices, mainly from experts in social philosophy like Judith Shklar, Avishai Margalit etc., that problematize from different angles the pattern of ‘justice’ (and of ‘injustice’ as its somehow complementary counter term) as a probably too self-evident element

of an ‘uncritical’ political theory, not the least since some of these theories might finally miss the real issues and challenges precisely of injustice; for more see Jürgen Manemann, “Vom Mangel an Anerkanntsein. Sozialphilosophische Perspektiven zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts,” *Herder-Korrespondenz* 67 (2013), pp. 414-418. For a different approach towards some similar critical reflection on ‘justice’ as being dealt within Christian social teaching see David Kaulemu, “Catholic Social Teaching at a Crossroad,” in *Catholic Theological Ethics. Past, Present, and Future. The Trento Conference*, ed. James F. Keenan (New York: Orbis Books, 2011), pp. 176-184.

<sup>36</sup> *CiV* [7].

<sup>37</sup> *CiV* [41].

<sup>38</sup> *CiV* [7]. In regard of the fact that the encyclical points at “the kind of charity which encounters the neighbor directly,” one could rightly ask whether calling ‘institutional charity’ “no less [...] effective” than ‘direct charity’ (*ibid.*) underestimates the challenges of institutional endeavors for the common good as it overestimates to a certain extent the effects of individual commitment, at least in view of the complexity of social problems in globalizing societies.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *CiV* [6].

<sup>40</sup> *CiV* [7].

<sup>41</sup> *CiV* [2]. See also, embedded in a broader theological context, *CiV* [34]: “Because it is a gift received by everyone, charity in truth is a force that builds community, it brings all people together without imposing barriers or limits.” This approach is also connected with a certain notion of the relation between religion and reason: “*Reason always stands in need of being purified by faith*: this also holds true for political reason, which must not consider itself omnipotent. For its part, *religion always needs to be purified by reason* in order to show its authentically human face. Any breach in this dialogue comes only at an enormous price to human development” (*CiV* [56]; see also *CiV* [74]).

<sup>42</sup> *CiV* [2].

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *CiV* [22]; see also the wording, though in a different context, in *CiV* [4].

<sup>46</sup> *CiV* [11]. A somehow similar critical comment concerns “the technocratic ideology so prevalent today, fully aware of the great danger of entrusting the entire process of development to technology alone, because in that way it would lack direction” (*CiV* [14]). However, the encyclical does not basically deny the significance of institutions, institutional resources and especially structural efforts

for global human development; on the contrary, it underlines their necessity (see also *CiV* [27]).

<sup>47</sup> *CiV* [16].

<sup>48</sup> *CiV* [17]; this can be said from a theological perspective, but it makes sense also within a mere phenomenological approach.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*; see also *CiV* [34].

<sup>52</sup> *CiV* [25].

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *CiV* [17].

<sup>55</sup> *CiV* [68].

<sup>56</sup> *CiV* [17].

<sup>57</sup> *CiV* [21]; see also the positive comment on the fact that “some areas of the globe, with a history of poverty, have experienced remarkable changes in terms of their economic growth and their share in world production [...]” (*CiV* [33]).

<sup>58</sup> *CiV* [24].

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* In this context, one may add another perspective, namely next to ‘activities in civil society’ to focus rather on ‘activities of or as civil society’; for more on this with reference to *CiV* see Ursula Nothelle-Wildfeuer, “Caritas in veritate,” pp. 95-96, and Margret Archer, “No man is an island,” *The Tablet* (18 July 2009), p. 10 and esp. p. 11.

<sup>60</sup> *CiV* [25]; see also *CiV* [64].

<sup>61</sup> *CiV* [59]: “Evolving societies must remain faithful to all that is truly human in their traditions, avoiding the temptation to overlay them automatically with the mechanisms of a globalized technological civilization.”

<sup>62</sup> *CiV* [55]; in this context the following is added: “While it may be true that development needs the religions and cultures of different peoples, it is equally true that adequate discernment is needed. Religious freedom does not mean religious indifferentism, nor does it imply that all religions are equal. Discernment is needed regarding the contribution of cultures and religions, especially on the part of those who wield political power, if the social community is to be built up in a spirit of respect for the common good” (*Ibid.*).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *CiV* [55].

<sup>64</sup> *CiV* [26].

- <sup>65</sup> *CiV* [2], with reference (cf. there footnote 62) to *Centesimus Annus*, the encyclical by Pope John Paul II from 1991.
- <sup>66</sup> For a short overview (with reference also to J. Habermas' and Ch. Taylor's views) see Christoph Halbig, "Anerkennung," in *Handbuch Ethik*, ed. Marcus Düwell, Christoph Hübenthal, and Micha H. Werner, 3<sup>rd</sup> updated ed. (Stuttgart/Weimar: J.B. Metzler, 2011), pp. 303-330, esp. p. 306.
- <sup>67</sup> *CiV* [26].
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>69</sup> Such reflection would have to involve issues like cultural relativism, and also the notion of the before mentioned 'cultural eclecticism' (within which "cultures are simply placed alongside one another and viewed as substantially equivalent and interchangeable [...]," finally to "the effect that cultural groups coexist side by side, but remain separate, with no authentic dialogue and therefore with no true integration") and 'levelling' (as "indiscriminate acceptance of types of conduct and life-styles") that both would mean "the separation of culture from human nature" so that "cultures can no longer define themselves within a nature that transcends them [...]" (*CiV* [26]). For critical remarks concerning the wording 'cultural eclecticism' see Christian Beck, "Die Sozialenzyklika Caritas in veritate," *Stimmen der Zeit* 227 (2009), pp. 631-637, esp. p. 634.
- <sup>70</sup> *CiV* [19].
- <sup>71</sup> See *CiV* [52]: "Truth, and the love which it reveals, cannot be produced: they can only be received as a gift [...]. That which is prior to us and constitutes us – subsistent Love and Truth – shows us what goodness is, and in what our true happiness consists. *It shows us the road to true development.*"
- <sup>72</sup> *CiV* [34].
- <sup>73</sup> Cf. *CiV* [36].
- <sup>74</sup> *CiV* [37]. The 'principle of gratuitousness', especially in its relation to justice, seems to be bound to a certain perception and attitude of 'mutuality' on all levels of humanely significant social action. Though of course itself being a rather complex issue, reflection on mutuality reveals some elements that show a certain similarity to what is meant in *CiV* by gratuitousness; for more on mutuality see the in-depth studies by Peter McCormick, *Moments of Mutuality. Rearticulating Social Justice in France and the EU* (Krakow: Jagellonian University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 11-13 and 147-154; there on p. 150 he says (with metaphoric reference to 'mutual inductance' in electricity): "Here is the use of the mutual that is independent of the use of the reciprocal [...]; the current is above all mutual only – the eventual action goes first in one way only. That is, the current goes

from the attentive, reflective person towards the destitute person. This is just the understanding of mutual and mutuality that has been the mainly operative one throughout this essay."

- <sup>75</sup> Cf. *CiV* [35].
- <sup>76</sup> *CiV* [36].
- <sup>77</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [1883] there with a quotation from *Centesimus Annus* [48], which itself refers to *Quadragesimo Anno*, the encyclical letter by Pope Pius XI from 1931.
- <sup>78</sup> *CiV* [57].
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>80</sup> *CiV* [42]. Since 'subsidiarity' is considered as so-called social principle, it should be applied not only to globalized development and universal cooperation; instead, it is seen as a basic principle of any social structure and cooperation everywhere and on all levels. Cf. *CiV* [60].
- <sup>81</sup> See *CiV* [57]: "Subsidiarity respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to others. By considering reciprocity as the heart of what it is to be a human being, subsidiarity is the most effective antidote against any form of all-encompassing welfare state."
- <sup>82</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [1885]: "The principle of subsidiarity is opposed to all forms of collectivism. It sets limits for state intervention. It aims at harmonizing the relationships between individuals and societies. It tends toward the establishment of true international order." In a sense, the principle of subsidiarity sets also limits to a certain, probably often unintended or even unconscious, misinterpretation of solidarity: solidarity that is not connected with subsidiarity "gives way to paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need" (*CiV* [58]).
- <sup>83</sup> Cf. *CiV* [39] and [43].
- <sup>84</sup> *CiV* [41]. *CiV* [57] puts explicitly subsidiarity into this context: "Globalization certainly requires authority, insofar as it poses the problem of a global common good that needs to be pursued. This authority, however, must be organized in a subsidiary and stratified way, if it is not to infringe upon freedom and if it is to yield effective results in practice." Insights of in-depth studies on this have been provided by Heinz-Gerd Justenhoven, "Frieden durch Recht," esp. p. 269. A critical approach towards the presentation of this issue in *CiV* provides Gerhard Kruip, "Entwicklung und Wahrheit. Die Sozialenzyklika Benedikts XVI. ermöglicht viele Lesarten," *Herder-Korrespondenz* 63 (2009), pp. 388-392, esp. p. 390.

- <sup>85</sup> *CiV* [41].
- <sup>86</sup> In the context of subsidiarity this is clearly stated in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [1883]: “Excessive intervention by the state can threaten personal freedom and initiative.”
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>88</sup> *CiV* [47].
- <sup>89</sup> *CiV* [57].
- <sup>90</sup> *CiV* [27].
- <sup>91</sup> *CiV* [27]. The quoted text from *CiV* relates also to some more effects that also concern the economy of ‘rich countries’ – revealing an interesting aspect of development cooperation which is not addressed in this essay: “It is important, moreover, to emphasize that solidarity with poor countries in the process of development can point towards a solution of the current global crisis, as politicians and directors of international institutions have begun to sense in recent times. Through support for economically poor countries by means of financial plans inspired by solidarity – so that these countries can take steps to satisfy their own citizens’ demand for consumer goods and for development – not only can true economic growth be generated, but a contribution can be made towards sustaining the productive capacities of rich countries that risk being compromised by the crisis” (*Ibid.*).
- <sup>92</sup> For a brief overview see J. Messner, “Sozialethik,” in *Katholisches Soziallexikon*, ed. Alfred Klose, Wolfgang Mantl, and Valentin Zsifkovits, 2<sup>nd</sup>, completely revised and extended ed. (Innsbruck/Wien/München: Tyrolia, and Graz/Wien/Köln: Styria, 1980), col. 2673–2681, esp. col. 2676. Cf. also Konrad Hilpert, “Sozialprinzipien,” in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Freiburg i.Br./Basel/Wien: Herder, 1993), vol. 9, col. 789–790.
- <sup>93</sup> *CiV* [57].
- <sup>94</sup> *CiV* [58].
- <sup>95</sup> *CiV* [53].
- <sup>96</sup> *CiV* [54].
- <sup>97</sup> Cf. e.g. *CiV* [48–50], also [27]. Regarding the “energy problem” *CiV* argues: “On this front too, there is a *pressing moral need for renewed solidarity*, especially in relationships between developing countries and those that are highly industrialized” (*CiV* [49]). In a comparable way, the larger context of those challenges is addressed by claiming: “[...] the protection of the environment, of resources and of the climate obliges all international leaders to act jointly and to show

a readiness to work in good faith, respecting the law and promoting solidarity with the weakest regions of the planet” (*CiV* [50]). With reference to a number of areas of that kind some experts of Christian social sciences suggest ‘sustainability’ as another (fourth) social principle, whereas one can also find arguments saying that sustainability would have to be seen as part of a broader and globalized notion of ‘solidarity.’

- <sup>98</sup> *CiV* [39] (with reference to *Populorum Progressio* [44]).
- <sup>99</sup> Cf. *CiV* [53].
- <sup>100</sup> *CiV* [41].
- <sup>101</sup> *CiV* [38].
- <sup>102</sup> *CiV* [39].
- <sup>103</sup> *CiV* [57].
- <sup>104</sup> *CiV* [58].
- <sup>105</sup> *CiV* [47].
- <sup>106</sup> As to opportunities, see *CiV* [59]: “*Cooperation for development* [...] offers a wonderful *opportunity for encounter between cultures and peoples.*”
- <sup>107</sup> *CiV* [58].
- <sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>109</sup> *CiV* [67].
- <sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>112</sup> *CiV* [47].
- <sup>113</sup> ‘Diversity management’ as part of a participative approach in the process of integral human development in a globalized world would exceed the usual though multifaceted (*quasi* micro-level) ‘diversity management’ as part of a comprehensive management concept and of an open and professional corporate culture of companies and institutions. However, quite a number of elements of the micro-level concept, in particular in regard to a broad notion of inclusion, may inspire respective macro-level concepts.
- <sup>114</sup> *CiV* [61].
- <sup>115</sup> Concerning the idea of a kind of ‘world authority’ *CiV* points at a similar problem: “Furthermore, such an authority would need to be universally recognized and to be vested with the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and respect for rights” (*CiV* [67], with reference – see footnote 148 – to the Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes* [82]).

<sup>116</sup> See for more on this Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, “Frieden durch Recht,” esp. pp. 265 and 267 (there ‘consensus’ and even the ‘consensus principle’ are explicitly mentioned); ‘consent’ is also required for setting up an efficient kind of ‘community of states’ (see *ibid.*, pp. 273-174).

<sup>117</sup> *CiV* [2].

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> *CiV* [9].

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, by quoting Second Vatican Council, pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes* [36].

<sup>121</sup> *CiV* [9].

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *CiV* [30].

<sup>124</sup> *CiV* [9].

<sup>125</sup> *CiV* [30]; this also applies to the Catholic social teaching (cf. *CiV* [31]). More specifically, the encyclical says: “The demands of love do not contradict those of reason. Human knowledge is insufficient and the conclusions of science cannot indicate by themselves the path towards integral human development. There is always a need to push further ahead: this is what is required by charity in truth” (*CiV* [30]).

<sup>126</sup> This essay did not intend to go into details about rather sophisticated issues concerning the interpretation of the tradition of the Catholic social teaching, as may e.g. be labeled by a kind of tension between ‘continuity and discontinuity.’ However, *CiV* explicitly refers to this issue (cf. *CiV* [12]). For more on self-conception and pretension of Catholic social doctrine see Johan Verstraeten, “Catholic Social Thought as Discernment,” *Logos. A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture* 8:3 (2005), pp. 94-111.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. *CiV* [31]. Both the title of the encyclical and its repeated pointing at the Christian fundamentals of ‘caritas in veritate’ have inspired a quite intensive debate in Christian social sciences about the basic pretension of Catholic social teaching, and subsequently of Christian social thought, to claim communicability and applicability within the general socio-ethical and socio-political debate; for more on this, emphasizing that this principle still prevails in *CiV* too, see Ursula Nothelle-Wildfeuer, “Caritas in veritate,” esp. pp. 84, 85, and 96. From a sociological point of view the encyclical’s “dialogue with social scientists” is stressed even more clearly by Margret Archer, “No man is an island.”

<sup>128</sup> Cf. esp. *CiV* [8], also *CiV* [6] and [9] to [12].

<sup>129</sup> *CiV* [8].

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> Cf. e.g. *CiV* [7], [21], [54], [79]. Also fighting hunger in a globalized context is considered as finally serving peace (cf. *CiV* [27]). On reverse, peace is understood as an important frame for solving global problems like water supply, protection of nature etc. (cf. *CiV* [51]).

<sup>132</sup> For more on this see Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, “Frieden durch Recht,” pp. 262-265; the emphasis of Catholic social teaching on peace is of remarkable impact on the Church’s early claims for a kind of institutionalization of ‘united nations’ (cf. *ibid.*, p. 262). See also *CiV* [57].

<sup>133</sup> *CiV* [72].

<sup>134</sup> *CiV* [11].

<sup>135</sup> *CiV* [9].

<sup>136</sup> *CiV* [11]: “[...] the Church, being at God’s service, is at the service of the world in terms of love and truth.”