

## ESSAY TWO

### Poetic Discourses

*“A literary work of art is a discourse abstracted, or detached, from the circumstances and conditions which make illocutionary acts possible; it is a discourse without illocutionary force.”<sup>1</sup>*

*RICHARD OHMANN (1971)*

*“The utterance ‘Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl’ is true if the following assertion is true, namely that the fairy-tale Little Red Riding Hood tells (explicitly or implicitly) that Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl.”<sup>2</sup>*

*GOTTFRIED GABRIEL (1979)*

**I**n this essay I would like to look more closely at literary art and in particular at what specifically literary uses of language are, as earlier theoretical work invites further reflection.

#### 1. Defining Literary Languages

Adapting some time ago J. L. Austin’s (1911-1960) distinguished work on ordinary language,<sup>3</sup> R. Ohmann proposed to focus especially on Austin’s notion of illocutionary acts. Ohmann’s aim was opposed

to those analytic philosophers who based their accounts of a literary work of art not on definitions but on versions of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance.<sup>4</sup> Instead, Ohmann offered a traditional definition of literary discourse consisting of a genus and species. After reflection, I think his work continues to offer some important and often overlooked insights about the nature of literary discourse and literary artworks.<sup>5</sup>

Although he does not choose to detail the difficulties of such traditional definitions,<sup>6</sup> Ohmann nevertheless specifies that the definition he pursues should be neither overly prescriptive nor merely persuasive. Rather, it should provide genuine insight into the nature of literature in that (a) it clearly demarcates the literary artwork from everything else, (b) that it demarcates the right class to which the literary artwork actually belongs as member, and (c) that it is perspicuous in the senses both of providing insight into literature and of helping to explain familiar but vague claims often made about literature.<sup>5</sup>

Besides providing these comments on the kind of account he is attempting, Ohmann also specifies the sense of the term "literary work" or "literature" which he hopes to define. "Literary work" here is to be taken in what he calls the "non-honorific sense" of "imaginative literature" as the term is commonly used. Hence any works, however distinguished their style, which are not imaginative in the familiar senses will not count as "literary works," and any works which are imaginative, however undistinguished their quality in the familiar senses, will count as literary works.

Given this initial description of both "literary work" and "literature," what then is the genus of the literary artwork? The literary work of art is not to be understood as a species of the genus *history*. For this genus is either too broad (history as a study of the past would include all empirical studies) or simply mistaken (history as

a study of the evolution of events would not include literature at all). The study of historical causes and effects moreover does not do justice to the peculiar interest which communities of readers have in the uniqueness of literary works.

Neither is the literary artwork to be understood as a species of the genus *psychology*. For despite the fact that literature seems to be the study of nothing more than mental events in the minds of authors and readers, this genus is simply too broad. Many entities besides literary works are also mental events of some sort, and to characterize the literary artwork as a member of the genus psychology would seem to court still further confusions rather than the clarity we seek. Since literary artworks however are not just mental events but linguistic structures of some peculiar sort, Ohmann moves to the suggestion that the proper genus of the literary artwork is neither history nor psychology but what he calls "discourse," that is, any sequence ". . . of speech and writing issuing uninterrupted from a single speaker or writer."<sup>7</sup>

If *discourse* then is the genus of the literary work, what is its species? Ohmann discusses six proposals. These proposals, when taken as a whole, might well be amalgamated into the kind of family-resemblance theory he wishes to avoid and yet when taken individually remain incomplete

(1) Reference is one aspect of language that some theorists like I. A. Richards tried to use as a means of specifying the peculiarity of the literary artwork. The claim here would be that in the literary artwork the referential function is in some sense subordinated to some other features of language.<sup>8</sup> Ohmann, however, rejects Richards' "astringent" notion of reference because it excludes some important features of literary discourse.

(2) Nor can discourse be adequately specified for the literary work by stressing its capacity for conveying assertions. This view

would encompass either some version of the propositional content view which remains controversial, or some undefined version of this theory, say the claim that literary works include not propositions but pseudo-propositions. Note, though, that Ohmann is nuanced here. He wants to reject the first interpretation while holding open the second interpretation for further investigation. He reformulates the second view thus as “. . . the question of whether assertion-like sentences in literature really do make assertions.”<sup>9</sup>

(3) A third function of discourse, besides referring and conveying assertions, is simply having meaning in the broad sense. Some, like M. Beardsley,<sup>10</sup> wanted to claim that what specifies literary discourse is the kind of meaning which literary discourse has, a suggested or connotated meaning, rather than a stated and denoted one. But this view is also incomplete because many non-literary works are rich in these kinds of indirect meaning. Moreover, it is arguably the case that one could find such meanings in any kind of discourse, even those where the examples are said to be poor in such respects.

(4) A fourth suggestion is that what distinguishes literary discourse from all other discourse is the peculiar effects it is used to generate. On S. Langer's account, literary discourse<sup>11</sup> is distinctive in arousing and ordering readers' emotions. Again, however, it is not difficult to argue that every kind of discourse, and not therefore distinctively literary discourse, has some effect on emotion. Moreover, such a criterion for literary discourse is also untestable in that it consists of effects which vary widely from one reader to another.

(5) Some, like R. Jakobson,<sup>10</sup> preferred to hold that what distinguishes literary discourse is the precedence of one of the constitutive elements of the speech event (context, message, contact, code in the relation between addresser and addressee) over the others. This view would seem to be a consequence of the reader having

already defined the discourse as literary, rather than being an antecedent of this definition.

(6) A last aspect of language which Ohmann picks out as a possible species for literary discourse is the highly structured character of literary discourse, a view which he finds in Jakobson. But this view too, just as the preceding emphases on reference, assertion, meaning, emotion, precedence, seems overly partial; while certainly demonstrable to some degree in all literary works, a highly structured quality can be found in many non-literary works as well.

## 2. Modifying the Speech-Act Account

With these earlier unsuccessful attempts at supplying a species for literary discourse in evidence, Ohmann turns to the task of providing a less objectionable account based on modifications in elements of Austin's theory of speech acts.

Recall that Austin distinguishes among the various kinds of acts which a speaker can perform, locutionary acts (saying what one says – I write correctly), illocutionary acts (in saying what one says performing a further kind of act within a conventional context – in writing correctly I make a statement), and perlocutionary acts (by saying what one says I perform a third kind of act – by articulating “I promise”, I make a promise).

Ohmann makes several thoughtful remarks about how each of these acts is altered slightly when we pass from speaking to writing. He also notes how the six unsuccessful attempts to define the species of literary discourse may be considered as falling into a set of three locutionary definitions which stress the text (1-3) and another set of three perlocutionary ones which stress the effects of the text (4-6). In this context he suggests exploring the possibility of articulating a species for literary discourse with the help of Austin's notion of illocutionary acts.

Ohmann proceeds by calling attention to one class only of illocutionary acts, performatives and their criteria, speech acts such as “I vote no,” and “I hereby dismiss the class.” Six criteria may be summarized from Austin’s extended account: (1) the existence of certain accepted conventional procedures, (2) appropriateness in invocation of particular procedures, (3) correct execution of the procedure, (4) complete execution of the procedure, (5) actual possession by relevant persons of mental acts presupposed for invocation of the procedure, and (6) actual conduct of the persons in accord with these beliefs.<sup>12</sup>

Arguing then in detail, Ohmann claims that if we take a particular example, say the illocutionary act of reporting one’s experiences and analyzing such an instance in its literary guise in a poem, then once we move beyond the innocuous first criterion we come up against a series of difficulties with each of the remaining five criteria. This analysis precipitates his interim conclusion. A literary work then “is a discourse abstracted, or detached, from the circumstances and conditions which make illocutionary acts possible; it is a discourse without illocutionary force.”<sup>13</sup>

But the central idea here is not yet in focus because this account is a negative one only. What is the positive result, if any, from this application of Austin’s notion to the case of the literary work? The key positive idea is that a literary work is that kind of discourse whose illocutionary force is mimetic.

Ohmann puts this positive context very well. In a literary work, as opposed to a non-literary work, “the writer pretends to report discourse, and the reader accepts the pretence. Specifically, the reader constructs (imagines) a speaker and a set of circumstances to accompany the quasi-speech-act and make it felicitous (or infelicitous – for there are unreliable narrators, etc.).”<sup>14</sup> What is constructed is in fact what R. Ingarden has described elsewhere as “an indefinitely

detailed imaginary setting for . . . quasi-speech-acts." Reports or statements or whatever which appear in literary works thus are not the same as reports or statements in nonliterary works; in the latter they are illocutionary acts, whereas in the former they are imaginary illocutionary acts. A literary work of art therefore is discourse consisting centrally of imaginary illocutionary acts.

This account, Ohmann observes, meets the demands he originally made on the kind of definition he proposed to find, for this definition of the literary work as discourse consisting centrally of imaginary illocutionary acts accomplishes three main things.

First, it does seem clearly to demarcate what we usually take to be literary works from nonliterary ones. Second, this definition does seem to demarcate the right class of discourses. And third, it does seem to yield insight in that it helps explain such familiar but obscure sayings as "literature is mimetic," "a literary work creates a 'world,'" "literature is rhetoric," etc.<sup>15</sup> So much then for an influential account some time ago of the nature of the literary work in terms of a particular construal of literary discourse.

### 3. Criticisms and Reformulations

While this account I think remains persuasive, we need to note nonetheless that a good deal of critical ground is covered here quite speedily before we get to Ohmann's own account.

Are in fact questions about reference, assertions, and meaning to be dealt with quite so expeditiously as Ohmann would have us believe? Moreover, when we get to Ohmann's own account we have again a very quick tour of what Ohmann finds to be the only relevant features of a theory of speech acts. But, to say the least, this kind of theory has not been left without both critical response and imaginative philosophical development. Finally, what about the crucial mat-

ter of just how we are to understand the entities that figure in literary discourse? These, however necessary, are simply omitted.

Perhaps we might find it fruitful to move more slowly than Ohmann does in order not just to fill out some of the related background here. We also should look more closely at a set of issues which his account cannot be expected to treat in detail. In particular, I would like to examine a sustained objection against the existence of fictional entities.

The topic of course is a familiar one in contemporary philosophy, especially since the criticism of Meinong's philosophy has not ceased to provoke interesting results in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and ontology. The critical version I want to examine here is a recent one which is part of a larger whole, a semantic theory of literature.<sup>16</sup> One way to get started is to distinguish with the German philosopher G. Gabriel different kinds of utterances which use fictional nominators in the subject position.

Here are four such utterances from the *Little Red Riding Hood*, widely familiar from the Grimm Brothers' collection of fairy tales. (1) "The bad wolf does not exist" assertive discourse in which we have, say, the affirming utterance of a mother who has just told her daughter the fairy tale and now wants to reassure her. (2) "The bad wolf does not exist" a fictionally narrated assertion in which we have, say, a possible verbal reaction of Little Red Riding Hood herself to her mother's warnings. (3) «Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl» – fictional discourse in which we have, say, a possible utterance of a storyteller who recounts a variant of the text that is found in the brothers Grimm. (4) "Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl" – assertive discourse in which we have, say, a possible utterance of a psychologist during a congress on literature and psychoanalysis.

Now given the common use here of the fictional nominators in the subject position, one argument for the existence of fictional

entities as referents for these fictional nominators might be put as follows. All four utterances are meaningful. To be meaningful, however, the nominators must be meaningful. For this to be the case, the nominators must refer to something. They cannot refer to real entities, however, so they must therefore refer to fictional entities. Hence fictional entities exist.

Gabriel, following Frege, rejects this argument. For although he accepts the first two statements, he rejects the third and consequently all the others. To be meaningful, the Fregean counter would assert, a nominator need not have reference, although it must have sense. Reference is a requirement only for utterances which have truth values, that is, for those which claim to be true, for assertive utterances in short like (1) and (4). Utterances which do not claim to be true, like (2) and (3), do not need to refer at all. This Fregean move allows us to dismiss the claim that utterances such as (2) and (3) entail the existence of fictional entities. But how are we to deal with the claim that utterances such as (1) and (4) do entail the existence of such entities?

Another Fregean move allows us to reject these remaining claims in the following way. Utterances such as (1) are singular, negative, existential statements. These statements can be understood as statements which are about the expression “the bad wolf” rather than about any fictive entity, “the bad wolf.” Gabriel puts the matter as follows: “the utterance, ‘the bad wolf does not exist’ may be analyzed as ‘the expression “the bad wolf” has no reference’ or ‘the expression “the bad wolf” is used fictionally.’”<sup>17</sup> In neither case is anything asserted about a fictional entity. Utterances such as (4) may be analyzed by looking for their truth conditions.

Gabriel’s version of this analysis goes like this. “The utterance ‘Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl’ is true if the following assertion is true, namely that the fairy-tale *Little Red Riding*

*Hood* tells (explicitly or implicitly) that Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl. Now the truth of (4) is a question of the correct interpretation of the Grimms' text. Then (4) is true if the sense of the text includes that Little Red Riding Hood was a six-year-old girl."<sup>18</sup>

Gabriel's analysis is not as lucid, perhaps, as some might want because, among other questionable matters, it includes a problematic distinction between explicit and implicit. Nonetheless this analysis, or one very much like it, enables us to hold that (4) is an assertion whose nominator (in this case a descriptive proper name) is not about a fictional entity but about the content of the Grimms' text.

There are several objections to this approach if we are willing to move into a discussion of possible worlds and hold for example that utterances like (3) may be true in a possible world. But, as Gabriel points out in his interesting response to this objection, the major problem here is just how to construe the relation between the semantical concept of fictional discourse and the ontological concept of fictional world. Since I have taken up some of these matters elsewhere, and since Gabriel's account is available for those who wish to pursue this objection, I prefer simply to note that an objection can be made here without going into the details of why I agree with Gabriel that such an objection finally fails.

We have then found a way of dismissing the claim that utterances like (1) (4) entail the existence of fictional entities. Consequently, we need to sharpen our reaction to Ohmann's views and hold that the relevant elements of literary discourse refer neither to fictional entities nor to fictional states of affairs but to fictional-like entities and fictional-like states of affairs, that is, to aspects of fictional texts as such.

#### 4. Literature and Semantics

To get a further grasp on several of the central issues with the problem of defining literary discourse, we may look in more detail at Gabriel's more general account of fiction.<sup>19</sup> In 1975, the same year in which Searle published his still-influential book, *Speech Acts*, Gabriel published his important book, *Fiktion und Wahrheit: Eine semantische Theorie der Literatur*.<sup>20</sup> However, in 1979 Gabriel articulated his theory more succinctly in the paper we have been examining, "Fiction – A Semantic Approach." Although Gabriel provides extended treatment of his view that literary works can and often do make truth claims in *Fiktion und Wahrheit*,<sup>22</sup> a claim which I want to contest for somewhat similar reasons to those which Ohmann rehearses, I would like to continue to focus attention on the more recent version of his theory, the 1979 paper.

Gabriel begins his discussion by stating his purpose in the light of two preliminary remarks. First, the notion of "fiction" here is to be taken in the way in which we have been taking so far the notion of "literary work," namely as any literary work regardless of its value. Second, a work of fiction such as an architect's recounting the story of a house which she has not yet constructed is a work of fiction, says Gabriel, but not a literary work of fiction – written expression is essential. Gabriel's aim is to provide ". . . a semantical characterization (including speech-act analysis) of literary works as fiction."<sup>21</sup> In the light of this semantical characterization, Gabriel then takes up the question of truths in literature.

The central concept in the semantical theory is that of "fictional discourse," an expression which should not be confused with the expression we have seen earlier of "literary discourse." The nature of fictional discourse may be understood with the help of a contrast between speaking-about and speaking-as-if. At an intuitive level we may be willing to concede that whereas non-fictional discourse

mainly consists of speaking-about, fictional discourse consists of speaking. Since however some speaking as if is in fact accompanied by the intention to deceive, an intention which cannot be imputed to most writers of fiction, further clarification is required.

Gabriel suggests that we understand speaking-about as a kind of rule-governed discourse. When speaking-about is exercised correctly, then, the suggestion continues, five rules are in effect. The first rule is that of reference. Speaking-about something most often comes to making use of referring expressions. These expressions may be proper names (“Obama,” “Natascha”), singular definite descriptions (“the former President of the United States” or “the fiancée of Natascha”), plural definite description (“the members of Parliament,” “the parents of Natascha”), singular indexical expressions (“I,” “this”), and plural indexical expressions (“we,” “these”). Referring expressions may be used to refer to something (“Obama,” “the retired Prime Minister”) or not used to refer to anything (“Natascha,” “the parents of Natascha”). When used to refer to something, referring expressions are used correctly. The rule of reference may be put as follows: (1) “when using a singular referring expression in ordinary expression in ordinary circumstances, the speaker must refer to one (and only one) person, thing, point of time, etc.” and similarly for plural referring expressions.<sup>22</sup>

A second rule is that of denotation. In speaking about something we often use predicative expressions in the place of grammatical subjects such as the (amusing?) example: “dragons are herbivorous animals.” This kind of speaking about has raised some difficulties. But briefly we can formulate the rule of denotation as follows: (2) “when using a predicative expression at the subject place, the speaker must know that the expression has a denotation.”<sup>23</sup>

Many cases of speaking about however are neither instances of reference nor of denotation but of assertion. When the speaker

says something, the speaker is claiming in addition that what is said is true. Three rules govern assertions: (3) the rule of sincerity – “the speaker must believe that his utterance is true;” (4) the rule of argumentation – “the speaker must defend the truth of his utterance;” and (5) the rule of consequence – “the speaker must accept the consequences of his utterance.”<sup>24</sup>

We may now use these rules to make the distinction we are after between speaking-about and speaking asif. Whereas speaking about are those instances where all five rules are in effect, speaking asif are those instances in which the rules of inference, denotation, sincerity, argumentation, and consequence are not infringed but simply out of place. Fictional discourse then is to be understood as speaking asif. To the objection that many historical works do include expressions which have referents or denotations, the reply is made that, though such expressions may have referents or denotations, they need not have them. This stress on contingency is the force of saying that for fictional discourse the five rules are out of place.

## 5. Truths in Literature

Against the backdrop of this semantical account of fictional discourse, Gabriel takes up the question of putative truths in literature. The question formulated here is: how can literary works be true? And two unsatisfactory answers are first pointed out.

One view consists in holding that what is true in literary works are precisely the true statements which some literary works contain. But this view is mistaken because, Gabriel says elliptically, it assumes “. . . that the truths of works of fiction are identical with the true statements which appear in the text or are implied logically by the statements of the text.”<sup>25</sup>

Another view consists in holding that what is true in literary works is precisely what is true in a possible world. But this view is

also mistaken for the same elliptical reason given against the first. We need not go further into what Gabriel may have in mind here when he rejects these two views so summarily, since we are interested more in his view than in those which he rightly or wrongly critiques.

Gabriel's own view is based on interpreting "meaning" more briefly than just in terms of what is actually stated by a text. We understand the meaning of many expressions, he points out, not just by rearticulating for ourselves the propositional content of what is stated, but by understanding what certain things are said to stand for, what they represent. The first way we may call meaning something by description, and the second meaning something by representation. For Gabriel ". . . a literary text must mean more than it says."<sup>26</sup> A literary work can mean more than it says by "suggestion, contextual implication, etc." – a list, we should note, which includes a number of very different items indeed.

If we go this route, then we can say that, even though a literary work may contain no true statements, it nonetheless can present truths which are not stated as such but which are shown by the text. These truths, Gabriel continues, are truths of a particular kind. That is, ". . . they are truths to which the recounted events, persons, and things, are in the relation of the particular to the general."<sup>27</sup> Since there is more than one kind of general entity, the relation between the particulars of the text and the general can allow for several variants.

Take a case where the general entities at issue are statements, what Beardsley calls "theses." The further question then arises as to just what kind of speech act these theses are. Gabriel holds that the propositional content of theses is "implied contextually."<sup>28</sup> If this is right, then a thesis cannot be an assertion or an argumentative speech act. Yet the rules of sincerity and consequence will still hold, since readers will expect that the author both believes the thesis to

be true and accepts its consequences. A thesis therefore is a peculiar species of modified speech act.

Finally Gabriel wants to claim that even literary works which contain no theses can still convey knowledge, since they may include particulars which stand in a different relation to the general than that of presenting a thesis, a view which is related to some of N. Goodman's reflections on exemplification. We are to understand "the general" here then on the Kantian model of "aesthetic idea" rather than on the Platonic one of "universal," that is as " . . . the surplus of meaning, i.e., the whole of all the possible connotations not said explicitly but shown implicitly or implied contextually by what is said in a text."<sup>29</sup>

These connotations, however, as Gabriel concedes, are not restricted to the domain of literary works only. To the question then as to how literary works can be true, Gabriel answers: both by describing something in a modified speech act and by presenting something, whether through suggestion, implication, or whatever.

Now I have settled on Gabriel's account of "fictional discourse" here for very much the same reason that I selected Ohmann's account of "literary discourse." Both in many respects are genuine contributions. But just as with the earlier account, so too here a number of problems need much more careful sorting than Gabriel has had the opportunity to pursue. I want for the moment to mention three only.

First, there is a difficulty in any semantic theory of literature, as Gabriel admits, as to how to decide what is going to count as a literary work of art. This difficulty is already evident at the outset of his paper when Gabriel passes over the distinction between 'work of fiction' and 'literary work of fiction' with only a brief example. In fact we cannot make the requisite distinction inside a semantic theory itself but only outside such a theory in the pragmatic realm of tradi-

tion, convention, author's intentions, and so on. Moreover, not just the nature of the literary work but also its interpretation must appeal to the pragmatic context. A semantic theory, even if correct, can only take us so far in dealing with the problem of truths in literary works, therefore, because it cannot of itself define just what those works are.

A second difficulty is I think much more substantial: the problem which this semantic theory has with the idea of showing. Gabriel's talk of showing is I think very much in the right direction. The problem is, as I indicated above, that he has lumped together under one tantalizing heading a whole batch of strange and perhaps in part irreconcilable procedures.

Remember that Gabriel here speaks, without qualification, of at least the following: "showing," "showing implicitly," "representing," "suggesting," "implying," "meaning more than it [the text] says."<sup>30</sup> But this won't do. If we are to hold, as Gabriel wishes, that literary works, whatever else they are, may be at least cognitive, then we will have to say quite plainly how. Gabriel, however, while telling us very helpfully just how a literary work in its speech-act aspect speaks as-if, has not yet informed us unequivocally about the other relevant aspects of the text.

Finally, even in the quasi-speech act analysis, Gabriel finally settles on as a way of parsing the claim that, at least in what it says (if perhaps not in what it shows), a literary work can present truths, I am not sure that I can follow his mainly Kantian-inspired account of generality.

### **Envoi: The Kantian Presupposition**

Recall that this account depends on the critical notion of the aesthetic since Gabriel, after Kant, wants to construe the "general" in terms of "aesthetic idea." But the Kantian notion of the aesthetic

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is suspect, as I have tried to demonstrate elsewhere. Unless that aesthetic notion can appropriately be reconstrued, we are left with a bare assertion that some kind of interpretation of the general as aesthetic idea will enable us to answer our questions about the nature of the different kinds of relations between the particular and the general. But why should we take Gabriel's word without further argument?

## Endnotes for Essay Two

- <sup>1</sup> R. Ohmann, "Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, (1971) 1-19. In what follows I will base my account on this key article. Ohmann's account rests on two important earlier papers: M. Weitz, "Truth in Literature," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 9 (1935), 116-129, and L. Ziff, "On Grice's Account of Meaning," *Analysis* 28 (1967), 1-8.
- <sup>2</sup> G. Gabriel, Manuscript, 1979.
- <sup>3</sup> Austin's most important works were published after his untimely death in 1960 at the age of 49. They include *Philosophical Papers* (1961), *How To Do Things With Words* (1962), and *Sense and Sensibilia* (1962).
- <sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein, 1953, I, paras. 65-67. See: Khatchadourian, 1971 and Mandelbaum, 1965. Ohmann's account rests on three important earlier papers: Stevenson, 1954; Ziff, 1953; and Weitz, 1956.
- <sup>5</sup> See: Robinson, 1952.
- <sup>6</sup> Ohmann, 1971, pp. 1-2, 15, 16.
- <sup>7</sup> Ohmann, 1971, p. 4.
- <sup>8</sup> See: Richards, 1924, pp. 272-273, which Ohmann cites. Despite Ohmann's structures, the passages remain very interesting, especially when compared for example with a counter-factual account such as the one discussed in chapter nineteen.
- <sup>9</sup> Ohmann, 1971, p. 6.
- <sup>10</sup> M. Beardsley, *Aesthetics* (NY: Macmillan, 1958), p. 127, which Ohmann cites.
- <sup>11</sup> See, for example, R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in: *Style in Language*, ed. T. A. Sebeok (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 359-377, which Ohmann cites.
- <sup>12</sup> See Austin, 1962, pp. 14-15 and Ohmann, 1971, p. 11.
- <sup>13</sup> Ohmann, 1971, p. 13.
- <sup>14</sup> Ohmann, 1971, p. 14.
- <sup>15</sup> See Ohmann, 1971, pp. 17-18, for a fuller account.
- <sup>16</sup> See Gabriel, 1979. In what follows I cite a manuscript copy.
- <sup>17</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 10.
- <sup>18</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 10.
- <sup>19</sup> Cf. L. Chamberlain, "Wittgenstein and Rilke," *TLS* 21 February 2020, p. 8.
- <sup>20</sup> Gabriel, 1975.
- <sup>21</sup> Gabriel, 1975, pp. 64-111.
- <sup>22</sup> pp. 3-4.
- <sup>23</sup> p. 4.
- <sup>24</sup> p. 6.
- <sup>25</sup> p. 13.

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- <sup>26</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 14.  
<sup>27</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 14.  
<sup>28</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 15.  
<sup>29</sup> Gabriel, 1979, p. 15.  
<sup>30</sup> See: Gabriel, 1979, p. 13-15.