

ONE

Strong Emotions and Basic Values¹

Ethical life grows from psychological capacities for empathy and emotion, the necessities for turn-taking and trust in conversation, and local social traditions and practices. [Yet] none of these alone suffices for ethics, or determines its emergence.²

[Achilles] is a man who lives by and for violence, who is creative and alive only in violent action. He knows that he will be killed if he stays before Troy, but . . . he accepts that certainty. His inadequacy for peace is shown by the fact that even in war the violence of his temper makes him a man apart and alone. His anger cuts him off from his commander and his fellow princes; to spite them he withdraws from the fighting, the only context in which his life has any meaning. He is brought back into it at last by the death of his one real friend, Patroclus.³

ORIENTATIONS

Many informed, commonsense discussions about better understanding the still obscure connections between strong emotions and basic values end fruitlessly. Most reflective persons today simply give up. Some give up on finding a unified account. Others just give up such matters to the cognitive and computational neuroscientists.

Failing philosophically, however, to investigate further the nature of such interconnections all too often turns out to be short-sighted. One consequence is that work in philosophical ethics often continues to make the mistake that T. S. Eliot

memorably called the “dissociation of sensibility,” the separation of thinking from feeling, of the cognitive and the evaluative from the emotive.⁴

Here I take up the particular case of several interactions between two basic ethical values (human life and personal dignity) and two basic emotions (anger and sympathy).⁵ With the suggestiveness of some recent empirical work on visual processes and a richly descriptive classical literary representation of negative ethical values,⁶ I try to suggest a correction to a still widespread, and seriously misleading, misconception. That misconception is the insufficiently critical view that strong emotional states thoroughly obscure ethical valuations.

In contrast, I try to suggest how proper intellectual intuitions of the contents of at least some basic ethical values may sometimes suggest the mutual implications of the evaluative, the cognitive, and the emotive, in both rational representations and emotional presentations.⁷ We need to understand better what and why we are often seeing clearly.⁸

My main concern is with one quite general issue: how to characterize, not improperly, several of the fundamental connections between the evaluative, the cognitive, and the affective. I will be suggesting that some failures to respond adequately to some basic ethical values are not always the consequences of overwhelmingly strong emotional states. Rather, such inadequate responses often follow upon perceptual, cognitive, and evaluative failures.

I. Ceramic Images

On one side of a Greek vase in the British Museum, and after more than three thousand years, we may still see today raging Aegean Bronze Age warriors clashing before the besieged city of Troy.⁹ The unknown vase painter has depicted two Homeric warriors, full length and naked¹⁰—except for their visually dazzling, gleaming helmets, shimmering shields, flashing swords, and bright spear points.¹¹ Hector is depicted in Achilles’ glinting armor, the very armor that Hector has stripped from the corpse

of Achilles' beloved friend Patroclus. And Achilles now wears the equally splendid armor that Thetis, his goddess mother, has urgently had Hephaestus forge anew.¹² Strikingly, the vase painter depicts both heroes as visually acute.¹³ They are glaring at one another and brandishing menacingly their glittering, bronze-tipped spears. All in furious physical readiness, they are straining to rush upon each other with an immense and truly terrifying violence.¹⁴

After scrutinizing the figures minutely, we follow the vase painter's depiction of the Homeric story in which Achilles hurls at Hector his long ashen spear.¹⁵ In the *Iliad* Book XXII, Homer describes the scene:

Hector made his swoop, swinging his sharp sword, and Achilles charged, the heart within him loaded with savage fury. . . .
 And as a star moves among stars in the night's darkening,
 Hesper [the evening star], who is the fairest star who stands in the sky, such was the shining from the pointed spear Achilles was shaking
 in his right hand with evil intent toward brilliant Hector.¹⁶

But Hector, while continuing to glare fixedly at Achilles, nimbly avoids the deadly throw by dropping to his knees. Unseen by Hector, however, the goddess Pallas Athena, Achilles' protector, retrieves Achilles' spear and returns it to him.

Then, Homer continues, Hector hurls his own spear at Achilles. But the spear sticks in Achilles' enormous, gloriously fabled shield. As sometime before, Hector again calls for help to his own divine protector, Phoebus Apollo.¹⁷ This time, however, Hector calls in vain.

So Hector draws from its intricately inlaid scabbard his "huge and heavy", sharply whetted bronze sword with its silvered hilt, and Achilles brandishes menacingly, for a second time, his fearful and miraculously retrieved spear.¹⁸ Then Hector sweeps his flashing sword at Achilles. But Achilles, while side-stepping the sword sweep, hurls his deadly spear again—this time right through Hector's neck. Hector falls noisily, choking out a last taunt, and, shortly afterwards, expires. Roaringly, like a raging lion says Homer, Achilles vaunts his triumph.

Now, in Homer's brutally realistic descriptions here and throughout the *Iliad*, one element in particular may merit renewed attention in our focus on ethical values and emotions, namely, the pre-eminence of the visual in many of even the obscure connections between ethical values and emotions. I would like to recall that a persons' non-conscious and conscious visual processes are not dissociated. Rather, these visual processes fully integrate the cognitive, affective, and evaluative moments in perception.¹⁹ Hence, I want to contend that empirical facts demonstrate that even reflective common sense divisions between feelings and valuations, between values and emotions, are misconceived.²⁰

After these orientations, and before coming back to scrutinize this memorable scene in European culture here and its sequel in Essay Eight, it will prove helpful if we take brief note of several further preliminaries.

II. Strong Emotions, Basic Values

The commonsense²¹ idea is that several quite strong emotions deprive us of ethical responsibility. That is, some strong emotions may sometimes incapacitate us for the perceptual, cognitive, and evaluative thinking that are essential conditions for being fully responsible ethically. Thus, many reasonably informed persons—say jury members deliberating on guilt or innocence in criminal cases of revenge killings and momentary insanity claims—often continue to believe that strong emotions greatly distort our capacities to respond properly to basic values. And, notably, on just these kinds of grounds such juries often acquit persons charged with such crimes.

More generally, consider some relations between, on the one hand, several quite basic ethical values, like those of human life and personal dignity; and, on the other, several quite strong emotions, like furious anger and revengeful hatred. Much of our experience seems to show that some strong emotional states often obscure our normal capacities to respond regularly and properly, in integrated ways, to some basic ethical values.²² Yet

when we critically re-examine detailed instances of, say, some important themes in the history of modern philosophy,²³ many thoughtful persons argue cogently for our capacity nonetheless to intuit intellectually at least some basic ethical values. Moreover, when we look again closely at some classical literary representations of strong emotions and basic ethical values,²⁴ a rather surprising suggestion may arise.

This suggestion goes contrary to many even relatively informed commonsensical beliefs today. For the suggestion is that some strongly negative emotional states like explosive anger²⁵ may exhibit an unusual kind of properly unified responsiveness to some positive ethical values, like personal dignity or its negation. Such strong emotional states may do so through perceptual presentations.²⁶ And these may be both conscious and non-conscious perceptual presentations of the objective contents of such positive ethical values as the value of human life.²⁷ Thus, far from overriding the disclosure of basic ethical values, some quite strong emotional states may actually reveal essential aspects of those values.²⁸

Now as Czeslaw Porebski has admirably shown with respect to Polish value theory, and Mariano Crespo with respect to early phenomenological inquiry, excellent philosophical work already exists for partly understanding these matters.²⁹ Moreover, very many empirical studies also exist, not just on emotions generally but especially on quite strong emotions.³⁰ Still, further sustained reflection on the intricacies of some interactions between ethical values and emotions may prove instructive.

But first, just how are we to understand the key expressions here? For now, let me suggest the following. Perhaps we may fruitfully take the cardinal expression “values” to denote generally what John Findlay (1903-1987), the distinguished English philosopher, once called “the excellence and desirability . . . which we attribute to certain sorts of objects, states [of affairs] and situations.”³¹ Note however that the key expression here—“which we attribute to”—entails very strong metaphysical presuppositions that eventually would need to be made explicit and then justified.

And perhaps we may usefully take the expression “emotions” to denote what some of the technical dictionaries call generally short-term evaluative, cognitive, and affective states characteristically directed towards . . . an object and “intrinsically connected with our beliefs.”³² Note here that the key expressions “directed” and “intrinsically connected” would also require sustained exposition and justification. Note too, especially in the contexts of political emotions, the perhaps overly narrow focus here on individual emotions to the apparent exclusion of what some distinguished contemporary historians increasingly refer to as “emotional communities.”³³

With these backgrounds in place we may now focus more sharply on significant concrete instances. But instead of discussing some current philosophical theories of ethical intuitionism, consider for a change just one richly significant literary representation of how emotions and passions seem to interact.³⁴

III. Furious Anger and the Value of Human Life

The *Iliad*'s³⁵ “characters,” the classicist Bernard Knox (1920-2010) has written,

are men in battle and women^[36] whose fate depends on the outcome. The war^[37] is fought by the Achaeans [i.e., the Mycenaean Greeks³⁸] against the Trojans for the recovery of Helen, the wife of the Achaean chieftain Menelaus [the brother-in-law of the leader of the Achaeans, Agamemnon³⁹]; the combatants are heroes who . . . engage in individual duels . . . a vision of individual prowess in combat. . . .^[40]

Knox offers pen portraits of the two major heroes.⁴¹

. . . Hector fights bravely but reluctantly; war, for him, is a necessary evil, and he thinks nostalgically of the peaceful past. . . . His pre-eminence in peace is emphasized by the tenderness of his relations with his wife [Andromache] and his child [Astyanax] and also by his kindness to Helen [see *Iliad* VI], the cause of the war which he knows in his heart will bring his city to destruction. We see Hector always against the background of the patterns of civilized life—the rich city with its temples and palaces, the continuity of the family.⁴²

On the evidence of Homer's magnificent text,⁴³ all of this is true. But this portrait of Hector is unfinished, for we need to recall the scene of Hector's brutal killing of Achilles' beloved companion, Patroclus. There, Hector strips Patroclus' corpse of Achilles' armor and especially of his shield,⁴⁴ and then, clad in Achilles' armor, Hector furiously drives the Achaians back to the sea. Nor should we forget that, for all of Homer's studied portrayal of Hector's humanity, Homer does not fail to depict Hector also as a late bronze-age warrior chieftain. Like Achilles, Hector too knows, and wants to know, no other way of fighting than fighting with extraordinary violence and brutality. Thus, Hector's peacefulness detracts in no way from his ferocious furies.

And now, here is a pen portrait of Achilles.

[Achilles] is a man who lives by and for violence, who is creative and alive only in violent action. He knows [from his goddess mother, Thetis] that he will be killed if he stays before Troy, but . . . he accepts that certainty. His inadequacy for peace is shown by the fact that even in war the violence of his temper makes him a man apart and alone. His anger cuts him off from his commander and his fellow princes; to spite them he withdraws from the fighting, the only context in which his life has any meaning. He is brought back into it at last by the death of his one real friend, Patroclus; the consequences of his wrath and withdrawal fall heavily on the Achaeans, but most heavily on himself.⁴⁵

Again, on the evidence of the text, this is true. But this portrait is also unfinished. For we must not overlook earlier scenes where Achilles tries to comfort his companion's father when he comes to lead Patroclus off to the war in which he will die. That is, besides his explosive rages, Achilles also has strong capacities for reflection and valuations, especially for reflective memory, for evaluative love, and for the great consolations he will later show Hector's grieving father. Like Hector, Achilles too is a furiously ferocious Aegean bronze-age warrior hero. But Homer depicts him, too, as a flawed but nonetheless profoundly human being.

With these reminders in hand, we may now return to the *Iliad's* climactic scene: Achilles' killing of Hector.⁴⁶

IV. In the Middle of Feeling and Knowing

We may begin by dividing the scene of Achilles' killing of Hector into three brief, closely related visual phases—emotive, cognitive, and evaluative.⁴⁷ Consider the phases, however, not as successive moments but as concomitant ones.⁴⁸

1. A Moment of Extreme Emotion

We remember that, initially, Homer describes Achilles and Hector as scrutinizing one another very closely.⁴⁹ There is sustained eye contact.⁵⁰ We know today that, physiologically speaking, the eyes of Achilles and Hector are not still at all; in fact, their eyes are moving incessantly.⁵¹ Given however the imminence of their extremely violent clash, the archaic brain systems that control their emotional experiences and expressions must be even more strongly activated than normally, and the pupils of their darting eyes must be very largely dilated.⁵²

As we have already noted, Homer devotes much description to the brilliance of the brightly shining armor glinting from the bronze helmets, the elaborately inlaid shields, and the heavily worked grieves. There is also a good deal of physical movement as the warriors jockey for advantageous positions. And there is above all the extremely alert eye of Hector that enables him to avoid with great agility Achilles' thoroughly practiced throw of his gleaming spear.⁵³

But this scene could not take place as Homer represents it, with his characteristically very detailed realism, without assuming, not a separation in each participant between cognitive, affective, and evaluative elements, but a deeply integrated unity. Consider again some details.

After acutely eyeing one another, Achilles first throws his spear ineffectually at Hector. Achilles missing his target is probably not just a result of Hector's extremely fast, almost reflex avoidance movements. But that such an extraordinarily accomplished warrior as Achilles misses also suggests some disruption in Achilles' eye-tracking,⁵⁴ his attempts to determine the

exact points at which to fix his aim on Hector's continuous eye-head movements.⁵⁵ Is it Achilles' extremely violent emotion that distracts him?

But there is also the repeated detail of Achilles first "eyeing" Hector with highly aroused attention to detect any exposed flesh. And then there is Achilles focusing his dilated pupils with intense fixity on a very small spot on Hector's lower neck, the only very slightly exposed spot where a single successful spear strike might succeed in killing Hector almost immediately. This is not distraction.

The keenness of vision on the part of both warriors results from the very great emotional arousal of a huge fear in Hector and a great fury in Achilles. These powerful emotions have cascaded the hormones in both persons—tightened their muscles, quickened their heartbeats, and almost unnaturally sharpened their eyesight.

In their final clash, then, have rage and fear totally eclipsed any capacities for their thinking further? Are all of the possibilities for their reflection, deliberation, evaluation, judgment, and choice now excluded?

The momentary dominance of the emotional does seem evident. Yet even in this moment of exceptionally high emotional excitement, the emotional element in the strained relations between ethical values and passions remains inextricably linked with the cognitive and affective elements. Here is how.

After Achilles hurls his first spear throw, Hector, we remember, successfully ducks the flying spear. Hector's fear-filled knees have now steadied, whereas before, when Achilles finally runs him down before the walls of Troy, Hector's knees, Homer tells us, were "shaking" with fear. And what Homer memorably calls Achilles' "black heart" is no longer "pondering"; rather, Achilles' black heart is now, Homer says, filled to overflowing, not just emotionally with passionate fury, but also cognitively with "evil intent."

Homer writes that Hector has lunged with his sword ineffectually at Achilles.⁵⁶ But Hector's own failure to strike fatally

results not just from Achilles' extremely well-practiced feints and dodgings. Rather, his failure follows from deficiencies in the non-conscious co-ordinations of Hector's eye-head movements.⁵⁷

Hector fails then not because of his fearful emotion. He fails because of his weakened co-ordination, his physical readiness worn down from his racing more than three times round the Trojan walls, Homer says, before "swift-footed" Achilles finally corners him against the fabled Scaean Gates.

Perhaps after this first emotive moment in the clash between Achilles and Hector, we may try to formulate a first provisional claim about ethical values and emotions.

A First Provisional Formulation

Sometimes, what can account for a failure to respond adequately to an ethical value is not the consequence of an emotional state obscuring that value, but of something else altogether, for example, of a physical deficit.

2. Two Different Cognitive Moments

After such an emotionally charged moment, consider now a second crucial moment, what we may call here "a know-how moment," a practical cognitive moment. Achilles succeeds on his second attempt, throwing his recovered spear straight through the bottom of Hector's only very slightly exposed neck. Homer writes:

[Achilles] was eyeing Hector's splendid body, to see where it might best give way, but all the rest of the skin was held in the armor, brazen and splendid, [that Hector had] stripped when he cut down the strength of Patroclus; yet [the body] showed where the collar-bones hold the neck from the shoulders, the throat, where death of the soul comes most swiftly: in this place brilliant Achilles drove the spear as he came on in fury, and clear through the soft part of the neck the spear point was driven.⁵⁸

This description of Achilles driving the bronze spear point of his fire-hardened, ashen spear into the base of Hector's exposed throat, barely showing at the intersection between his helmet and his armored breastplate, is characteristic of Homer's brutal visual scenes.⁵⁹ We almost see Achilles' cognitive know-how terribly at work. Homer's epic realism enables readers to imagine visually Hector's white throat pierced with darkly yellowing bronze. Further, this narrative realism⁶⁰ prepares readers for visualizing the coming dehumanization of Hector's soon-to-be-defiled corpse.⁶¹

Before the imaginations of Homer's readers, then, Hector, with his throat transfixing by Achilles' long spear, and hugely encumbered in Achilles' magnificent and glittering bronze, is crashing clatteringly to the dusty ground. The heavy ashen spear at the bottom of his neck drags Hector downwards. He seems to be able to do no more than gasp out his life's blood and breath.⁶² However, although extraordinarily accurate in transpiercing Hector's white throat, Achilles' darkly yellowing bronze spear-point does not, Homer says grittily, "sever [Hector's] windpipe." A last, verbal—and cognitive—exchange ensues.

Above the now expiring Hector, Achilles "vaunts" his vengeance for Hector's killing of his dearly beloved friend, Patroclus. Still, Hector manages to choke out a final entreaty. He supplicates Achilles to return his body to his parents and to accept the abundant "bronze and gold" they will give him in ransom. But Achilles ragingly retorts with an unforgiveable and dehumanizing insult. He calls the dying Hector a "dog," an animal Greeks considered to be utterly shameless.⁶³ At the same time, Achilles almost dehumanizes himself in the horror of his bloody fantasy. Homer has Achilles shout out:

No more entreating of me, you dog, by knees or parents.
I wish only that my spirit and fury would drive me
to hack your meat away and eat it raw for the things
that you have done to me. . . .⁶⁴

Then Hector speaks his dying words and expires. Homer writes:

Then, dying, Hector of the shining helmet spoke to him:
 I know you well as I look upon you, I know that I could not
 persuade you, since indeed in your breast is a heart of iron.
 Be careful now; for I might be made into the god's curse
 upon you, on that day when Paris and Phoebos Apollo
 destroy you in the Skaian gates, for all your valor.
 He spoke, and as he spoke the end of death closed in upon him,
 And the soul fluttering free of the limbs went down into Death's
 house
 mourning her destiny, leaving youth and manhood behind
 her.⁶⁵

Achilles stoops finally to retrieve his armor from the stripped and now expired Hector. And the Achaean warriors crowd round to share in his triumph.

But, quite uncharacteristically, Achilles hesitates. Achilles hesitates between either immediately trying to breach Troy's main gates before him with his newly emboldened comrades, or returning to the Achaean ships to give his companion Patroclus, at last, his proper burial.⁶⁶

And then, very surprisingly after the furiously raging killing but moments before, Achilles begins to question himself in a different kind of cognitive moment, a cognitive self-reflective moment importantly different from the moment of cognitive practical know-how. "Yet still," Achilles asks himself, "why does the heart within me debate on these things?"⁶⁷ And some of Homer's readers ask: "Is this the same 'heart of iron' that Hector has just attributed to Achilles?"

What makes Achilles hesitate is his unexpected two-mindedness. After Achilles' iron resolution has shortly before driven him unrelentingly in his explosive rage and extremely violent killing of Hector, Achilles now hesitates to finish with Troy altogether. That is, despite the still continuing, although slowly ebbing, effects on him of his extremely violent emotion, Achilles is reflecting and weighing the values of now slaughtering the people of Troy or of returning to bury his beloved companion.

But this divided mental state in no way involves the separation of the cognitive, the emotive, and the evaluative. For Achil-

les almost immediately makes a strongly felt, but well weighed evaluation. He decides not to delay Patroclus' cremation any longer. He urges the excited Achaeans to return calmly with him to their beached ships and to prepare the funeral rites for Patroclus.

Before moving on, however, perhaps we may try to formulate a second provisional claim about ethical values and emotions.

A Second Provisional Formulation

Sometimes, what can account for a failure to respond adequately to an ethical value is not the consequence of an emotional state obscuring that value but of something else altogether, for example of a cognitive failure.

3. An Evaluative Moment of Disrespect

A last major moment now occurs. Achilles experiences the rekindling of his passionate rage. Achilles is staring again at Hector's dead body. An essential part of this further visual experience is the succession of his rapid yet very precise eye movements. With the vivid memory of Patroclus' own corpse suddenly before him, in a series of reflex saccadic movements, Achilles' eyes unconsciously palpate the figure of Hector's corpse.⁶⁸ Then, a conscious saccadic movement follows on the preceding unconscious reflex.⁶⁹ Achilles intentionally and voluntarily directs his gaze onto Hector's face and onto the fatal spear wound now gaping at the bottom of Hector's neck.

But we may imagine still a further movement here as well, an anti-saccadic one.⁷⁰ That is, Achilles then averts his eyes from the face of Hector's corpse and deliberately directs his gaze onto the dead hero's still unmarked torso. In this renewed look at Hector's almost perfect male body is where the visual similarities deeply lie with his remembered vision of the equally almost perfect male body of the dead Patroclus.

Achilles' returning memories here⁷¹ are of Patroclus' own body, the body, the young body, of an extraordinarily fit

bronze-age warrior. What rekindles Achilles' furious anger then is not Hector's face; what rekindles Achilles' emotive fury are the cognitive memories of his beloved companion Patroclus, whom Hector's still unblemished torso brings rushing back to mind.⁷²

Yet Achilles focuses his eyes once again on the corpse of Hector. And Achilles sees all at once the corpse of the person who had brutally killed Patroclus, stripping him of Achilles' own armor, and then, though losing the bloody struggle for possession of Patroclus' corpse, exulting in that armor, vaunting his triumph while driving the Achaians back against their ships on the sandy shore. Fully seeing Hector's corpse rekindles Achilles' raging fury.

Achilles thinks again. But now he thinks not, as before, of how to bury Patroclus with all the dignity the corpse of a heroic warrior fully deserves. Nor does he think now, as he will later, of how he might grant the wish of Hector's inconsolable father to recover Hector's own corpse for heroic burial also. Achilles now thinks only of how to bring the very worst shame upon what Homer repeatedly calls Hector's "glorious" body. Before the eyes of all the heroic men and devoted women of Troy and their families gathered on the embattled walls of Troy and looking on grievously, Achilles will drag Hector's corpse round and round in the endless swirling dust. He grasps the feet of the corpse and mutilates still further the body of the truly heroic warrior, whom he himself has moments before insulted as no less than a shameless dog. Homer writes:

[Achilles] . . . now thought of shameful treatment for glorious Hector.

In both of his feet at the back he made holes by the tendons,
in the space between ankle and heel, and drew thongs
of ox-hide through them,
and fastened them to the chariot so as to let the head drag,
and mounted the chariot, and lifted the glorious armor inside it,
then whipped the horses to a run, and they winged their way
unreluctant.

A cloud of dust rose where Hector was dragged, his dark hair
was falling

about him, and all that head that was once so handsome was
tumbled
in the dust; . . . Zeus had given him over
To his enemies, to be defiled in the land of his fathers.⁷³

Despite, then, his very great emotion, Achilles is still very much able to think and evaluate. Indeed, Achilles thinks of the basic ethical values, that he now intends to violate the dignity of the human person, and life itself.

In fact, Achilles has never lost his capacities to think and to evaluate and not just to feel. For even in the throes of an overwhelming rage in full cry in his killing of Hector, Achilles is not thoughtless. His passionate fury has not completely overridden his capacity either to think or to respond to basic ethical values. Here, then, the deeply suggestive surprise is that Achilles is still able to respond fully to ethical values. He responds, however, to what a Polish ethical thinker once called negative ethical values.⁷⁴

Yet in the immediate bloody aftermath, while now thinking more fully once again and no longer just acting almost thoughtlessly, Achilles seems able to think of nothing so much as how to make of Hector's corpse a shameful thing. He will abandon in the dust, round the battlements of Troy, Hector's mangled corpse for the starving dogs from the besieged city to devour. And yet, and yet . . . For, moments later, Achilles will change his mind. After dragging the corpse round Troy's thronged walls,⁷⁵ he will not abandon Hector's corpse to the famished dogs. He will finally drag Hector's corpse in the dust all the way back to his commodious tented shelter in the Greek encampment.

Later, in the final sacking of Troy, the Achaeans will kill Hector's wife and parents, and then from the high walls of Troy they will throw Hector's only son, Astyanax, to his death below.⁷⁶ And still later, in accordance with his fate and the warning of his goddess mother, Achilles himself will die in battle, mortally wounded by an arrow let fly by Paris, Hector's younger brother and the seducer of Helen, an arrow guided by Hector's protector god, Apollo, who earlier could not save him from Achilles' wrath.⁷⁷

But, finally, we ourselves are left today puzzling about how we are to understand such tragic matters, such entanglements of ethical values and emotions (see Essay Eight below). Before ending, however, perhaps we can once again try to formulate a final provisional claim about ethical values and emotions.

A Third Provisional Formulation

Sometimes, what can account for a failure to respond adequately to an ethical value is not the consequence of an emotional state obscuring that value but of something else altogether, for example of an evaluative failure.

ENVOI: VALUES AND VISION

Part of such an understanding can be exclusively neither literarily critical nor falsifiably scientific; such an understanding of values and emotions must also be, even if not exclusively, philosophical, for we can no longer continue today to elude the metaphysical matters of consciousness, of mind and body, still intermingling mysteriously.⁷⁸ In retrospect, however, several issues appear salient.⁷⁹ And these issues may give us food for further critical reflection.

One issue is the very idea of an action,⁸⁰ in particular, the idea today of that mental act called intentional action.⁸¹ Yet we are told that there are different levels of mental action and different kinds of mental acts. But the very idea of “levels” of mental action already raises problems, and the proper differentiation of mental acts also remains problematic.⁸²

Still, when we return to the issue with which we began, characterizing not unsatisfactorily the nature of the so-called “integration” of the cognitive, the emotive, and the evaluative, perhaps we can now appreciate that their interaction does not seem to be properly called “integrated.” Rather, as our examination of an extended classical literary example, together with our recollection of some current empirical detail to make key details explicit, have suggested, these phenomena may now seem to be better described as “mutually implicative.”

The other issue is this idea of the so-called mutual implication of the emotive, the evaluative, and the cognitive aspects of thinking. These aspects are certainly independent; each certainly has its own nature. But each seems to be just as certainly interdependent; none can exist separately. These concomitant, and not merely successive, aspects of the mental thus appear to be distinct but not separate. This has been the point of the extended emphasis here in the preceding analyses on visual processes.⁸³ For visual processes appear to show extraordinarily well both the independence and yet the interdependence of the mind's cognitive, emotive, and evaluative aspects. Moreover, they seem to be not successive phenomena, but quasi-simultaneous ones.

Perhaps we may put this summary point then in the form of a general question. Regarding the nature of the relations between ethical values and emotions, and in light of the analyses above, can even the informed commonsense idea that sometimes very strong emotions render us ethically irresponsible be critically sustained any longer? If not, then from now on perhaps we will just have to try to see better, to see more acutely, just how responsible, in fact, we so often are. Developing such an acuter vision in the ethical domains, however, requires more than exclusively philosophical reflection; it requires empirical, historical, religious, and aesthetic reflection, as well—many more practical and not just theoretical particulars. All too often continuing to see such quite important matters badly, it seems we sometimes need rather urgently to see them better.

Endnotes: Essay One

- ¹ This essay is a newly revised version of an invited paper first presented at the Second Central and Eastern European Conference on Ethics at the Palacky University in Olomouc, Czech Republic, on 28-30 May 2015. The essay was later solicited by, and then first published in, the Czech online philosophical journal, *Aither* 15 (2016), 18-45 (<http://www.aither.cz/casopis/>).
- ² Hayward 2017.—Note that in order to make this text especially useful for study purposes, I have included here and throughout these essays more than the usual number of endnotes. For the usual senses

of ordinary English language expressions, see the two-volume 6th ed. of the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (hereafter, SOED 2007). For contemporary English language philosophical uses, I have relied mainly on the understandings of these expressions in the most recent contemporary English language reference work, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. R. Audi, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). (In the notes below, “standardly” refers to an “account” in Audi 2015; an account is “standard” merely in the sense here that it comes from a reputable contemporary philosophical dictionary.) I have also used the last updated versions of the pertinent articles in the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by E. N. Zalta (hereafter cited as “Zalta”).

- 3 Knox, in *The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces*, ed. M. Mack *et al.*, 5th Continental Edition (New York: Norton, 1987), 65. Further citations from Homer are from this translation. Also, cf. S. Farron, “The Character of Hector in the *Iliad*,” *Acta Classica* 21 (1978), 39-57.
- 4 Eliot first wrote of the dissociation of sensibility in his 1921 article, “The Metaphysical Poets,” reprinted in T. S. Eliot, *Selected Prose*, ed. F. Kermode (New York: Harcourt, 1975), 59-67. Cf. L. Menand, “Dissociation of Sensibility,” in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, ed. R. Greene *et al.*, 4th ed. (Princeton: PUP, 2012), 369.
- 5 For details on the neuropsychological account of consciousness I rely on here cf. S. Dehaene, *Consciousness and the Brain* (New York: Viking, 2014), esp. 115-160. In general, cf. R. Van Gulick, “Consciousness,” in Zalta (Spring 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/consciousness/>; A. Brook and P. Raymont, “The Unity of Consciousness,” in Zalta (Winter 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/consciousness-unity/>; and C. Siewert, “Consciousness and Intentionality,” in Zalta (Fall 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>.
- 6 Cf. C. Porebski, *Polish Value Theory* (Cracow: Jagiellonian UP, 1995), 62-64. A second enlarged edition is in active preparation. For negative values, see the selections from H. Elzenberg on 129-134.
- 7 Cf. S. Siegel, *The Contents of Visual Experience* (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
- 8 Some interconnections between visual experience and the occasional medley between immediate and mediate knowledge are discussed in M. McGrath, “Knowing What Things Look Like,” *The Philosophical Review*, 126 (January 2017), 1-41.
- 9 Cf. the colored plate in *Greece and Rome: The Birth of Western Civilization*, ed. M. Grant (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 50, bottom, reproduced from the British Museum in London.
- 10 For a brief and recent overview, see B. Graziosi, *Homer* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), and the up to date “Further Reading” section on 137-148.

- ¹¹ Cf. J. Georganas, “Weapons and Warfare,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Bronze Age Aegean (ca. 3000-1000 BC)*, ed. E. H. Cline (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 305-314, esp. 310-311.
- ¹² Cf. the two scenes from the side walls of the peristyle of the House of Achilles in Pompey reproduced as illustrations nos. 34a and 34b in M. Beard and J. Henderson, *Classical Art: From Greece to Rome* (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 42. In the first scene, Vulcan (Hephaestus), at his forge, shows the specially commissioned new armor to Achilles’ goddess mother, Thetis. In the second, Thetis delivers the new armor to her son. The Foundry Painter has depicted a very different representation of the first scene on a cup to be seen in the *Antiken Sammlung* in Munich and, in reproduction, in Boardman 1975, illustration no. 262.1.
- ¹³ Visual acuity, or sharpness of vision, is the capacity of the eye “to distinguish between objects that lie close together. This hinges on the ability of the eye to focus incoming light to form a sharp image on the retina” (Coleman 2010, 861). In the case at issue here, the objects that lie close together are the various almost completely overlapping pieces of bronze armor that protect the protagonists from spear thrusts. Given the unconsciously darting movements of the warriors’ eyes and their continual body feints and head movements, detecting any still exposed vital points requires extremely sharp vision.
- ¹⁴ Concerning these preparatory physiological events, note some recent empirical observations, like the following: “Activity in [the brain’s] motor cortex predicts specific [bodily] movements seconds before they occur, but [just how] this preparatory activity related to upcoming movements is obscure . . . The relationship of this complex preparatory activity [the correlation of ‘intermingled motor cortex neurons shows puzzlingly diverse selectivity for multiple movement directions with complex dynamics’] to future movements is not understood. A key question is how preparatory activity [in the motor cortex] evolves into commands that descend to motor centers to trigger movement” (N. Lui *et al.*, “A Motor Cortex Circuit for Motor Planning and Movement,” *Nature* 519 [5 March 2015], 51).
- ¹⁵ For the Greek text of Book XXII, lengthy introduction and interpretation, plus extensive commentary and bibliography, see I. J. F. De Jong, *Homer: Iliad Book XXII* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). De Jong’s Greek text is her own collated text of the *Iliad* from Munro’s 1922 text in the Loeb edition and from more recent ones. I have limited my concerns here to the language of the English translation only, despite roughly two hundred years of close attention to Homer’s Greek, which still rewards renewed and thorough scrutiny. Especially important here are the extraordinary variations in Homer’s use of modal expressions. See, for example, the innovative analyses relying on contemporary linguistic

research in J. Wilmott, *The Moods of Homeric Greek* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), esp. the “Catalogue of Modal Uses” of passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, 211-237; G. C. Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals: An Investigation of Classical Greek* (Amsterdam: Brill, 1994); and B. Louden, “Pivotal Counterfactuals in Homeric Epic,” *Classical Antiquity* 12 (1993), 181-198.

- ¹⁶ *Iliad*, II 311-312; 317-320; tr. R. Lattimore (my underlines), as partly reprinted in Mack 1987.
- ¹⁷ See the respective stances of Achilles and Hector, each with his spear and shield, closing with one another, on the late sixth-century BCE Berlin painter’s elaborate red-figure calyx cup from Athens in the British Museum, reproduced in *The Oxford History of Classical Art*, ed. J. Boardman (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 77, illustration no. 75. The editor of this section of the Oxford history, A. Johnston, comments: “. . . it is Homer’s text that is illustrated in depth, with the figure of Achilles [on the left] about to triumph over the defeated Hector. [Behind Achilles] Athena encourages her protégé, while [behind Hector] Apollo, the Trojan’s divine helper, signals his acceptance of the will of Zeus by walking away; yet he turns, displaying his arrow, auguring Achilles’ death from the bow of Paris” (p. 78). For a more detailed illustration of the same scene but with the four figures much more closely engaged, see illustration 3.1 of the early fifth century Athenian cup, reproduced from the Louvre in Paris (inventory no. G 115) in P. Jones *et al.*, revised by R. Osborne, *The World of Athens*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 85.
- ¹⁸ See especially the very extensive collections of Mycenaean armaments in the National Archeological Museum in Athens.
- ¹⁹ Note that philosophers do not agree even today on the exact nature of general perceptual experience. While the biological and psychological sciences continue to refine current understandings of perception, the nature of perceptual experience itself continues to divide philosophers between, very roughly, those holding a representational conception of experience, turning on the mind’s most basic *representing* reality as mind-independent; and those holding a relational conception of experience, turning on the mind’s most basic *relating* human beings to mind-independent reality. Cf. the sustained arguments between two such contemporary analyses of perceptual experience in J. Campbell and Q. Cassam, *Berkeley’s Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?* (Oxford: OUP, 2014). On related Greek conceptions, see the essays in A. A. Long, *Greek Models of Mind and Self* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2015), esp. “Psychosomatic Identity,” 15-50; and the essays in *Rationality in Greek Thought*, ed. M. Frede and G. Striker (Oxford: OUP, 1996), esp. D. Frede, “The Philosophical Economy of Plato’s Psychology,” 29-58.

- ²⁰ On visual experience, cf. N. Orlandi, *The Innocent Eye: Why Vision is Not a Cognitive Process* (Oxford: OUP, 2014). Note that Orlandi's title is rather misleading since on her account, vision has a strong cognitive component. For a review, see C. French, "Embedded," *TLS* (13 February 2015), 24.
- ²¹ That is, ". . . the sturdy good judgement, uncontaminated by too much theory and unmoved by skepticism, that is supposed to belong to persons before they become too philosophical" (S. Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 3rd ed. [Oxford: OUP, 2016], 91).
- ²² For example, sometimes a jealous rage for revenge obscures the basic ethical value of a human life.
- ²³ Cf. X. Tilliette, *L'Intuition intellectuelle de Kant à Hegel* (Paris: Vrin, 1995), esp. 245-280; B. Saint-Sernin, *Le rationalisme qui vient* (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), esp. 197-260; and, historically, Ockham's texts collected in *G. d'Ockham: Intuition et abstraction*, Latin/ English, tr. and ed. D. Piché (Paris: Vrin, 2005), esp. 7-51. See also the essays in *The New Intuitionism*, ed. J. G. Hernandez (London: Continuum, 2011), esp. R. Kennedy, "Intuitionism and Perceptual Representation," 69-83, and R. Audi, "Intuitions, Intuitionism, and Moral Judgment," 171-198. For a book-length cogent defense of ethical intuitionism, see M. Huemer, *Ethical Intuitionism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), esp. 231-253. In this paper, I will be understanding the expression "intuitionism" to denote Huemer's "rationalist intuitionism," the philosophical view that "[value] terms such as 'good' refer to objective irreducible value properties, which we know about on the basis of rational intuition, and [with respect to which] our evaluative judgments give us reasons for action independent of our desires" (p. ix).
- ²⁴ Cf. two different but related philosophical approaches from my approach here, in, for example, B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity*, Sather Classical Lectures, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: UCal Press, 2008), esp. 21-49 and 79-80; and J. Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion in Literature, Music, and the Arts* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), esp. 101-228.
- ²⁵ For example, despite its negative ethical valence, consider Achilles' murderous rage at Hector in Homer's *Iliad*.
- ²⁶ Note that the 18th century, Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-1796) was the first modern to distinguish between "the subjective experience or feeling that results from excitation of sensory receptors, and perception, sensory experience that has been interpreted with reference to its presumed external stimulus object or event. . ." (A. M. Coleman, *The Oxford Dictionary of Psychology*, 4th ed. [Oxford: OUP, 2015], 559). Cf. S. Siegel, "The Contents of Perception", in Zalta (Spring 2015), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/perception-contents/>.

- ²⁷ For an extended analysis of some kinds of emotional presentations, see A. Meinong, *Über emotionale Präsentation* (Wien, 1917), tr. as *On Emotional Presentation*, by M.-L. Schubert-Kalsi (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1972). For the idea of representations, see, for example, H. Price and S. Blackburn, *Expressivism, Pragmatism, and Representationalism* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013). Representationalism is the philosophical view that “the mind or (sometimes) the brain works on representations of the things and features of things that we perceive or think about” (Blackburn 2016, 414); cf. F. Jackson, *[Visual] Perception: A Representative Theory* (Cambridge: CUP, 2009).
- ²⁸ Cf. J. E. Dunsmoor *et al.*, “Emotional Learning Selectively and Retroactively Strengthens Memories for Related Events,” *Nature*, 520 (16 April 2015), 345-348; and P. Namburi *et al.*, “A Circuit Mechanism for Differentiating Positive and Negative Associations,” *Nature*, 520 (30 April 2015), 675-678.
- ²⁹ See Porebski 1995; and M. Crespo, *El valor ético de la afectividad: Estudios de ética fenomenológica* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012).
- ³⁰ For a recent and extensive standard contemporary philosophical account with selected empirical references, see R. de Sousa, “Emotion”, in Zalta (Spring 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotion/>. On the empirical aspects of emotions see, among many others, *Handbook of Emotions*, ed. M. Lewis *et al.*, 3rd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2010), esp. J. E. Ledoux and E. A. Phelps, “Emotional Networks in the Brain,” 159-179, and J. Panksepp, “How Does Neural Activity Generate Emotional Feelings?,” 42-67. For the specifically philosophical issues, see *The Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. P. Goldie (Oxford: OUP, 2012), esp. A. Morton, “Epistemic Emotions,” 385-400, and J. J. Prinz, “The Moral Emotions,” 519-538.
- ³¹ J. Findlay, *Axiological Ethics* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 6. See also his important book, *Intentions and Values* (London: Unwin / Routledge, 1968). Paul Grice offered a more complex view of the nature of value in his 1983 “Carus Lectures on Conception of Value.” See P. Grice, *The Conception of Value* (Oxford: OUP, 1991), esp. “Reply to Richards,” 93-120, and J. Baker’s excellent “Introduction,” 1-23. For an extensive standard contemporary account, see M. Schroeder, “Value Theory,” in Zalta (Summer 2012), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/>.
- ³² See M. Proudfoot and A. R. Lacey, *The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 4th ed. (London: Routledge, 2010), 114; and Coleman 2015, 244.
- ³³ For example, T. Tackett, *The Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap and Harvard UP, 2015), 6-7, 346. Cf. B. Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca:

Cornell UP, 2006), esp. 1-31 and 79-99. Tackett has recently elaborated on some of his views in ways that may suggest some further considerations of ethical values and emotions in Homer's *Iliad*: ". . . I place considerable emphasis on the *mixed emotions*, or *oscillation of emotions* between joy and enthusiasm on the one hand and fear and anger on the other . . . these emotions are often *entangled* in complex ways. It seems to me one also needs to explore *the class-specific differences in emotional registers*. I argue that the elites and the urban popular classes represented substantially different '*emotional communities*.' I think that one can also find differences in the emotional mix (notably along *the joy/fear spectrum*) between many of the Third Estate and many of the Noble deputies at the time of the Great Fear and the August 4 decrees; But in addition, *the situation varied over time*. . . ." (T. Tackett, Personal Letter to Jon Elster [30 March 2015]; cited with permission; my italics). I thank T. Tackett for many discussions on these and related matters.

- ³⁴ Before proceeding, note the frequent objection that literary representations, however "suggestive" they might be, are beside the point of properly philosophical inquiries into the truth and not the fictions of ethical matters. Perhaps one thoughtful reply is that of the early existentialist Ukrainian philosopher, critic, and student of Léon Chestov, who wrote memorably about the *Iliad* (*De l'Iliad* [New York: Brentano, 1943]), Rachel Bepaloff (1895-1949). ". . . *ce que je tiens pour le vrai, le réel*," she writes, "*est à la merci—de quoi?—d'une sensibilité dont je connais les écarts et les intermittences. Qu'il y ait là un scandale pour le philosophe, j'en conviens. Son propos n'est-il pas de nous fournir une garantie morale pour le vrai? . . . Peut-être faut-il enfin concevoir que* [as Valéry writes somewhere] *'le plus grand problème, l'unique, est celui de la sensibilité'*" (*Cheminements et carrefours*, 2nd ed. [Paris: Vrin, 2004 (1st ed., 1938)], 18). For a more extensive account of how literary representations continue to challenge philosophical reflection on truth, see P. Lamarque, "Truth" and "Value" in his *The Philosophy of Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 220-254 and 255-296, respectively. With regard specifically to poetry, see W. Tatarkiewicz's memorable essay, "The Concept of Poetry," tr. C. Kasparek, *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1975), 13-24.
- ³⁵ For the Greek text with a revised English translation on facing pages, see *Homer: The Iliad*, tr. A. T. Murray (2nd ed. 1924 and 1925; rev. tr. by W. F. Wyatt [1999]), 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999). The newest Greek text (still being debated in the scholarly journals!) is that of M. L. West, *Homerus: Ilias*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1998-2000). Here I rely on the more recent composite Greek text with extensive introduction and commentary of De Jong 2012, while citing the English translation by R. Lattimore (Mack 1987). Among other distinguished translations, cf. that of R. Fagles (London: Penguin, 1991) and the very

recent one, prepared explicitly for reading or being performed aloud, by P. Green, *The Iliad: A New Translation* (Berkeley: UCal Press, 2015), with an excellent Glossary and short bibliography. Roman numbers refer to the books of *The Iliad*, whereas Arabic numbers refer to the lines in the English translation (not in the Greek) of a particular book. As for proper names, Bernard Knox, the distinguished classicist and editor of the Homeric materials in the Norton reprinting, writes, “The transcription of Greek names is, unfortunately, a game without rules.” Here, I follow the broadly Latinized spellings in the reference work by B. Radice, *Who’s Who in the Ancient World: A Handbook of the Survivors of the Greek and Roman Classics*, rev. ed. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), and in Knox, writing “Achilles,” “Patroclus,” “Hector,” and the “Achaean” for “Achilleus,” “Patroklos,” “Hektor,” and “Achaians,” which Lattimore uses. Note that most classicists and ancient historians today argue that a single unknown composer first transcribed the evidently highly ordered text of the *Iliad* (before the *Odyssey*) from much earlier, diverse, and looser oral versions sometime around the turn of the eighth to seventh century BCE, say between 725 and 675 BCE (Knox, in Fagles, *Homer: the Iliad*, rev. ed. [London: Penguin, 1996], 19). Debate, however, continues!

- ³⁶ An outstanding instance of Homer’s unusually sensitive descriptions, not just of Greek warriors, but also of women, are the celebrated portraits of Hector’s wife, Andromache, notably in her meeting with Hector in Book VI of the *Iliad*. Cf. especially the Greek text with introduction and commentary in *Iliad: Book VI*, ed. B. Graziosi (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), esp. 29-32 and 47-55.
- ³⁷ The story of Achilles—partly legend, partly history—is the story of the Trojan War. Most recently, E. H. Cline presents succinctly the legends, the history, and the archaeology in his 2013 book, *The Trojan War* (cf. also, T. Bryce, “The Trojan War,” in Cline 2010, 475-482.) Besides a glossary and bibliography, Cline also provides discussions of the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the fragments of the twelve narratives in the *Epic Cycle* as a whole (cf. *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homeric*, ed. H. G. Evelyn-White [London: Heinemann, 1914]). This cycle includes the *Cypria* on the origins of the struggle for Troy or Ilion, the *Iliad* on the critical weeks only in the final year of the ten-year struggle for Troy, the *Aethiopis* on the sequel to the death of Hector at the end of the *Iliad*, the *Little Iliad* after the death of Achilles, the *Iliupersis* on the sack of Troy, the *Nostoi* about the returns of the Mycenaeans from Troy, the *Odyssey* about Odysseus’ ten-year journey home to Ithaca, and the *Telogy* about the death of Odysseus. See also Book II of Virgil’s *Aeneid*. For the literary reception, see M. J. Anderson, *The Fall of Troy in Early Greek Poetry and Art* (Oxford: OUP, 1997). The basic reference

work on Homer himself is *The Homer Encyclopedia*, ed. M. Finkleberg, 3 vols. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). The basic commentary is by G. Kirk, *et al.*, *The Iliad: A Commentary*, 6 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 1985-1993). As I write in May 2015, the newly comprehensive *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar*, ed. A. Bierl, J. Latacz, *et al.* (Basel 2000-) has not yet reached Book XXII, the key book under discussion here. For critical essays, see among others the thirty overview essays in *A New Companion to Homer*, ed. I. Morris and B. Powell (Leiden: Brill, 1997); and *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, ed. R. Fowler (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). For an influential cultural reading of the *Iliad*, on which, notably, Paul Ricoeur relied, see J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad*, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993).

- ³⁸ On the Mycenaeans, see L. Schofield, *The Mycenaeans* (Malibu, CA: The J. Paul Getty Museum, 2007). For the general historical backgrounds, see R. Osborne, *Greece in the Making 1200-479 BC*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009), esp. 131-152.
- ³⁹ In Mack 1987, 64-65. Interestingly, Herodotus gives a somewhat different version that he learned, he tells us, from Egyptian priests. See Herodotus, *The Histories*, tr. T. Holland (London: Allen Lane, 2013), Book II, 155. Later, Thucydides explains more fully how the Mycenaean king Agamemnon was able to assemble such a number of allies manning such a large fleet for the attack on Troy. See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, tr. M. Hammon (London: Penguin, 2009), Book I, 6-8.
- ⁴⁰ On the archaeology of Troy and the Trojan War, see, P. Jablonka, "Troy," in Cline 2010, 849-861. Jablonka is the successor of M. Korfmann as the director of Tübingen's Troia Project and the still continuing renewed archeological excavations at Troy.
- ⁴¹ Cf. the very different kind of portraits in Bernal 2004, 7-24.
- ⁴² Knox, in Mack 1987, 66. Cf. Knox's long "Introduction" to Fagles 1996, 3-64.
- ⁴³ "The language of the Homeric epics," De Jong writes in her distinguished 2012, "is not the spoken dialect of any period or area but an artificial language. It is a composite of different dialects: primarily Ionian, with some elements of Aolian . . . and 'Achaean,' the language of the Mycenaeans known to us through the decipherment of Linear B. . . . There are occasional Attic elements, which probably result from the regular performances of the Homeric poems in Athens at the Panathenaic festival. . . ." (29). On Homer's language, cf. Graziosi 2010, 18-20. On Homer's diction, cf. the extraordinary and finally completed *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, ed. B. Snell *et al.*, 25 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955-2010).
- ⁴⁴ The shield of Achilles in Book XVIII is an emblem of the entire conflict in Homer's *Iliad*. Here is Bernard Knox's account. The "two poles of

the human condition, war and peace, with their corresponding aspects of human nature, the destructive and the creative, are implicit in every situation and statement of the poem, and they are put before us, in symbolic form, in the shield which the god Hephaestus makes for Achilles. Its emblem is an image of human life as a whole. Here are two cities, one at peace and one at war. In one a marriage is celebrated and a quarrel settled by process of law; the other is besieged by a hostile army and fights for its existence. Scenes of violence—peaceful shepherds slaughtered in an ambush, Death dragging away a corpse by its foot—are balanced by scenes of plowing, harvesting, work in the vineyard and on the pasture, a green on which youths and maidens dance. And around the outermost rim of the shield runs ‘the might of the Ocean stream,’ a river which is at once the frontier of the known and the imagined world and the barrier between the quick and the dead. The shield of Achilles is the total background for the tragic violence of the central figures; it provides a frame which gives the wrath of Achilles and the death of Hector their just proportion and true significance” (in Mack 1987, 66-67).

⁴⁵ Knox, in Mack 1987, 65. Cf. Farron 1978, 39-57.

⁴⁶ For understanding how the anger escalates throughout this climactic scene, cf. E. A. Lemerise and K. A. Dodge, “The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions,” in Lewis 2010, 730-741. Here as elsewhere, Homer’s grammar is extremely important, as De Jong, in her 2012 commentary, continually demonstrates. P. Chantraine’s classic *Grammaire Homérique*, first published in 1942 and then in 1958 (vol. I) and 1963 (vol. 2), has recently re-appeared in a corrected and revised edition by M. Casevitz (Paris: Klincksieck, 2013 and 2015). A very helpful shorter account of Homer’s grammar is that of R. Wachter, “*Grammatik der homerischen Sprache*,” in *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar. Prolegomena*, ed. J. Latacz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000), 61-108.

⁴⁷ De Jong (2012) divides the scene into many sections. Here, however, I rely mainly, but not exclusively, on C. Marendaz, *Du regard à l’émotion: la vision, le cerveau, l’affectif* (Paris: Le Pommier, 2009), esp. 71-80 and 133-144. Two helpful classic studies here are D. H. Hubel, *Eye, Brain, Vision* (New York: Scientific American Library, 1988), esp. 33-91; and R. L. Gregory, *Eye and Brain*, 5th ed. (Princeton: PUP, 1997), esp. 84-120. See also G. Orban, *La vision, mission du cerveau: Les trois révolutions des neurosciences* (Paris: Collège de France / Fayard, 2007), esp. 52-75.

⁴⁸ Again, note an objection, namely, that making use here of recent empirical work is beside the point of philosophical inquiries into the truth of what might be the nature of the interconnections between the evaluative, the emotive, and the cognitive. Moreover, bringing in empirical

work in the ways I do so far, the objection might proceed, is doing no more than illustrating a literary work of art. But by doing so, such a procedure reduces centrally important passages in that literary work of art to no more than examples of some current scientific research. Perhaps one thoughtful reply might go, in part, like this. The use of empirical research here is not intended to illustrate what that empirical work is about, although it may in fact do so. Rather, the scientific references here are intended to make explicit the actual empirical elements of salient features in Homer's imaginative literary representations of the scenes in the literary work of art as well as in the readers' imaginative apprehensions of those scenes. Such articulations are required not just for properly aesthetic appreciations of the literary work of art but also for elucidating just where empirical analyses often remain incomplete and where properly non-empirical philosophical analysis needs to take place. Perhaps such empirical research finally needs supplementing with phenomenological analyses of different types of intentional affectivities.

- ⁴⁹ For a recent account of the relations between sensation and perception in accurately locating persons and things in three dimensional space as necessary preliminaries to action and interaction, cf. J. M. Groh, *Making Space: How the Brain Knows Where Things Are* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014).
- ⁵⁰ M. Argyle, "Eye Contact," in *The Oxford Companion to the Mind*, ed. R. L. Gregory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 326-327.
- ⁵¹ I. D. Gilchrist, "Eye Movements," in Gregory 2004, 327-328.
- ⁵² These archaic systems include the limbic system that comprises six elements, including the amygdale. The limbic system controls basic emotions. Cf. K. Demos *et al.*, "Human Amygdala Sensitivity to the Pupil Size of Others," *Cerebral Cortex* 18 (2008), 279-284.
- ⁵³ Note that throughout Homer's text, we can distinguish between the effects of light and the visual responses to these effects (and to others). Here I want to emphasize the visual responses generally, while leaving the light effects themselves for later reflection and discussion.
- ⁵⁴ Achilles' eye-tracking is his ocular drift, the necessary small random movements of the eyes to keep his visual image of Hector from disappearing. Cf. L. Cossell, *et al.*, "Functional Organization of Excitatory Synaptic Strength in Primary Visual Cortex," *Nature* 518 (19 February 2015), 399-403.
- ⁵⁵ Cf. R. L. Gregory, "Seeing Movement," in Gregory 1997, 98-120.
- ⁵⁶ Mack 1987, 311-312 and 317-320.
- ⁵⁷ The eye-head movement system is understood today as a sub-section of the visual system. This complex "enables the movement of objects in the environment to be computed from the image-retinal system,

discounting movements of the eye and head.” These computations are “necessary because movements of the images across the retinas provide insufficient information for determining movement of objects in the environment, given that eye and head movements cause retinal images to move even when the objects themselves are stationary” (Colman 2015, 267-268).

⁵⁸ *Iliad*, II. 321-327.

⁵⁹ A former twice-decorated combatant in the Second World War, Bernard Knox, comments lucidly (cf. the obituary of Knox in *The New York Times* [16 August 2010]): “This is meticulously accurate; there is no attempt to suppress the ugliness of Thestor’s death. The bare, careful description creates the true nightmare quality of battle, in which men perform monstrous actions with the same matter-of-fact efficiency they display in their normal occupations; and the simile reproduces the grotesque appearance of violent death—the simple spear thrust takes away Thestor’s dignity as a human being even before it takes his life. He is gaping, like a fish on the hook” (Knox, in Mack 1987, 65).

⁶⁰ See I. J. F. De Jong, *Narratology and the Classics* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), esp. 47-72 on focalization.

⁶¹ An important comparable scene is Homer’s earlier description of Achilles’ comrade, Patroclus, killing with his spear a Trojan warrior. “Patroclus went up to him and drove a spear into his right jaw; he thus hooked him by the teeth and the spear pulled him over the rim of his [chariot].” Again Homer adds a simile. “As one who sits at the end of some jutting rock,” Homer says, “and draws a strong fish out of the sea with a hook and line—even so with his spear did [Patroclus] pull Thestor all gaping from his chariot; he threw him down on his face and [Thestor] died while falling.” This is the same Patroclus whom Hector killed later and whom Achilles is now ragingly avenging.

⁶² This event is an instance of eye signals in the processing of visual information. What happens unconsciously is that eye-position extra-retinal signals that are present in the visual cortex prior to any visual stimulation already actively co-ordinate the cortical processing of information with the selection of what information is coming into the visual processing stream. Cf. D. Rosenbluth and J. Allman, “Eye Position Signals in Active Visual Processing,” in Gregory 2004, 329-332.

⁶³ For an ancient Greek warrior to call another warrior a “dog” was one of the worst insults possible. Cf. C. France, *Shameless: The Canine and the Feminine in Ancient Greece*, tr. M. Fox (Berkeley: UCal Press, 2014), esp. 7-74. For the Greeks, a dog was unlike any other animal part of the human framework of values, although holding the least important rank. A dog, accordingly, was expected to behave with a properly human sense of shame. But dogs were shameless; they were *anaideia*

(remember the example of the Greek Cynic, Diogenes!). Achilles here calls Hector a dog, meaning that Hector is an utterly shameless animal. Cf. the now classical study of D. L. Cairns, *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: OUP, 1993).

⁶⁴ *Iliad*, II. 345-348.

⁶⁵ *Iliad*, II. 355-358.

⁶⁶ These funereal rites were various. Cf. W. Cavanagh, "Death and the Mycenaeans," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Aegean Bronze Age*, ed. C. W. Shelmerdine (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 327-341, esp. 338-339.

⁶⁷ Mack 1987, 385.

⁶⁸ Cf. Marendaz 2009, esp. 134-136.

⁶⁹ The voluntary saccadic movement of the eyes has a different, more complicated neural pathway than the reflex saccadic movement. In the reflex case, the visual information process streams from the retina to the superior *colliculus*, then to the reticular formation, and finally to the saccade; whereas in the voluntary case, the visual process proceeds from the retina first to the visual cortex and then to the parietal cortex, before attaining the superior *colliculus* and then the reticular formation and the saccade (Marendaz 2009, 138; cf. the detailed figure on 137).

⁷⁰ On anti-saccadic eye movements, cf. Marendaz 2009, 139-143.

⁷¹ On reinforced memory in such situations and others, see Dunsmoor 2015, 345-348.

⁷² Cf. E. A. Kensinger and D. L. Schachter, "Memory and Emotion" in Lewis 2010, 601-617.

⁷³ *Iliad*, II. 395-404.

⁷⁴ See the passages C. Porebski reprints from the Polish philosopher of values, Henryk Elzenberg, on negative values, in Porebski 1995, 129-134. For the physiology, cf. Namburi 2015, 675-678.

⁷⁵ See illustration no. 69 of Achilles with the body of Hector behind his chariot, on the Athenian black-figure water jar from the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, reproduced in Boardman 1993, 74. A detail of Achilles stepping over Hector's body into his chariot can be seen in illustration no. 203 in J. Boardman, *Athenian Black Figure Vases: A Handbook* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974) from the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston.

⁷⁶ See illustration no. 66 of the 480 BCE red-figure water jar painted by the Kleophrades Painter and reproduced in color from the Archeological Receipts Fund (TAP) in Athens, in M. D. Fullerton, *Greek Art* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), 96.

⁷⁷ Cf. the still extraordinary essays of two women who experienced in terrible ways the extraordinary violence of the Second World War and met tragic ends, Simone Weil (1909-1943), *The Iliad or the Poem of Force*:

A Critical Edition, 3rd ed. (New York: Peter Lang, 2005; first published in French in 1943 in *Cahiers du Sud*); and Rachel Bepaloff (1895-1949), *De L'Iliad* (1943), also first published in French in New York by Brentano shortly after Weil's text.

⁷⁸ Cf., for example, R. Kirk, *The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental* (Oxford: OUP, 2013).

⁷⁹ Note that a retrospective view of the account here shows a very different approach than that in an article bearing the same title as the Olomouc 2015 Conference, K. Mulligan's "Emotions and Values," in Goldie 2012, 475-501.

⁸⁰ Cf. G. Wilson and S. Shpall, "Action," in Zalta (Summer 2012), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/action/>.

⁸¹ C. Siewert 2011.

⁸² "Thus," as two contemporary philosophers write recently, "there are different levels of action to be distinguished, and these include at least the following: unconscious and/or involuntary behavior, purposeful or goal directed activity . . . , intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents. Each of the key concepts in these characterizations raises some hard puzzles" (Wilson and Shpall 2012, 1).

⁸³ There is an analogy here that I hope to develop elsewhere, between rational and emotional relations in ethics, and connection strength and receptive field in vision. Cf. Cossell 2015, 399-403; and B. Scholl and N. J. Price, "The Cortical Connection," *Nature* 518 (19 February 2015), 306-307.