

EIGHT

Difficulties with Compassion?¹

One of the most damaging sources of error about early Greek morality has been the assumption that in order to study the moral notions in a work of art or in a society it is enough to list and analyze the words indicating moral concepts which occur in it. The scrutiny of such words is certainly an important part of such an investigation; but the investigation will not be complete until the study of moral terminology has been supplemented by a study of the actions performed in the book or the society in question and the attitudes shown towards them by those who have performed and those who have described them.²

Getting to grips with a philosophical question is partly a matter of understanding where the problem comes from—but this requires us to think . . . about the historical construction of the problem, and to take seriously the deeply contingent nature of the philosophical tradition in which we find ourselves.³

INTRODUCTIONS

Ordinary language and standard linguistic descriptions of what the English language expression “compassion” denotes often fail to capture adequately at least two basic elements of two culturally central normative experiences of compassion—its non-standard personal element and its peculiarly passive character. These two elements crystallize not from lexical analyses alone

but from relational analyses of attitudes and actions of persons. Contrasting sketches, however, of English ordinary language and scientific linguistic analyses of “compassion” with literary representations of exclusively naturalistic and non-exclusively naturalistic experiences of compassion may fruitfully highlight these still obscure matters. These contrasts make clear at least one fundamental difficulty. That difficulty is whether several essential elements that some emotional experiences of compassion seem to comprise can be properly conceptualized in linguistic terms only. Initial critical reflection on this basic difficulty raises three philosophical issues requiring further discussion and inquiry about understanding properly both the expression “compassion” and the lived experiences of the emotion of compassion. Returning to the sequel of the literarily represented experiences of the perception of basic ethical values that we first explored in Essay One, and complementing these Homeric examples with a different kind of normative examples, proves fruitful.

I. Experiences of Compassion

Seeing needy persons may sometimes give rise to experiencing the complex emotion of compassion whose comprehension seems especially to require philosophical analysis. Yet, on reflection, the emotion of compassion would appear to be particularly resistant to such analysis. This is partly the case because of compassion’s occasional double guise as both a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic phenomenon. But how to deal in exclusively philosophical terms with non-naturalistic matters seems today to be increasingly problematic. One apparent problem with compassion, then, is how to account reasonably for such a sometimes apparently two-fold phenomenon in strictly philosophical ways.

To begin, let us offer two examples of compassion for further consideration. First, when Achilles looked at the distraught and aged Priam,⁴ he was, Homer said memorably, “filled with pity.” Then, Homer continued, Achilles showed “compassion,” giving

the body of Trojan Hector back to his grieving father. Second, in Scripture, Mark unforgettably said that, when Jesus looked at the ignorant and hungry people,⁵ he was “moved to compassion.” Then, Mark continued, Jesus showed “compassion,” instructing and miraculously feeding the ignorant and hungry multitude. These moments remain fundamental ones within Western culture even today. But some reflective English language persons continue to have a problem here. For they are no longer sure about just what, if anything, today’s clichéd expression “compassion” still denotes. Nor are they any longer sure about just what, if anything, the experience⁶ of compassion may involve.

In particular, for many philosophers the problem with compassion is not just the term’s multiple denotations—benevolence, empathy, pity, even mercifulness. Rather, their problem is compassion’s double guise. That is, compassion seems sometimes to be, concurrently,⁷ both a naturalistic and a non-naturalistic⁸ emotional phenomenon⁹ that may sometimes mediate certain basic ethical values like respect for personal dignity. But whether, strictly speaking, some basic phenomena are exclusively natural, and whether all basic ethical values are exclusively natural entities, remains controversial. Thus, how to account for emotions like compassion in more than a strictly naturalistic way is philosophically problematic.

To many philosophers, most emotions appear to be completely natural phenomena.¹⁰ That is, their satisfactory explanations¹¹ are strictly naturalistic. And such explanations rely on a scientific understanding of the natural world as causally closed.¹² Yet explaining some lived experiences of emotions like compassion seems at times to require more than a strictly general naturalistic approach, and specifically, more than any exclusively naturalistic ontology for the natural world.¹³ So, one question is whether understanding,¹⁴ if not explaining, compassion satisfactorily requires, at least in part, a non-naturalistic philosophical account? Or can we come to understand satisfactorily the basic aspects of compassion in scientifically naturalistic terms alone?

Recall our first example, taken from Homer's still culturally fundamental literary masterpiece. Achilles was "filled with pity" when he looked at Priam,¹⁵ and then showed "compassion" when he gave Hector's body back to his father. And recall, too, Mark's also still culturally fundamental religious masterpiece. Jesus was "moved to compassion" when he saw a crowd looking "like sheep without a shepherd,"¹⁶ and then showed "compassion" when he instructed and miraculously fed the ignorant and hungry multitude. Now, almost 800 years separate these two normative¹⁷ artistic and religious Greek texts from each other, and more than a further 2000 years separate them from us. Yet not only do distinguished translations continue to use the same English word to translate different Greek expressions; the Greek words themselves also seem to denote quite different states of affairs. Further, even today, most uses of the English word "compassion" strike many reflective persons as being no more than worn-out substitutes for denoting the full richness of the complex lived experiences of compassion. But, against the larger backgrounds of current investigations into values, persons, and emotions,¹⁸ how are we to understand more fully, whether strictly naturalistically or not, both the word "compassion" and the experience of compassion? How are we to understand compassion not only in some of our culture's most basic texts, but perhaps as well in our own lives?

II. Coming to Terms with "Compassion"

At first glance, it may seem helpful to have philosophical recourse to a linguistic analysis of "compassion." For such analyses assemble reminders of how most English language speakers today ordinarily use this expression. And these reminders often indicate how most English language speakers ordinarily understand this expression. On such an analysis, the word "compassion" can be properly understood as mainly denoting a subjectively experienced merciful feeling, one strongly linked to a primary emotion of sadness at another person's misfortune. My general point in this section and in the next will be that exclusively linguistic characterizations of the word "compassion,"

whether ordinary language analyses or scientific linguistic analyses, fail to capture the richness of several quite basic elements in some central experiences of compassion.¹⁹

We may begin by assembling some reminders about how most English speakers today use the word “compassion.”²⁰ Here, then, are several everyday uses of the word that may serve to remind us of the most pertinent linguistic contexts for understanding the central denotations of “compassion” in English.²¹ Everyday uses of the word “compassion” cluster into what linguists call generally a “semantic field,” or, in the case of a specific natural language like English, a “lexical field.”²² Thus, a recent standard dictionary of English marks out the lexical field of the word “compassion” as including, in addition to the word “compassion,” five other related words: “benevolence,” “charity,” “clemency,” “leniency,” “mercy.”²³ Here is the entry, with the related words underlined and examples in italics.

. . . benevolence, [is] a general word for good will and kindness
(*a grandfather's benevolence*).

Charity [suggests] generous giving (*the baker gave him bread out of charity*) but also . . . tolerance and understanding of others
(*she viewed his selfish behavior with charity*).

Compassion is a feeling of sympathy or sorrow for someone else's misfortune (*he has shown compassion for the homeless*), and often includes showing mercy.

Aside from its religious overtones,^[24] mercy means compassion or kindness in our treatment of others . . . (*mercy towards the pickpocket*).

Clemency is mercy shown by someone [in administering] justice . . .
(*the judge granted clemency*), while

leniency emphasizes gentleness, softness, or lack of severity . . .
(*a father's leniency in punishing his young son*).²⁵

If we now exclude the examples, we find that the word “compassion” in some situations denotes “a feeling of sympathy or sorrow for someone else's misfortune . . . and often includes showing mercy” understood as “kindness in our treatment of others. . . .” Aggregating such reminders of everyday uses

of the word then suggests that “compassion” mainly denotes a subjectively experienced merciful feeling that is strongly linked to the primary emotion of sadness at another person’s misfortune. By contrast with this ordinary language sense of the word “compassion,” consider now a bit more fully Homer’s description of Achilles’ experience of compassion (*éleos*) for Hector’s bereaved father, Trojan Priam.

III. Representing a Normative Natural Experience of Compassion

On an exclusively linguistic account, then, the expression “compassion” seems mainly to denote a feeling fully centered on another person. But testing such a preliminary result requires further critical reflection. Subsequent reflection on an extended classical representation of a naturalistic experience of compassion suggests that, contrary to the first results of an exclusively linguistic account of the word “compassion,” the experience of compassion does not seem to be fully centered on another person. Rather, the complex experience of compassion seems to include essentially dynamic relational movements, which I will figuratively designate here as “mutualities.” Moreover, these specific kinds of relational phenomena seem to require a more-than-exclusively naturalistic analysis.

Hector’s father, Priam, begs Achilles for pity. He embraces the knees of Achilles in supplication²⁶ and kisses the hands that have killed his eldest surviving son. Priam then addresses Achilles.²⁷ Homer²⁸ describes the scene that culminates in a key passage.

. . . Priam prayed his heart out to Achilles:
 “Remember your own father, great godlike Achilles—
 As old as *I* am, past the threshold of deadly old age!
 No doubt the countrymen round about him plague him now,
 With no one there to defend him, beat away disaster.
 No one—but at least he hears you’re still alive
 And his old heart rejoices, hopes rising, day by day,
 To see his beloved son come sailing home from Troy.

But I—dear god, my life so cursed by fate . . .
 I fathered hero sons in the wide realm of Troy
 And now not a single one is left, I tell you.
 Fifty sons I had when the sons of Achaea came,
 Nineteen born to me from a single mother's womb
 And the rest by other women in the palace. Many,
 Most of them violent Ares cut the knees from under.
 But one, one was left me, to guard my walls my people—
 The one you killed the other day, defending his fatherland,
 My Hector! It's all for him I've come to the ships now,
 To win him back from you—I bring a priceless ransom.
 Revere the gods, Achilles! Pity me in my own right,
 Remember your own father! I deserve more pity . . .
 I have endured what no one on earth has ever done before—
 I put to my lips the hands of the man who killed my son."²⁹

In his speech, Priam first evokes Achilles' father, Peleus. He goes on to recount his own fatherhood. He recalls his eldest son, Hector. Priam then asks Achilles to remember his own father, Peleus. Finally, Priam asks Achilles to take pity on him, to show him compassion, and to return to him, for proper burial, Hector's mutilated body.

After a long while, Achilles finally gives orders to wash and anoint Hector's corpse with olive oil, fearing that, were Priam to see the corpse in its present mutilated state, a terribly violent anger would break out. And then Achilles himself lifts up Hector's finally washed and anointed corpse, places it on a litter, and, with the help of his companions, settles the litter outside into the mule wagon Priam has brought in hopes of receiving Achilles' compassion and Hector's body. Homer then continues.

. . . Achilles lifted Hector up in his own arms
 and laid him down on a bier, and comrades helped him
 raise the bier and body onto the strong wagon . . .
 Then with a groan he called his dear friend by name:
 "Feel no anger at me, Patroclus, if you learn—
 even there in the House of Death—I let his father
 have Prince Hector back. He gave me worthy ransom

and you shall have your share from me, as always,
your fitting, lordly share.”

So he vowed

and brilliant Achilles strode back to his shelter,
sat down on a well-carved chair that he had left
at the far wall of the room, leaned toward Priam
and firmly spoke the words that kind had come to hear:
“Your son is now set free [*léluta*³⁰], old man, as you requested.
Hector now lies in state. With the first light of day
you will see for yourself as you convey him home.”³¹

This initial extended example of the experience of compassion, and not just an analysis of the ordinary language uses in English of the word “compassion,” allows us to begin testing our initial linguistic understanding of the word “compassion.” Recall that we took that everyday understanding of the word “compassion” to refer mainly to a subjectively experienced merciful feeling strongly linked to a primary emotion of sadness at another person’s misfortune. A not unsatisfactory commentary on the Greek text of this very complex passage would require lengthy considerations. For now, however, note briefly just two points.

First, for our rather narrow concerns with the English word “compassion,” we previously excluded from further consideration the related English words “benevolence,” “charity,” “clemency,” “leniency.” We also excluded from further consideration the word just following “compassion” in the list of terms in the lexical field of “compassion,” namely “mercy.” We need to recall, however, that the lexical description of “mercy” expressly omitted, without argument, what that description itself called the word “mercy’s” “religious overtones.” In the light, however, of Homer’s extended example of Achilles’ experience of compassion, this omission of the word “mercy” from the lexical account³² of the word “compassion” seems odd. For even without any religious overtones, an exclusively lexical account still describes “compassion” as “kindness in our treatment of others. . . .” Yet even this summary lexical description itself surely allows of religious interpretations, just as the description of Achilles’ experience of compassion for Priam includes some of Achil-

les' own religious understandings of his feelings in terms of the much studied Homeric gods.³³

Note, second, that the initial working definition of "compassion," when this word is understood exclusively in terms of its situation in a lexical field, is "a feeling of sympathy or sorrow for someone else's misfortune." In other words, on a strictly lexical account "compassion" denotes a feeling fully centered on another person. But in the light of the extended example, the experience of compassion, as contrasted with the lexical account of the word "compassion," seems to be not fully centered on another person. For it appears to include, as one of its most basic elements, the interpenetration of Achilles' empathetic feelings for Priam with the imaginative figurations of his own elderly father's future misfortunes. These figurations arise from Achilles' present perceptions, not of the elderly father Priam's present misfortunes, but of another elderly father's misfortunes, of Achilles' own father's future misfortunes.³⁴ In short, the experience of compassion appears not always to be a monadic, but at least a sometimes dynamic, dyadic relation.³⁵

Nonetheless, if we turn from word meanings to sentence meanings,³⁶ we might of course still try to put these observations in linguistic terms. Take for example the linguistic notion of person. In linguistics, person is a grammatical category for indicating the idea of "the number and nature of the participants in a situation."³⁷ Generally, English has three grammatical kinds of persons—first, second, and third, whether singular or plural.³⁸ However, the linguistic category of person may also include further distinctions, for example, between inclusive or exclusive (depending on whether the speaker is included but not the hearers), formal or informal (depending on whether honorifics or familiar expressions are used), etc. Further, in some non-English natural languages (for example, in some North American Indian languages), there are more than three persons; there is a fourth person, the so-called "obviative person," that, unlike the English language third person, includes, in addition to the third person already referred to, a "someone else" who is not further specified. These complexities should qualify any

initial hopes about putting at least some of our observations into fully satisfactory linguistic form only.³⁹

Return now to our first example. I wrote above that the experience of compassion appears to be some kind of dynamic, dyadic relation, in the sense that this experience sometimes does not appear to be centered on just one person but may involve a kind of back-and-forth, an oscillation, let's say, between several persons. When expressed verbally—for example, “Achilles experienced compassion”—the experience of compassion seems to suggest, in addition to mainly a third-person structure, something more complicated. For in experiencing compassion, the subject-person Achilles both does something with respect to one other person—Achilles actively “shows compassion” to Priam. But Achilles also seems to empathize⁴⁰ with Priam imaginatively in such ways that Achilles treats him compassionately, while having not just his relation with Priam centrally in mind, but also his relation with another person, his own father, centrally in mind. We might say that Achilles seems to be passively caught up in imaginative projections of more than one person, and not just actively doing something with respect to one person only. In other terms, experiencing compassion sometimes seems to comprise, concurrently, both a transitive moment, where the subject in the expression “he experienced compassion” has the semantic role of an agent, and an intransitive moment, where the subject has the semantic role of a patient.⁴¹ Here I refer figuratively to an agent's conjunctions of active transitive and passive intransitive relational moments as “mutualities.”⁴²

After some reflection, then, the possibilities of satisfactorily capturing in exclusively linguistic terms the fullness of what seems to be going on in some experiences of compassion seem to be very limited. We will need to come back to this puzzling matter below. For now, these first observations correspond to some of the usual understandings operative today in almost all continuing empirical studies on emotions and values such as we find in most lexicological work. For the underlying presuppositions in contemporary lexicology are strictly scientific.⁴³ That is, lexicology today is understood professionally as a sub-

discipline of the science of linguistics.⁴⁴ But as this first extended example begins to show, we do not seem able to render a fully perspicuous account of the lived experience of compassion solely in terms of a lexical account of the meaning of the word “compassion.” In short, what the strictly lexical account of the word “compassion” would seem to be leaving out is the puzzling relational character of some compassionate experiences of a particular feeling. Thus, the initial composite lexical definition of the word “compassion” calls for further analysis. For the notion of compassion consisting of a feeling either of sympathy or sorrow is not simple but complex. To what, more exactly, then, are we referring in speaking of compassion as including a certain feeling?

IV. The Senses of “Emotion”

One key expression in the description of the word “compassion” is “emotion.” Like the word “compassion,” the word “emotion” also occupies a lexical field in English, one which assembles reminders of how, not ordinary English speakers, but in particular professional English-language psychologists today use this expression. Professional usage shows that the word “emotion” is mainly used to denote any short-term evaluative, affective, intentional, psychological state of subjectively experienced feeling including one of the primary emotions, sadness. However, we can best get access to this field indirectly by looking at the lexical field of the very closely related word “feeling.” The lexical field of “feeling” includes, in addition to the word “feeling” itself, four other words: “emotion,” “passion,” “sentiment,” and “affect.” The entry reads as follows:

A feeling can be almost any subjective reaction or state . . . that is characterized by an emotional response (. . . *a feeling of pleasure*).

An emotion is a very intense feeling . . . (*to be overcome with emotion*).

Passion suggests a powerful or overwhelming emotion . . . (*their passion remained undiminished after 30 years of marriage*). . . .

[Sentiment.] There is more intellect and less feeling in sentiment . . . (*political sentiments; antiwar sentiments*). . . .

Affect is a formal psychological term that refers to an observed emotional state (*heavily sedated, he spoke without affect*).⁴⁵

But we need to simplify. Instead then of investigating still more lexical fields, let us restrict ourselves now to considering the usual reports on usage that we find in the standard English language dictionaries. And let us focus on an entry not for “feeling,” but instead for “emotion.”

emotion,

- [1] a natural instinctive state of mind deriving from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationships with others: (*she was attempting to control her emotions / his voice was low and shaky with emotion*).
- [2] any of the particular feelings that characterize such a state of mind, such as joy, anger, love, hate, horror, etc.; (*fear had become his dominant emotion*).
- [3] instinctive or intuitive^[46] feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge: (*responses have to be based on historical insight, not simply on emotion. . .*).⁴⁷

Thus, an authoritative English language dictionary reports that the word “emotion” denotes either a mental state, or any feelings accompanying such a state, or a distinctive kind of feeling, or perhaps some combination of the preceding.⁴⁸ But this is still no more than a report on how the word “emotion” is used in everyday language. Consider, then, perhaps for more precision, just how most professional psychologists today use the word “emotion,” for instance in the 2015 edition of a widely used dictionary of psychology for professionals.

emotion: any short-term evaluative, affective, intentional, psychological state, including happiness, sadness, disgust, and other inner feelings.

primary emotions: . . . the six emotions of happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, anger, and surprise, so called partly because their associated facial expressions appear to be innate. . . .^[49] Some researchers believe that other emotions or affects are blends of these six.

affect: Emotion or subjectively experienced feeling, such as happiness, sadness, fear, or anger. . . .⁵⁰

In professional uses of the word “emotion,” then, we find that the word mainly denotes not “any temporary but a relatively sustained and affective state” like a mood.⁵¹ Accordingly, psychologists use the word “emotion” mainly to denote “any short-term evaluative, affective, intentional, psychological state” of “subjectively experienced feeling,” including one of the primary emotions, sadness. At times, some such experiences may even be partly constitutive of the self.⁵² Such reminders of everyday and professional uses of the word “emotion” suggest that we may use this word here not unreasonably to denote mainly “any short-term evaluative,^[53] affective, intentional, psychological state” of “subjectively experienced feeling.”

V. Representing a Normative

Not Exclusively Natural Experience of Compassion

On an exclusively linguistic account, we note, the word “emotion” appears to denote mainly a first-person action. But, again, confirming such a preliminary result requires further critical reflection. And subsequent reflection on an extended representation of, this time, a not fully naturalistic experience of the emotion of compassion suggests that, contrary to the results of strictly linguistic account of “emotion,” some experiences of the emotion of compassion appear to include something elusively passive that a person may antecedently undergo. Moreover, this elusively passive something seems to require more than a strictly naturalistic account of the partly metaphysical nature of the person’s mutualities and passivities.

Consider now a bit more fully Mark’s normative religious account of Jesus’ compassion for the ignorant and hungry multitude. In the sixth chapter of the Gospel according to Mark, after being seized by compassion (*esplangchnisthē*)⁵⁴ for an immense crowd of people (*polloi*)⁵⁵ in a wilderness area, Mark tells us that Jesus begins to teach the multitude and then multiplies some bread and fish so as to give the hungry crowd something

to eat.⁵⁶ Earlier, after having received from his apostles the deeply upsetting news of Herod's execution of his cousin, John (the Baptist), Jesus had temporarily withdrawn with his apostles from the crowds by a boat to a wilderness area. The crowds however had anticipated their move, and the people arrived before Jesus at the previously deserted place. Mark⁵⁷ describes the scene this way.

. . . they went away in a boat to a deserted place privately. But they were seen going, and many people found out about it, and they ran together to the spot on foot and got there before them. And when he got out of the boat Jesus saw a great crowd, and he took pity on them, for they were like sheep not having a shepherd, and he began to teach them many things.⁵⁸

For our concerns here, the key clause is Mk 6:34, underlined above, in Greek (with my transliteration and some accents missing):

[. . .] *kai ekselethōn eiden polūn oxlon kai esplangchnisthē ēp' autoūs, hoti ēsan hōs probata mē echonta poimēna*[. . .]⁵⁹

Compare now the Marcus (2000) translation of the clauses I have underlined and marked as "A" and "B," with the New Revised Standard Version (1989) translation of the same clauses underlined and marked as "C" and "D."

And when he got out of the boat Jesus saw a great crowd, and ^[A] he took pity on them, ["Jesus is moved to compassion (*esplangchnisthē*) on them"⁶⁰] ^[B] for they were like sheep not having a shepherd, and he began to teach them many things.

As he went ashore, he saw a great crowd; and ^[C] he had compassion for them, ^[D] because they were like sheep without a shepherd; and he began to teach them many things.

Evidently, clauses B and D are essentially identical, whereas clauses A and C translate the Greek verb respectively as "he took pity on them" and as "he had compassion on them." Are we to understand that these two expressions are synonymous?⁶¹ As for A and C, the partial linguistic analysis above accounts for the legitimacy of construing the phrases "taking pity on" and "having compassion on" in these contexts as synonymous in English.

For the essentially identical phrases B and D, however, note that the identical English expression (if not “meaning”) renders an important and often repeated ancient Near Eastern and biblical image.⁶² When read in their New Testament contexts (for example, Mt 9:36, 10:6, 15:24, 25:32-33; Jn 10:1-29, 21:15-17; Heb 13:20; 1 Pt 2:25), these traditional figurative uses of the expressions “sheep” and “shepherd” are newly significant. Many of these usages reflect the Hebrew Bible’s frequent references to “the customs of shepherds to illustrate spiritual principles (e.g., Num 27:16-17 and Eccl 12:11).”⁶³ Thus, shepherds should constantly oversee and lead their flocks. Good shepherds guard their flocks against thieves and wild animals; they find food and water for their sheep; they care for the ewes giving birth and for the newborn lambs; they attend to sick sheep; they search out and rescue sheep that have strayed; they accept to undergo much hardship and deprivation in caring for their sheep unremittingly. That is, in some collective contexts, shepherds are figuratively understood as pastors.

Here the suggestiveness of Jesus’ seeing the crowd as being like sheep without a shepherd “becomes a proverbial metaphor for [seeing] the people suffering either through lack of strong leadership . . . or through evil rulers, and both nuances may apply in the present case.”⁶⁴ When, after his instruction, Jesus tells the disciples to give the people something to eat, and the disciples go on to ask sarcastically whether they are then to go and buy the equivalent of roughly a half-year’s salary, Jesus does not answer. Rather, he has the disciples go through the crowd to find out just how much food is actually on hand. When he learns that all the food comes to merely five loaves of bread and two pieces of fish, Jesus has the enormous crowd sit down in fifties and hundreds. Mark resumes his account.

And taking the five loaves and two fish, and looking up into heaven, he said the blessing and broke the loaves, and kept giving them to his disciples, in order that they might distribute them; and the two fish he divided among them all. And they all ate and were satisfied; and they took up twelve baskets full of bread fragments and fish. And there were five thousand men who ate the loaves.⁶⁵

At the very beginning of this complex representation of compassion, teaching, and miraculous feeding, we need to note the extraordinary character of Jesus' experience. The key expression here is the Greek verb *splangchnizomai*. In most New Testament contexts, the word usually denotes being moved by a compassion that finds its first expression in trying to instruct the person or persons whose situation has occasioned the compassion. Without trying to review here any of the detailed exegetical commentary on this expression and its contexts,⁶⁶ we can already catch part of what makes Jesus' experience of compassion here extraordinary by simply noting the choices the new standard French liturgical translation has made. "*Jésus fut saisi de compassion pour eux*"—literally, "Jesus was seized by compassion for them," that is, for the persons in the crowd. Here, the experience of compassion appears to include not just something a person actively shows to another person. Rather, some experiences of compassion seem also to encompass something one may also passively undergo⁶⁷—at times, compassion may, as it were, seize the agent in its grasp. But these passive aspects of compassion would seem to elude any fully satisfactory and strictly exclusive naturalistic account.⁶⁸

This second extended example of experiencing compassion allows us to raise further critical issues about the proper understandings of the central expressions that seemed to govern the first example.⁶⁹ Here too, of course, just as in the first example, a not unsatisfactory account of this complicated text would involve a great deal of quite careful exegesis. But, once again, note here just two brief points.

First, note that the lexical field of the word "feeling" describes the key expression "affect" in strictly scientifically naturalistic terms as "an observed emotional state" (my underline). But, as Mark's story and some everyday experiences of compassion show, this exclusively linguistic description seems too narrow, for some affects appear to be so evidently on hand mentally that their actual presence does not require certification from any external scientific observers, whether professional psychologists or others.

And note, second, that the description here of the key notion of “feeling” is strongly linked to physical and not just mental expression. Thus, abbreviating slightly, “feeling” is described as “almost any subjective reaction or state . . . that is characterized by an emotional response.” But, again, Mark’s example and everyday experience also show that some genuine feelings do not appear to require external physical expression at all.⁷⁰ In short, Jesus’ feelings for the multitude are in part deeply mysterious, for they are linked inescapably with the religious mysteries of redemption. Moreover, the central expression in this description of “feeling,” namely the word “emotion,” remains unspecified.

Nonetheless, we may still try to articulate further what I just called the deeply mysterious character of these specific feelings. Take this time the notion of voice. In linguistics, voice, like person, is also a grammatical category. It is used to describe the structure of sentences especially with respect to verbs. In particular, voice is used to describe “the way sentences may alter the relationship between the subject and the object of a verb, without changing the meaning of the sentence. The main distinction is between active and passive. . . .”⁷¹ Now, recall that in our first example, we saw that the experience of compassion seems to suggest a kind of relational mutuality between acting and undergoing—a situation in which a first-person subject both actively does something and at the same time also passively undergoes something on the part of other persons, one represented as actual and the other as fictional. And we said that sometimes experiencing compassion seems to comprise concurrently both a transitive moment, where the subject in the expression “he experienced compassion” has the semantic role of an agent, and an intransitive moment, where the subject has the semantic role of a patient.

Here we may expand on this account by focusing more sharply on the passive voice. Thus, when, on reading Mark, suppose someone says, “Jesus was seized by compassion in Galilee in the thirties of the first century.” Here we seem to have a clearly passive sentence construction. This kind of passive construction however is ambiguous. That is, the verb in this

sentence can be understood not just as passive, but also as either a “statal passive” or an “actional passive.” In other words, the sentence may be described, on the one hand, as having a “statal meaning,” referring to the subject having experienced compassion in the sense of having fully completed his compassionate act there and then; but the verb in the sentence can also be described as having an “actional meaning,” referring to the subject’s not yet having fully completed his compassionate act and continuing to undergo his experience of compassion.⁷² (This sense of “actional meaning” is close to the sense of the progressive present tense of a verb.⁷³)

But, however we may finally parse the puzzling passive elements of verbal expressions of some experiences of compassion,⁷⁴ we still need to pin down just how we are to understand the primary senses and significations here of the word “emotion” in at least some significant personal experiences.⁷⁵ And this fuller description must rely on the usual, but different, understandings at work today in almost all theoretical but non-strictly naturalistic contexts, such as religion and theology. But what exactly would a not exclusively naturalist account and, in that sense, a non-naturalist account of the experience of compassion look like?⁷⁶ For without knowing more precisely the nature of such an account, we remain unable to specify clearly enough what appear to be the non-scientific naturalistic aspects of certain experiences of compassion. Such an account, I think, would have to be based upon a non-naturalist account of the person.

VI. Accounting for Compassion

The possibility of such conceptual reconciliations, however, raises at least three difficult issues requiring further critical discussion. These issues are: (A) whether the physical is a strict correlate of the material; (B) whether a non-naturalist metaphysics might dispense with still further recourse to supervenience; and (C) whether articulating a satisfactory non-naturalist metaphysics requires qualified, critical attention on the part of philosophers to continuing developments in microphysics.

For now, here are what can only be but three programmatic suggestions for our ensuing critical discussions.⁷⁷

First, I think that a not rationally unsatisfactory contemporary metaphysics of the person and of some quite basic personal experiences like compassion (think of palliative end-of-life care) may do well to exclude any misleading talk of naturalism altogether. This does not mean sidestepping the continually changing issues arising from ongoing refinements in reflection on microphysical reductionisms. Rather, dispensing with talk of a naturalist metaphysics here sharpens the central task for any non-naturalist one.

But that central task is fundamentally not a reconciliatory one between microphysics and the human body. Rather the central task of a non-naturalistic metaphysics of the person and of basic personal experiences, like compassion, is a task for reconfiguration.⁷⁸ What needs doing is philosophically reconfiguring just what the physical now comes to⁷⁹ in the continually cascading empirical data from the neurosciences, from big data, and from the endless experiences of linguistic self-consciousness.

Isn't the challenging question here, then, whether the physical is a strict correlate of the material?

Second, I think that a less naturalistically encumbered metaphysics of the person also does well to move beyond still further philosophical puzzlements about supervenience.⁸⁰ Good work on supervenience has moved on since its most distinguished proponent delivered his much-considered verdict that the notion of supervenience remains a work in progress.⁸¹ But the nature and the kinds of dependence that supervenience entails have grown shadowy. They have grown shadowy in the bright light of newer work on types of causation in the physical sciences themselves.⁸²

Presumably, something quite basic lies somewhere in the shadowy worlds of supervenience.⁸³ For example, just what kind of causation can be properly attributed to higher level neuronal networks with respect to the most fundamental level of these networks is an essential question for any metaphysics

of the person. But just how which kinds of causation and which kinds of supervenience are to be correlated may be dealt with more economically.⁸⁴

Isn't another key question here, then, whether we non-naturalist metaphysicians might reasonably dispense with still further talk of supervenience altogether?

Third, I think that a not exclusively naturalistic and non-supervenient metaphysics of the person and of some basic personal experiences like compassion, one that relies on some contemporary critical reflection among physicists on the understanding of emergence,⁸⁵ on some recent philosophical work in the metaphysics of causation,⁸⁶ and on similarly recent work on the metaphysics of relations,⁸⁷ may make a substantial philosophical contribution indeed. Metaphysicians today need neither neglect particle physicists and physical chemists nor espouse them nor become philosophers of physics either.⁸⁸ But doesn't building a non-naturalist metaphysics call wherever possible for much more attention on the part of philosophers to continuing developments in microphysics?

So much then for at least three questions for further inquiry regarding the nature of an eventual non-naturalistic account of compassion.

ENVOI: RESISTING NATURALISMS?

When Homer tells us that Achilles showed compassion in giving back Hector's body to Priam, and when Mark tells us that Jesus showed compassion by instructing and then miraculously feeding the ignorant and hungry multitude, Homer and Mark seem to have been talking about not just a completely naturalistic human experience, but about a partly non-naturalistic one, too. Seeing needy persons, it would seem, may sometimes give rise to the experience of both undergoing compassion and, at the same time, of showing compassion.

Essentially, this experience seems to be one person's allowing himself or herself to be affected deeply enough by feeling compassion for another's person's specific neediness that he or

she goes on to show compassion by doing something to relieve that neediness. Yet this complex dyadic relation between experiencing compassion (“being seized by compassion”) and showing compassion (“being compassionate”) may sometimes be strongly resistant to any fully satisfactory explanation in exclusively scientific naturalistic terms. That is, the emotion and experience of compassion does not seem to be satisfactorily understandable in exclusively scientifically naturalist ways alone. Rather, a rationally satisfactory elucidation of at least some quite basic experiences of compassion would seem to presuppose a causally open understanding of some elements of experience as a whole.

Moreover, understanding such basic experiences would also seem to require something more than exclusively philosophical reflection. For the nature of the “openness” at issue here, in partial view only, perhaps in the very structure of fictional, human, and divine persons, seems to surpass the reach both of philosophical ethics itself and perhaps, too, of any finally merely philosophical elucidations alone.

Endnotes: Essay Eight

- ¹ This previously unpublished essay is a newly revised version of an invited paper first presented in much shorter form at the “International Workshop on Emotions and Moral Values” held at the University of Navarra in Pampelona, 8-11 March 2016.
- ² H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: UCal Press, 1983), 2-3.
- ³ T. Crane, “Bewitched: Review of *Portraits of Wittgenstein*,” *TLS* (26 February 2016), 4.
- ⁴ Homer, *Iliad* XXIV, l. 516, in C. W. Mcleod, *Homer: Iliad Book XXIV* (Cambridge: CUP, 1984), 76; Fagles 1996, 605, l. 603. Cf. Green 2015, and R. Lattimore’s translations in Mack 1987. For online Greek texts, see *Perseus*, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>; and/or *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, <http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu>.
- ⁵ Mk 6:34 in *Novum Testamentum Graece With Dictionary*, ed. E. Nestle and K. Aland, *et al.*, 27th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft and Münster: Institute for New Testament Research, 2012), 108; *Mark 1-8 A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary. The Anchor Bible*, tr. J. Marcus (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 11. Generally, *The New Oxford Annotated Bible, New Revised Standard Version with*

the Apocrypha, ed. M. Coogan, 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2010); cited hereafter as “NOAB.”

- 6 Usually, concepts may articulate satisfactorily most elements of ordinary human experience (*Erfahrung*), whereas, standardly, most philosophers hold that conceptualizing satisfactorily the directness, immediacy, and the fullness of experience—lived experience (*Erlebnis*, cf. J. Bowman, “*Erlebnis*,” in Audi 2015, 32)—is not possible. Cf. T. Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek*, tr. J. L. Moreau (New York: Norton, 1960/2015), 323.
- 7 That is, not just occurring alongside of but occurring at the same time as.
- 8 A “naturalistic” account is a philosophical explanation of something in terms that are continuous, in some sense, with those in science (cf. J. F. Post, “Naturalism,” in Audi 2015, 698). Besides this epistemological claim, naturalism also includes the ontological claim that “everything is composed of natural entities—those studied in the [natural] sciences . . . whose properties determine all the properties of things, persons included (*abstracta* like *possibilia* and mathematical objects, if they exist, being constructed of such abstract entities as the [natural] sciences allow)” (*loc. cit.*). Cf. the papers in De Caro and Macarthur 2015.
- 9 Generally, on emotion in Christian texts, see C. A. Evans, “The Life and Teaching of Jesus and the Rise of Christianity,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Biblical Studies*, ed. J. W. Rogerson and J. M. Lieu (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 301-316; R. Roberts, “Emotions in the Christian Tradition,” revised 25 April 2011, Section 2.3, in Zalta (Spring 2015); and R. Roberts, *Emotions in the Moral Life* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013).
- 10 Emotions “are any of several general types of mental states . . . [and] appear to be linked together only by overlapping family resemblances rather than by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions” (R. M. Gordon, “Emotions,” in Audi 2015, 300-301; and “Empathy,” in Audi 2015, 302. Cf. related entries in SOED 2007). See also R. De Sousa, “Emotions,” revised 21 January 2013, in Zalta (Spring 2015); and D. Evans, *Emotion* (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
- 11 Most philosophers today understand explaining individual events by specifying their cause by subsuming them under a natural law (arguing deductively with “the covering law” model), and they understand explaining individual human actions by “citing the agent’s beliefs and desires (and other ‘intentional’ mental states such as emotions, hopes, and expectations) that constitute a reason for doing what was done” (J. Kim, “Reductionism, Mental,” in Honderich 2005, 794; cf. J. Kim, “Explanation,” in Audi 2015, 346-347).
- 12 Cf. the recent articles in Goldie 2012. On causal closure, the idea that all the causes of both physical and mental events are themselves physical events, see E. LePore, “Davidson, Donald,” in Audi 2015, 239-240. For general philosophical backgrounds on science, see T. Lewins,

The Meaning of Science: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (New York: Basic Books, 2016).

¹³ Cf. articles in Lewis 2010.

¹⁴ “One pervasive thought in the literature is that . . . understanding involves the discernment of structure or dependencies of some kind. It is also commonly said that understanding this structure or these dependencies cannot be achieved in just any way but requires that they be ‘seen’ or ‘grasped’ ”(S. R. Grimm, “Understanding,” in Audi 2015, 1091).

¹⁵ Homer, *Iliad* XXIV, l. 516, in Mcleod 1984, 76; tr. Fagles 1996, 605, l. 603.

¹⁶ Mk 6:34 in Nestle and Aland 2012, 108; tr. Marcus 2000, 11.

¹⁷ For a standard account of normativity, see B. Russell, “Normativity,” in Audi 2015, 729-731. On one important idea of what normative discourse is, namely “what we are doing when we talk about what ought to be,” see R. Wedgwood, *The Nature of Normativity* (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 17. On the different notions of normative statements, concepts, properties, entities, judgments, and beliefs, see, respectively, *Ibid.*, 35, 119-122, 135, 69-75, and 244-245. Cf. G. Brennan *et al.*, *Explaining Norms* (Oxford: OUP, 2013). For a different approach to normative discourse than Wedgwood 2007’s mainly semantic account, see C. Möllers’s mainly conceptual account in his *Die Möglichkeit der Normen* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015), 125-237.

¹⁸ See the forthcoming papers of the Second International Conference of the Central and Eastern European Ethics Network held in Olomouc, Czech Republic, in May 2015. On emotions and values, see the papers in *Emotion and Value*, ed. S. Roeser and C. Todd (Oxford: OUP, 2014). On emotions as a source of evaluative understanding, see M. S. Brady, *Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), and for contrasting contemporary papers on persons both human and divine, Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 2007, esp. 237-260.

¹⁹ For extended examples of such experiences, see P. J. Larkin, *Compassion: The Essence of Palliative and End of Life Care* (Oxford: OUP, 2015). I am grateful to Maria Aparicio for this very helpful reference.

²⁰ In what follows, I set aside here trying to say just what value is. Standardly, on value as the worth of something, see N. M. Lemos, “Value,” in Audi 2015, 1100-1101. On how emotions may “present” values, see especially Porebski 1996; Findlay 1970; and Meinong 1917/2011, translated as Meinong 1972. Cf. Paul Grice’s three 1983 lectures on “The Conception of Value,” especially “Metaphysics and Value,” in Grice 1991, 69-91; Findlay 1970; and M. J. Zimmerman, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values,” revised 24 December 2014 in Zalta. On functional, human being, and animal attribute views, see papers in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman 2007. Provisionally, perhaps we may here simply agree

(with Findlay) that the expression “value” refers mainly to “a philosophical equivalent of the goodness, the excellence, the desirability . . . which we attribute to certain sorts of objects, states, and situations: such value is very plainly correlated, and correlated in principle, with attitudes . . . [called] ‘valuations’ ” (7).

- ²¹ See R. Stalnaker, *Context* (Oxford: OUP, 2014) for clarifications of the difficult philosophical and not just linguistic notion of context.
- ²² In natural languages, generally such a cluster is termed a “conceptual field.” In English or in some other specific natural language, such a cluster is termed a “lexical field.” Cf. Matthews 2014, 359. See also the several related entries under “lexical” in Matthews 2014, 221-225. The reference throughout is to British English on the bases of the International Corpus of English (B. Aarts, *English Syntax and Argumentation*, 4th ed. [London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011], 6 and 347-348). For basic discussions of English syntactical features, see B. Aarts *et al.*, *The Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2014), *passim*. Nuances can be found for American English in three works: in two standard dictionaries of American English, *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary*, ed. P. B. Gove (New York: Webster, 1993), and *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4th ed., ed. J. Pickett (New York: American Heritage, 2001—note, this is not the newer but less complete 5th ed. from 2011), and in the standard usage manual *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of English Usage* (New York: Webster, 1994).
- ²³ On the related expressions “sympathy” and “empathy,” see respectively the papers in *Sympathy: A History*, ed. E. Schliesser (Oxford: OUP, 2015), and the monograph of M. Slote, *The Ethics of Care and Empathy* (Oxford: Routledge, 2007). According to Slote, we may distinguish between the two by holding that empathy involves “feeling someone’s pain” when the feelings of another are aroused involuntarily in oneself, whereas sympathy involves “feeling sorry for, bad for, the person who is in pain” without necessarily undergoing empathy (13). Cf. the relevant essays in *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*, ed. A. Coplan and P. Goldie (Oxford: OUP, 2011).
- ²⁴ Cf. Pope Francis, *Amoris Laetitia* (2016), 26, 37, and 113. Cf. also Pope John Paul II, *La miséricorde divine* (Paris: Le Centurion, 1980), 49-53.
- ²⁵ *The New Oxford American Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 1062; my underlines and italics; hereafter cited as “NOAD.”
- ²⁶ See F. S. Naiden, *Ancient Supplication* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), for a recent and thorough treatment of this complex subject.
- ²⁷ See the entries on Achilles and Priam in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 4th ed., ed. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, and E. Eidinow (Oxford: OUP, 2012); cited hereafter as “OCD.” For an excellent critical overview of *The Iliad*, see B. Knox’s “Introduction” to Fagles 1996, 3-64.

- ²⁸ On Homer as the “author” of the *Iliad*, see the entry “Homer” in OCD 2012. For the Trojan War, see Cline 2013, esp. 9-37.
- ²⁹ *Iliad* XXIV.569-591, in Fagles 1996, 604-605. Fagles translates the 1920 D. B. Monro and T. W. Allen Greek text of the older Oxford Classical Text edition, *Homeri Opera*. (A new OCT Greek Text is forthcoming.) In the Greek text of Macleod 1982, Priam’s argument runs from lines 486-506. For historical backgrounds, see S. Price and P. Thonemann, *The Birth of Classical Europe* (New York: Penguin, 2010), 39-42; and Jablonka 2010, 849-861. For bibliography, see Bierl and Latacz 2010; and *Vierundzwanzigster Gesang: Kommentar, Faszikel 2*, ed. C. Brügger (Springer: Berlin, 2009), 271-320. For methodological overviews, see *Homer’s Iliad: The Basel Commentary: Prolegomena*, tr. F. Graff and I. De Jong (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015). For history of recent interpretation, see Brügger 2009. For lexical items, see *A Greek-English Lexicon with Revised Supplement*, ed. R. Scott, H. G. Liddell, and H. S. Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); see also *The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon*. For Homeric syntax in particular, see Chanttrain/Casevitz 2013-2015. For Greek Grammar generally, see R. Kühner and B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* (Hannover-Leipzig, 1898-1904); and F. Blass and A. Debrunner, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Early Christian Literature*, tr. and ed. R. W. Funk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). For commentary, see Brügger 2009, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁰ Macleod’s Greek text, l. 599: “*lélutai* ‘he is released.’ The perfect denotes, as usual, an achieved state; it thus figures naturally in an expression of willing compliance” (Macleod 1982, 139).
- ³¹ *Iliad* XXIV.691-706, in Fagles 1996, 607-608. The Greek text in Macleod 1982 runs from lines 587-600. “Achilles in effect begins the funeral rites by having the body washed, and by himself laying it on the bier. . . . [T]his, together with his words to Patroclus, marks the end of his vengeance on Hector” for having killed Patroclus (Macleod 1982, 138). For minimal notes and commentary on the details of this scene, cf. Macleod 1982, 136-139.
- ³² Cf. M. L. Murphy, *Lexical Meaning* (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), esp. 108-145. See especially the analyses in Lloyd-Jones 1983, 1-27.
- ³³ Cf. W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical*, tr. J. Raffan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985), *passim*.
- ³⁴ On the mixtures here of sympathy and empathy and their distinct kinds, see the articles in *Empathy and Morality*, ed. H. Maibom (Oxford: OUP, 2014).
- ³⁵ On the nature and different kinds of relations, see S. J. Wagner 2015, 920-921. On the issue of the proper analysis of relations, see R. Foley, “Analysis,” in Audi 2015, 32.
- ³⁶ For word meanings, see J. I. Saeed, *Semantics*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 53-86; and for sentence semantics, see *Ibid.*, 117-189.

- ³⁷ D. Crystal, *A Dictionary of Linguistics*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 344: cf. Matthews 2014, 296.
- ³⁸ Cf. Aarts 2011, 21, Table 2.1 “The Person System.”
- ³⁹ Much more, of course, could be said about the fuller linguistic analyses in scientific terms of sentences such as “he shows compassion” and “he feels compassion.” My recourses, then, to linguistics here and in a later section are very partial ones indeed.
- ⁴⁰ According to SOED 2007, empathy is “the power of mentally identifying oneself with (and so fully comprehending) a person or object of contemplation.” SOED then cites an interesting example of how the word “empathy” is used today: “M. L. King: Pity is feeling sorrow for someone; empathy is felling sorry with someone.” Contrast this current usage report with the now standard English language philosophical view of empathy as the “imaginative projection into another person’s situation, especially for vicarious capture of its emotional and motivational qualities” (Gordon 2015, 302).
- ⁴¹ The transitive-intransitive dichotomy is complicated. Thus, describing a verb in English as “transitive” indicates the ways in which this verb “licenses one or more complements” (constituents of phrases and sentences) as legitimate (Aarts 2014, 422-423). There are different types of “transitive” verbs, those with one object only (“monotransitive” verbs), those “with an object and an object related predicative” (complex transitive), and those with both a direct and an indirect object (“ditransitive”). Moreover, some verbs can change their “license,” sometimes being transitive and sometimes being intransitive, depending on contexts. Still more, some objects of transitive verbs can be present or absent, and, in cases of absent objects, some can be fully absent whereas others can be partly absent but still implicitly present. All of these nuances affect the meaning of clauses and sentences and sometimes pose problems for philosophical analysis. Cf. Aarts 2011, 90-105, with various Tables.
- ⁴² For the figurative senses here of “mutualities,” see McCormick 2012, esp. 147-150.
- ⁴³ Compare and contrast, for instance, L. Bloomfield, “A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language,” in *Lionard Bloomfield: An Anthology*, ed. C. F. Hockett (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1926), 128-138; with N. Chomsky, “Naturalism and Dualism in the Study of Language and Mind,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 2 (1994), 181-200.
- ⁴⁴ See for example the 1993 Preface to the first edition and the 2007 Preface to the sixth edition of the SOED 2007, vii-ix, where the preponderant role of the ongoing development of the International Corpus of English at University College London and the controlling principles of corpus linguistics are stressed. On corpus linguistics, see T. McEnery and A. Hardie, *Corpus Linguistics* (Cambridge: CUP, 2012).

- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*; my underlines. Contrast this formal sense here with some of the phenomenological uses of this expression in M. Crespo, “*Prologomenos a una fenomenología de la compasión*,” in Crespo 2012, 85-98.
- ⁴⁶ On intuition, see the essays in *Intuitions*, ed. A. R. Booth and D. P. Rowbottom (Oxford: OUP, 2014).
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*; my underlines, parentheses, and italics.
- ⁴⁸ On various connections between emotion and imagination, see A. Morton, *Emotion and Imagination* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
- ⁴⁹ See the portfolio of colored pictures of faces exhibiting each of these six basic emotions in “Portfolio: Les six émotions de base,” *Sciences et Vie, Hors Série*, 232 (September), 6-24.
- ⁵⁰ See Coleman 2015, 284, 598, and 16, respectively for each definition.
- ⁵¹ Cf. Coleman 2015, 476 on mood: “mood: a temporary but relatively sustained and pervasive affective state, often contrasted in psychology and psychiatry with a more specific and short-term emotion.”
- ⁵² See K. Kristjánsson, *The Self and Its Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), esp. ch. 4.
- ⁵³ On evaluating emotions, see E.-M. Düringer, *Evaluating Emotions* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
- ⁵⁴ My transliteration. Following W. D. Davies and D. C. Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: Clark, 1988-1997), vol. 2, 479, Marcus observes that “throughout the Synoptic tradition this verb is traditionally and naturally associated with miracles . . . [Here, however] Jesus’ compassion does not immediately lead him to perform a miracle but to teach them” (417).
- ⁵⁵ The context, Mk 6:30-44, includes a favorite Markan expression, “many,” which occurs here initially six times. “Most of these instances . . . emphasize the greatness of the need Jesus confronts; the reference in 6:34 to the many things Jesus teaches [our focus] points to the sufficiency of his response to this challenge. . . . [Here, however,] Jesus’ compassion does not lead him immediately to perform a miracle but to teach them—a typically Markan fusion of the motif of wonder-working power with that of teaching . . .” (Marcus 2000, 405-406 and 417). For the parallel passages in the gospels, see *Synopsis of the Four Gospels*, ed. K. Aland, 12th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006).
- ⁵⁶ For a widely praised university textbook overview of Mark, see B. D. Ehrman, *The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings*, 5th ed. (New York: OUP, 2012), 88-104.
- ⁵⁷ On Mark as the “author” of this gospel and on his working with pre-existing materials, see Marcus 2000, 17-25 and 57-62, respectively. Note that R. Horsley, “Notes and Commentary on Mark 6:30-44: Wilderness Feeding of Five Thousand,” in NOAB 2010, 1791-1792, disagrees with Marcus about the persisting controversies over the authorship, date, place of composition, sources, and intended audience.

- ⁵⁸ Mk 6:32-34, tr. Marcus 2000, my italics and underlines; cf. Mt 14:13-15. “Mark appears to have drawn upon a rich variety of oral traditions of Jesus’ actions and teachings . . .” (cf. Horsley 2010, 1791).
- ⁵⁹ Nestle and Aland 2012, 108; with marginal references to Mt 9:36 and Num 28:17ff., and textual variants at the bottom of the page.
- ⁶⁰ Marcus 2000, 417.
- ⁶¹ Linguists hold that two expressions are synonymous either absolutely, when two lexical units “have meanings identical in all respects and in all contexts,” or partially, when these meanings are “identical in some contexts, or identical only in that replacing one with the other does not change the truth conditions of a specific sentence” (Matthews 2014, 39; for the senses of “meaning” here cf. 238-239).
- ⁶² As Horsley 2010, 1803, notes, “a frequent image for a people without a prophet or king to lead them (see Num 27:17; 1 Kg 22:17; Ezek 34:8; Zech 10:2).” Cf. G. L. Mattingly, “Shepherd,” in *Eerdman’s Dictionary of the Bible*, ed. D. N. Freedman (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 1208.
- ⁶³ Mattingly 2000, 1208; all the examples here are selected from Mattingly.
- ⁶⁴ Marcus 2000, 406. “. . . Jesus sees the spiritual darkness of the people, has compassion upon them, and expresses this compassion in the most effective way possible—by teaching them” (*Ibid.*, 417).
- ⁶⁵ “. . . in a sustained program of sea crossings, exorcisms, healings, and wilderness feedings . . . [Mark presents Jesus] in terms of popular Israelite memories of the great prophets, especially Moses, who had led Israel’s Exodus from subjection to alien rule in Egypt; Elijah, who had led the renewal of Israel in resistance to oppressive monarchs; and Jeremiah, who had proclaimed God’s judgment on the Temple and the rulers based there” (Horsley 2010, 1792).
- ⁶⁶ The entire episode runs from Mk 6:32-44 (cf. Mt 14:13-21). The Greek text is in Nestle and Aland 2012. The English translations are from Marcus 2000; for the NRSV translation, see NOAB 2010, 1803-1804. For historical backgrounds, see Evans 2006, in Rogerson and Lieu 2006, 301-316. For bibliography, see Marcus 2000, 86-133; and *Mark 8-16, The Anchor Yale Bible*, vol. 27a, tr. and ed. J. Marcus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), xxi-lx. For methodological overviews, see S. E. Porter, “Language and Translation of the New Testament,” in Rogerson and Lieu 2006, 184-210. For history of recent New Testament interpretation, see R. Morgan, “New Testament,” in Rogerson and Lieu 2006, 27-52. For lexical items generally, see W. Bauer, W. F. Arndt, F. W. Gingrich, and F. W. Danker, *A Greek-English Lexicon of New Testament and Early Christian Literature*, tr. and rev. R. W. Funk, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). For *eleos* as *hêséd*, *compassion* in particular, see *Nouveau Vocabulaire Biblique*, ed. J.-P. Prévost (Paris: Bayard, 2004), 151-153 (cf. *éleos* in *Iliad* XXIV,

in Macleod 1982, 92). For New Testament syntax, see D. B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997). For commentary, see Marcus 2000, 404-421.

- ⁶⁷ The distinction in English between the active and the passive voice is complex. For a concise account, see Aarts 2014, 7-8 and esp. 294-296; a somewhat fuller account is in R. Huddleston and G. K. Pullum, *A Student's Introduction to English Grammar* (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), esp. 240-242, and its bases in the relevant and much more detailed account in R. Huddleston, G. K. Pullum, *et al.*, *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language* (Cambridge: CUP, 2002). The implications here for a fuller discussion of the passage in question would require a more focused discussion of the system of voice in English.
- ⁶⁸ For several of the complications in the nature and the functions of the passive voice and the intransitive in English, see B. Aarts, *Oxford Modern English Grammar* (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 96-97 and 144-150; and Aarts 2014, 294-296, 200, and 412. Cf. Aarts 2014, 247 ("mediopassive") and 248-249 ("middle verb"). The second expression is adapted from the Greek grammatical category of "middle voice" in addition to active and passive voice (cf. Matthews 2014, 244). On the complex but suggestive issue here of "passivization," see Aarts 2011, 323-324.
- ⁶⁹ Regarding Mark's Greek text, note the contrasting accounts of these passages in the strongly lexical view of R. T. France, *The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014); and in the strongly syntactic view in R. J. Decker, *Mark 1-8: A Handbook on the Greek Text* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014).
- ⁷⁰ Cf. C. Sievert, "Phenomenological Approaches [to perception]," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception*, ed. M. Matthen (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 136-152.
- ⁷¹ Crystal 2003, 495; cf. Matthews 2014, 429-430.
- ⁷² Cf. Aarts 2014, 294-296 ("passive"). Cf. the discussion of semantic roles in Aarts 2011, 106-107, Table 4.13. Cf. also the discussion of the anti-passive sentence construction in which an intransitive verb may sometimes be related to the subject in the same way in which a transitive verb may be so related (Matthews 2014, 21-22).
- ⁷³ Note that in English the grammatical system of tense and the grammatical category of aspect are usually represented together (as here in terms of the "present progressive," where the present is a tense and the progressive is an aspect), even though an important distinction holds between the two. Thus, "tense is concerned with how time is encoded . . . and is often based on morphological form (e. g. *write*, *writes*, *wrote*); aspect is concerned with the unfolding of a situation, and in English is a matter of syntax, using the verb *be* to form the progressive, and the verb *have* to form the perfect" (Aarts 2014, 36).

- ⁷⁴ Cf. the still suggestive, although now largely obsolete, term in linguistics of the “passival” that denotes something like the progressive quality of the way in which a subject may sometimes undergo certain experiences (see Aarts 2014, 294).
- ⁷⁵ See F. De Vignemont, “A Multimodal Conception of Bodily Awareness,” *Mind* 123 (2014), 989-1020.
- ⁷⁶ For elements of such an account, see, for example, some of the phenomenological work of Jan Patočka (cf. M. Cajthaml, *Europe and the Care of the Soul* (Nordhausen: Verlag Traugott Bautz, 2014).
- ⁷⁷ Cf. McCormick, *On the Nature and Grounds of Persons*, 2016.
- ⁷⁸ Cf., for example, the recurring central theme of the ontology of material things between the death of Aquinas and Locke’s *Essay* in R. Passau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671* (Oxford: OUP, 2011). See the challenges however to both external and internal realisms in T. Button, *The Limits of Realism* (Oxford: OUP, 2013).
- ⁷⁹ See Montero 2009, 185-186; and Beckerman 2009, esp. 169-171. Cf. Shoemaker 2015, 829. See also the papers in *After Physicalism*, ed. B. P. Göcke (Notre Dame, IN: NDUP, 2012); and Kirk 2013.
- ⁸⁰ When something is philosophically said to supervene on something else, what supervenes is a subsequent occurrence of a property that some underlying thing also possesses. A common example is the case where a mental property is said to supervene on a physical one in the sense that the mental property is strongly related to some underlying physical property. See McLaughlin and Bennett 2014.
- ⁸¹ See T. E. Horgan, “Supervenience,” in Audi 2015, 1038-1039; and Kim 2003, 556-584.
- ⁸² See, for example, the articles in Beebe, Hitchcock, and Menzies 2009, by M. Lange (649-660), L. Sklar (661-672), R. Healey (673-686), and C. Hofer (687-706). See especially M. Tooley, “Causes, Laws, and Ontology,” 368-386.
- ⁸³ Cf. Proudfoot and Lacey 2010, 396-399.
- ⁸⁴ See for example M. Gabriel, *Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015).
- ⁸⁵ See List and Pivato 2015, 119-152.
- ⁸⁶ Muller 2015, 201-237. Cf. Williamson 2013, 272-273, on contingency and the compresence relation.
- ⁸⁷ See the articles in Marmodoro and Yates 2016, esp. the introduction on 1-18.
- ⁸⁸ For two recent and quite helpful works in OUP’s Very Short Introductions Series with excellent “Further Reading” sections, see F. Close, *Nuclear Physics* (Oxford: OUP, 2015); and P. Atkins, *Physical Chemistry* (Oxford: OUP, 2014).