Two

Bounded Sovereignties[1]

> Globalization is a multidimensional and polyvalent phenomenon that must be grasped in the diversity and unity of all of its aspects, including in its theological dimensions. This understanding will allow living and orienting the globalization of humanity in terms of relationality, communion, and sharing.[2]

> The EuroMaidan seeks many of the values that Paris, France, and Western Europe represent: rule of law, equal justice for all, social freedoms and guarantees. . . . [The EuroMaidan's] spirit speaks to a need encoded in our spiritual DNA: each person deep in his or her soul knows that he or she is called to a life of dignity and a life of relationship. This truth is sacred despite being so often violated.[3]

Orientations

Recent events in Ukraine are my subject here and in the next essay.[4] I would like to suggest that many basic ethical values, including "relationality, communion, and sharing," as well as "equal justice for all and social freedoms and guarantees," apparently cannot be lived out in common today in Ukraine. The practical particulars are simply too exacting. That is, the ethical values that support these personal and communal ideals cannot be generally instantiated in Ukrainian society without radically changing current global understandings of national sovereignty in absolutist, externalist political terms only. The idea of political sovereignty itself needs to be freshly understood

as essentially limited internally. And political sovereignty must be understood in just such ways that sufficient conceptual space remains open for the play of those basic ethical values that underpin both social and individual sovereignties.

After particularizing the increasingly vague notion of globalization,[5] I specify the overly narrow, externalist, and now globalized understanding of sovereignty that arguably blocks most political, social, and individual attempts to live out in common today ethically centered lives. I then reformulate these reflections in terms of three key points for public debate and further scholarly inquiry. I conclude by recalling several reflections of V. Havel by way of calling attention to the indispensable work of further critical reflection today on Ukraine and other central and eastern European countries.

I. Particulars and The General

The 2014 Lviv international conference proposed for critical reflection the general theme of "Global Political Theory with Special Reference to [the 2009 Encyclical] *Caritas in Veritate."* Among the very many stimulating reflections in that challenging work, I focus here on just one. That reflection goes: "globalization is a multidimensional and polyvalent phenomenon. [It] must be grasped in the diversity and unity of all of its aspects, including its theological dimensions. This understanding," Pope Benedict XVI concluded, "will allow living and orienting globalization of humanity in the terms of relationality, communion, and sharing."[6] Grasping, however, what Pope Benedict called here "the diversity and unity" of the globalization phenomenon involves, I believe, discerning the limits of today's overly narrow uses of sovereignty in exclusively political and externalist terms only.

In this connection, recall Ukrainian Catholic Bishop Borys Gudziak's words from early January 2014: "The EuroMaidan," he wrote, "seeks many of the values that . . . Western Europe represent[s]: [the] rule of law, equal justice for all, social freedoms and guarantees. . . . [The EuroMaidan's] spirit," he concluded, "speaks to a need encoded in our spiritual DNA: each person

deep in his or her soul knows that he or she is called to a life of dignity and a life of relationship."[7] But grasping what Bishop Borys called here "our spiritual DNA" involves reflecting not just on externalities, but also on internal, and even interior, matters.

II. Historical Reminders

After these generalities, and with both the Holodomor's almost 3 million murdered people[8] and the EuroMaidan's "*centurie celeste*" in mind,[9] recall now some of the chronology of the tragic events in Ukraine. With the help of BBC journalists in Ukraine, here are some evocative reminders concerning the fall of Ukraine's former president and the Russian annexation of Crimea.[10]

> **14-16 February 2014:** All 234 protesters arrested since December released. Kyiv city hall, occupied since 1 December, abandoned by demonstrators, along with other public buildings in regions. Amnesty granted.
>
> **18 February:** Clashes erupt [in Kyiv] . . . 18 dead, including seven police, and hundreds more wounded. Some 25,000 protesters encircled in Independence Square.
>
> **20 February:** As truce breaks down, Kyiv sees worst day of violence for almost 70 years. At least 88 people killed in 48 hours of bloodshed. Video shows uniformed snipers firing at protesters holding makeshift shields. Three European Union foreign ministers fly in to try to broker a deal; Russia announces it is sending an envoy.
>
> **21 February:** President Yanukovych signs compromise deal with opposition leaders, brokered by French, Polish and German foreign ministers. New national unity government to be formed, with constitutional changes handing powers back to parliament, and early elections to be held by December. Sporadic violence continues, and protesters remain defiant.
>
> **22 February:** Events move quickly.
>
> - President Yanukovych disappears—reports say he . . . left for Kharkiv in the northeast.
> - Protesters take control of presidential administration buildings without resistance.

- Opposition leaders call for elections on 25 May; Parliament votes to remove president from power with elections set for 25 May.
- Mr. Yanukovych appears on TV to insist he is [the] lawfully elected president and denounces "coup d'etat."
- Archrival Yulia Tymoshenko, jailed for seven years in 2011, freed and travels from Kharkiv to address Kyiv crowds **23-26 February.**
- Parliament names speaker Olexander Turchynov as interim president.
- Arrest warrant issued for Mr. Yanukovych, and acting president warns of dangers of separatism.
- Members of proposed new government appear before demonstrators, with Arseniy Yatsenyuk nominated prime minister.
- Elite Berkut police unit, blamed for deaths of protesters, is disbanded.
- Rival protests in Crimea.
- Former PM Yulia Tymoshenko makes an emotional speech to protesters at Kyiv's Independence Square.

27-28 February: Pro-Russian gunmen seize key buildings in Crimean capital Simferopol. Unidentified gunmen in combat uniforms appear outside Crimea's main airports, sparking fears of Russian military intervention. At first news conference since fleeing Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, now in southern Russia, insists he remains president and opposes military intervention or division of Ukraine. The toppling of President Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine leads to escalating tensions, with fears of a Russian takeover of the Crimean peninsula.

1 March: Russian parliament approves President Vladimir Putin's request to use Russian forces in Ukraine. In Kyiv, acting President Olexander Turchynov puts army on full alert. Large pro-Russian rallies in several Ukrainian cities outside Crimea, including second-biggest city Kharkiv. West reacts with alarm: US President Barack Obama tells Mr. Putin in 90-minute telephone conversation to pull forces back to bases. Mr. Putin says Moscow has right to protect its interests and those of Russian-speakers in Ukraine.

2 March: Ukraine's PM Yatsenyuk says Russia has declared war. US says Russia in control of Crimea. Ukraine's newly appointed naval chief defects.

3 March: "Black Monday" on Russian stock markets as reports suggest Russia's military issued deadline for Ukrainian forces in Crimea to surrender. Reports later denied. Russia's UN envoy says toppled President Yanukovych asked Russian president in writing for use of force.

4 March: Russian President Vladimir Putin breaks silence, denying Russian troops have besieged Ukrainian forces in Crimea, asserting they are self-defense forces. Ukrainian installations are surrounded by soldiers, apparently in Russian uniforms, who prevent a Ukrainian force from retaking Belbek airbase.

6 March: Crimea's Vice Premier Rustam Temirgaliev says that a referendum on the region's status will take place on 16 March. The referendum is to ask people whether Crimea should remain part of Ukraine or join the Russian Federation.

MPs in Crimea have asked Moscow to allow the southern Ukrainian region to become part of the Russian Federation. Parliament said if its request was granted, Crimean citizens could give their view in a referendum on 16 March. A government minister in Kyiv said it would be unconstitutional for Crimea to join Russia.

The Crimean parliament resolved "to enter into the Russian Federation with the rights of a subject of the Russian Federation". In a statement on its website, parliament said it had asked Russian President Vladimir Putin "to start the procedure" of formally allowing Crimea to join the Russian Federation. "This means we have reunited with our motherland, which we have been a part of for so long," said Crimea's deputy parliamentary speaker, Sergei Tsekov. The Kremlin said President Putin was aware of developments in the Crimean parliament, but no response has yet been made public.

If Russia agrees to Crimea's request, the Crimean people will be asked two questions in the 16 March referendum, the statement says: Are you in favor of reuniting Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation? Are you in favor of retaining the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine? Mr. Tsekov told reporters he believed most Crimeans would be happy about parliament's move and would "support our decision at the referendum."

Ukraine's new interim government does not recognize the leadership in Crimea—which was sworn in at an emergency session while the building was under siege from pro-Russian

> armed men last week. A spokeswoman for Acting President Olexander Turchynov said those in charge in Crimea were "forced to work under the barrel of a gun, and all their decisions are dictated by fear and are illegal." Interim Economy Minister Pavlo Sheremeta said it would be unconstitutional for Crimea to join the Russian Federation. According to Article 73 of the Ukraine constitution, "alterations to the territory of Ukraine shall be resolved exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum". But Crimea's deputy prime minister, Rustam Temirgaliev, dismissed the suggestion, saying Crimea views the new authorities in Kyiv as illegitimate.

So much then for at least some salient reminders of such consequential events even today.[11]

III. A Question

Now, such a juxtaposition of general ideas from church leaders and particular historical events in recent memory suggest any number of sensible questions.[12] Here is just one: Where, in all these concrete matters, are to be found any of those abstract ethical values[13] that both Pope Benedict and Bishop Borys stressed? That is, just where in official Ukrainian politics and in Ukrainian society are to be found such abstract values as the ones I began with in the citations above—relationality, communion, and sharing; the rule of law; equal justice for all; and social freedom? In other words, why do such very important general realities as basic ethical values remain largely invisible in the midst of such basically important social and political events as those in Ukraine?

These basic ethical values remain largely invisible, I suggest, partly because Ukraine's former President and Russia's actual President share a dangerously distorted and deliberately misleading idea of the general nature of state sovereignty, and of Ukrainian national sovereignty in particular. Someone might object, of course, that such an outspoken charge is patently unfair. For both presidents have repeatedly called publicly for a "limited sovereignty" for Ukraine in the future, and for a "federation" of Ukraine's very different three main regions. But such an objec-

tion falls prey to Russia's almost completely state-controlled media's systematic uses of what such twentieth century Russian poets as Osip Mandelstam called "Aesopian language." Aesopian uses of language are, like those of the legendary 6th-century BCE Greek poet, Aesop, fabled uses of language. That is, Aesopian language is deliberately used to suggest indirectly the opposite of what is said directly. In this ironic case, however, the effect is not positive but negative.[14]

Thus, continuing Russian government and media talk of a Ukrainian "federation" of regions is negative Aesopian talk of, in fact, a limitation of Ukrainian sovereignty. Moreover, continued Russian government and media talk of Ukrainian "limited sovereignty" is, in fact, a deliberately distorted use of language. For "limited sovereignty" does not denote sovereignty at all. The expression "limited sovereignty," as generally used in Russian government and media contexts today, is a fabled expression that actually denotes externally imposed feudalistic suzerainty.

May I insist, then, that this idea of sovereignty is a dangerously distorted and deliberately misleading idea of the nature of Ukraine's national sovereignty? It is distorted because it arbitrarily narrows the scope of Ukraine's national sovereignty to the supposed inviolability of political sovereignty only. And it is dangerous because it effectively excludes from sustained official consideration all words and actions from outside Ukraine's official government circles. (Such matters are taken unwarrantedly as so-called absolutely unacceptable "external interference."[15]) Moreover, the Russian government's and media's distorted, dangerous idea is misleading because it suggests that Ukraine's national sovereignty can be a properly limited sovereignty only when limitation is imposed externally. Still more, this distorted, dangerous, and misleading idea is also deliberately misleading. For their idea cynically contradicts the very notion of sovereignty as properly limited only internally. And this is just the idea that Russia itself has repeatedly invoked in ongoing UN Security Council debates to justify its unfailing veto of any external interference whatsoever in Syria's (but not in Ukraine's) national sovereignty.

In short, some political powers today, like Russia, have tried to make something absolute of what is essentially something limited, and limited properly only internally not externally,[16] namely, political sovereignty rightly understood.[17]

IV. Global Political Theories

After reflection,[18] I think that the values that both Pope Benedict and Bishop Borys evoked so cogently—"relationality, communion, and sharing" in the first case and, in the second, "equal justice for all and social freedoms and guarantees"—cannot fully emerge today in Ukraine, in the EU, or elsewhere without understanding better the essentially and internally limited nature of sovereignty, whether political, social, or personal.[19] For without understanding political sovereignty in its proper senses as an always internally limited "bounded" sovereignty, I do not think the values that *Caritas in Veritate* detailed and that Bishop Borys publicly insisted on could engage Ukrainians and Russians fully enough in their individual and community lives (see Essay Three).

Before, however, we can talk more here about ethical values, "global political theory," and the now globalized but overly narrowed notion of sovereignty as exclusively national and political, we need to specify briefly what we ordinarily mean by globalization itself.[20] In common English language parlance today, the word "globalization" denotes doing something whose scope encompasses the whole world.[21] That is, global political theory is generalized, worldwide political theory.

Globalization of course is hardly just generalized theory.[22] For globalization mainly involves the spread of commerce and finance, the sciences and technologies, across the entire world. But globalization also includes other important areas of human activity, including theoretical and philosophical reflection in general, and political theory in particular. Moreover, globalization, in this sense of the worldwide generalization of certain human practices, has occurred many times in human history,[23] for example, just before the First World War,[24] and not just within the limits of our own daily experiences and memories.[25]

Now, when we reflect on this current working consensus among historians and theorists of globalization, perhaps we can discern at least one fundamental feature of globalization today. This feature is globalization's generalizing, at the world level, of that particular kind of practical knowledge English speakers call "know-how." Know-how is the specific cognitive mix of imaginative power and technical savvy. Accordingly, we might then take globalization here as the planetary generalization of systematized practical know-how. And an excellent example of such planetary generalization of systematized practical know-how is the understanding of sovereignty in global political theory. But what, in fact, is sovereignty?

V. Sovereignty: Contemporary Views

Political sovereignty in its modern form[26] derives mainly from the political settlements in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended the extraordinary and very wide spread European catastrophes of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).[27] In this historical sense, then, political sovereignty is "a specifically European innovation;" it is called "Westphalian sovereignty."[28]

But today, sovereignty is no longer just a European concept.[29] Like other basic concepts, such as the technological conjecture,[30] the concept of sovereignty now is also globally recognized.[31] "The European way of government," one distinguished political scientist writes, "became a global system, and the only one known to history. The entire planet was enclosed by it."[32] Despite its continuing historical developments,[33] however, the concept of political sovereignty has preserved many of its old characteristic features.[34] That is, the now 28 EU member states included in the EU system of state sovereignty continue to insist, and increasingly so, on their national authority as almost absolute. For while cooperating with the United Nations and other international organizations at the highest levels, EU member states recognize finally no higher governing authority than their own.[35] The events surrounding the UK's fateful June 2016 Brexit decision have strongly confirmed this view. In other

words, neither any world government nor any European Union federal government exists to which the sovereign authority of European nation states is to be regularly subordinated.[36]

The EU state sovereignty system, then, is to be understood today—and for the indefinite future—as an almost absolute form of state sovereignty.[37] This form of common political life can be generally understood in both jurisdictional and constitutional terms. Nonetheless, the indispensable condition for proper comprehension is getting clearer about the different senses of the key expression here: "sovereignty." Among the many forms that political power may take, most are linked directly or indirectly with the polyvalent notion of political sovereignty. Thus, contemporary reflection in political theory, empirical work in political science, as well as the history of polities and political institutions in Europe, show that political sovereignty is at the center of political power in general. Further, political sovereignty, whatever its many different declensions, is perhaps most often a matter not of relative political sovereignty but of almost absolute political sovereignty. That is, the political pretention of those in power is to be as unlimited a form of political sovereignty as they are able to achieve by whatever means.

But European history also demonstrates that, despite the most frequent pretentions to unlimited political sovereignty, most European polities have had to settle either for a quasi-absolute sovereignty or, more often and more weakly, for a relative sovereignty. For whatever the polity, the historical facts are that there are most often more than just one set of powerful political forces at work. Moreover, there are also more than just powerful political forces a polity must deal with; there are also powerful and contrary social and individual forces.[38] We see this concretely today in the events in Ukraine. During its very long and complicated history, then, political sovereignty in Europe appears to be necessarily limited. That is, European political sovereignty appears to be essentially subject to the necessity for rules, for regulations, and eventually for laws—in a word, political sovereignty is subject to normativities.[39]

VI. Normativities

European history teaches us that the eventual substantive ethical contents of a political and social order—especially in some post-communist societies like Ukraine, societies that Vaclav Havel in Prague in November 1989 defined as societies combining authoritarian regimes with mafia capitalism[40]—should comprise, among other elements, the primacy of normativity.[41] Here, normativity is "not about what *is* the case, but about what *ought* to be the case, or about what people *ought* to think or do[; normativity is] . . . about what *ought* to be."[42] Recall that "what ought to be done" is the ancient European value of moral obligation. The basic value of moral obligation may be understood as arising from the even more basic ancient European value of ethical responsiveness.

But notice here three points about these values. First, what makes such essential moral and ethical values possible is a manifold reasoned and critically measured restraint in all things.[43] Second, this manifold reasoned and critically measured restraint in all things is the restraint internalized in some individuals, societies, and polities. And third, this manifold and internalized restraint in all things can reasonably be taken to underwrite the further idea here that all European political sovereignties are in principle not absolute but essentially internally limited political sovereignties.

Perhaps we may now put these observations more simply. First, the necessities for rules, regulations, and legal norms trumping quasi-unlimited political sovereignties arguably arises from the quite basic and manifold internal value of a reasoned and critically measured restraint in all things.[44] Second, the rewards of a manifold restraint in all things are the many incalculable benefits arising from the continued development (law-making) and application (jurisprudence) of the rule of law entailing internally and not externally, limited and not unlimited, political sovereignties. More speculatively, perhaps we may also say, third, that one of the rewards of an 'originary' value of a reasoned and critically measured internalized restraint in all things is the centrality of the normative in our renewed

understandings today of the necessarily limited nature of political sovereignties.

ENVOI: A PAUSE FOR RENEWING PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS TODAY?

In concluding, then, may I ask whether we can make time for a "pause," a pause for a philosophical ethics? A pause, the Ukrainian philosopher Viktor Malakhov has argued, "[is] the real beginning of any philosophizing and conscious orientation in the world. A pause . . . means a moment of internal focus, 'a recollection of oneself' [M. Mamardashvili], and . . . a starting point of a *spiritual resistance* against any kind of outside elements that force a person to uncontrolled actions, those not directed by the moral mind."[45] In the next essay I take up that notion of "pause" in the guise of possible reconciliations between Ukrainian and Russian people today.

Appendix: The Annexation of Crimea[46]

What justification does Russia claim for taking de facto control of Crimea?

Russia's historical links with the peninsula go back to Catherine the Great in the 18th century, when Russia conquered southern Ukraine and Crimea, taking them from the Ottoman Empire. In 1954, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who was himself half-Ukrainian, handed Crimea to Ukraine as a gift. Only 10 years earlier, for allegedly having cooperated with Hitler's Germany, Stalin had deported Crimea's entire Tatar population, some 300,000 people. In 1991, when Ukraine became independent, Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed that Crimea could remain in Ukraine, with Russia's Black Sea fleet remaining at Sevastopol under lease. Ukraine and Russia later extended that lease to 2042.

Is there a legal basis for Russia's actions?

Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the US, Russia, Ukraine, and the UK agreed not to threaten or use force against

the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine. They also pledged never to use economic coercion to subordinate Ukraine to their own interest. Russia continues to claim that its decision to send troops into Ukraine was necessary to protect Russian citizens. Indeed, an ethnic Russian majority lives in Ukraine's autonomous republic of Crimea. Russia's Black Sea fleet is based at Sevastopol, where much of the population have Russian passports.

But the US insists there is no legal basis for the Russian move. It accuses Moscow of having acted unilaterally in violation of its commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty. The G7 group of leading economies agrees under the terms of its agreement with Ukraine. Before the annexation, Russia was entitled to have 25,000 troops on the peninsula and had an estimated 16,000 deployed there. But these troops had to remain on base. Later, pro-Russian troops were deployed across Crimea. Moscow first insisted that they were local self-defense forces. Widespread reports, however, claimed that these forces had come directly from Russia. Much later, Moscow acknowledged the gist of these reports.

What has been Russia's response?

Initially, Russia denied breaching the Budapest Memo. But Moscow later said that the situation has continued to worsen in Ukraine after the seizure of power by "radical extremists", threatening the lives and safety of residents in Crimea and other southeastern regions. It also claims that the new government had "trampled" on the 21 February 2014 agreement signed by ousted President Viktor Yanukovych.

What happened to the 21 February agreement?

When the president fled Kyiv, the opposition moved in to fill the power vacuum. But earlier that same week, in a bid to calm the crisis, both sides had agreed a deal to restore the 2004 constitution and reduce the president's powers. Mr Yanukovych, opposition leaders, and three EU foreign ministers had signed this agreement. The Russian official present did not sign. Fast-moving events soon rendered the 21 February agreement out of date.

What about the role of 'radical extremists'?

Moscow regularly complained that the protests in Kyiv's Independence Square were hijacked by the far right. According to Moscow, the far right then went on to take power in a new government that included "undisguised Nazis". Two groups, Right Sector and Svoboda (Freedom), are frequently mentioned. Moreover, regular references continue to be made to wartime nationalist Stepan Bandera, seen as a hero to some but accused by others of being a Nazi collaborator linked to massacres of Jews and Poles.

The far right was a minority element in the protests that attracted a wide cross-section of support from Kyiv and other cities. They were, however, often involved in the most violent confrontations, and nationalist symbols were frequently visible in the square. The nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party had four posts in the government. Oleksandr Sych was deputy prime minister, and Oleh Makhnitsky became acting chief prosecutor. It also ran the agriculture and ecology portfolios, but its leader, who has been accused of anti-Semitism, was not in the government. Protest leader Andriy Parubiy became chairman of the National Security Council (NSC). A co-founder of Svoboda, labelled an extremist by the ousted president, was Dmytro Yarosh, the head of the far-right paramilitary group, Right Sector. He became one of Mr. Parubiy's deputies at the NSC.

Was the government anti-Russian?

Part of the problem is that the government that was first sworn in had little connection to Ukraine's more Russophile east. One of its first actions was to repeal a 2012 law recognizing Russian as an official regional language. The decision was widely criticized across Ukraine.

Were Russian citizens in danger in Crimea?

From 24 February to 2 March 2014, disturbances took place in the Crimean capital, Simferopol, when pro-Moscow protesters and supporters of Ukraine's new leaders confronted each other outside the parliament building. After reports had emerged of Russian troops taking up positions across Crimea, Moscow ac-

cused Kyiv of sending armed men to destabilize the peninsula. It was already in Russian hands.

Did the annexation of Crimea create a precedent for other Ukrainian cities?

The circumstances in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Kharkiv were at first comparable to the situation in Crimea. And there were pro-Russian protests in both predominantly Russian-speaking cities. In Donetsk, some 100 demonstrators stormed the regional administration building. Repeatedly, Russian troops have taken part in exercises over the border. And President Putin first spoke of sending the military onto "the territory of Ukraine" without specifying where. Later, however, he said Russia will use force in Ukraine only as a last resort.

What does Russia want?

In Crimea, Moscow appears keen to strengthen its grip with a package of financial aid to the peninsula in the form of pensions and salaries. It also promised that a $3bn (£1.8bn) bridge will be built, linking the Russian mainland to Crimea over the Kerch Strait, a distance of some 4.5 km (2.8 miles). That promise seems to have been kept as work on the bridge proceeds. Moscow continues to call for the Minsk accords to be fully implemented across Ukraine. Mr. Putin accepts there is no return for the ousted president. But Moscow repeatedly stresses the need for a government of national unity. Russia sees the current government as anti-constitutional and not representative of the native Russian-speaking population.

On 5 March 2014 the United States' Department of State attempted to counter widely publicized Russian claims in its note entitled "President Putin's Fiction: 10 False Claims about Ukraine." "As Russia spins a false narrative to justify its illegal actions in Ukraine, the world has not seen such startling Russian fiction since Dostoyevsky wrote, 'The formula "two plus two equals five" is not without its attractions.' " The State Department listed 10 claims of President Putin that purported to justify Russian military activities in the Ukraine. It then appended to each of these claims facts that, according to the State

Department, President Putin's claims had either ignored or distorted. Below, I cite the State Department 2014 note.

1. **Mr. Putin says:** *Russian forces in Crimea are only acting to protect Russian military assets. It is "citizens' defense groups," not Russian forces, who have seized infrastructure and military facilities in Crimea.*

   The Facts: Strong evidence suggests that members of Russian security services are at the heart of the highly organized anti-Ukraine forces in Crimea. While these units wear uniforms without insignia, they drive vehicles with Russian military license plates and freely identify themselves as Russian security forces when asked by the international media and the Ukrainian military. Moreover, these individuals are armed with weapons not generally available to civilians.

2. **Mr. Putin says:** *Russia's actions fall within the scope of the 1997 Friendship Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.*

   The Facts: The 1997 agreement requires Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity. Russia's military actions in Ukraine, which have given them operational control of Crimea, are in clear violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

3. **Mr. Putin says:** *The opposition failed to implement the February 21 agreement with former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.*

   The Facts: The February 21 agreement laid out a plan in which the Rada, or Parliament, would pass a bill to return Ukraine to its 2004 Constitution, thus returning the country to a constitutional system centered around its parliament. Under the terms of the agreement, Yanukovych was to sign the enacting legislation within 24 hours and bring the crisis to a peaceful conclusion. Yanukovych refused to keep his end of the bargain. Instead, he packed up his home and fled, leaving behind evidence of wide-scale corruption.

4. **Mr. Putin says:** *Ukraine's government is illegitimate. Yanukovych is still the legitimate leader of Ukraine.*

The Facts: On March 4, President Putin himself acknowledged the reality that Yanukovych “has no political future.” After Yanukovych fled Ukraine, even his own Party of Regions turned against him, voting to confirm his withdrawal from office and to support the new government. Ukraine’s new government was approved by the democratically elected Ukrainian Parliament, with 371 votes—more than an 82% majority. The interim government of Ukraine is a government of the people, which will shepherd the country toward democratic elections on May 25th—elections that will allow all Ukrainians to have a voice in the future of their country.

5. **Mr. Putin says:** *There is a humanitarian crisis and hundreds of thousands are fleeing Ukraine to Russia and seeking asylum.*

   The Facts: To date, there is absolutely no evidence of a humanitarian crisis. Nor is there evidence of a flood of asylum-seekers fleeing Ukraine for Russia. International organizations on the ground have investigated by talking with Ukrainian border guards, who also refuted these claims. Independent journalists observing the border have also reported no such flood of refugees.

6. **Mr. Putin says:** *Ethnic Russians are under threat.*

   The Facts: Outside of Russian press and Russian state television, there are no credible reports of any ethnic Russians being under threat. The new Ukrainian government placed a priority on peace and reconciliation from the outset. President Oleksandr Turchynov refused to sign legislation limiting the use of the Russian language at regional level [sic]. Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers have filed petitions attesting that their communities have not experienced threats. Furthermore, since the new government was established, calm has returned to Kyiv. There has been no surge in crime, no looting, and no retribution against political opponents.

7. **Mr. Putin says:** *Russian bases are under threat.*

   The Facts: Russian military facilities were and remain secure, and the new Ukrainian government has pledged to abide by all existing international agreements, including those covering Russian bases. It is Ukrainian bases in Crimea that are under threat from Russian military action.

8. **Mr. Putin says:** *There have been mass attacks on churches and synagogues in southern and eastern Ukraine.*

   The Facts: Religious leaders in the country and international religious freedom advocates active in Ukraine have said there have been no incidents of attacks on churches. All of Ukraine's church leaders, including representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, have expressed support for the new political leadership, calling for national unity and a period of healing. Jewish groups in southern and eastern Ukraine report that they have not seen an increase in anti-Semitic incidents.

9. **Mr. Putin says:** *Kyiv is trying to destabilize Crimea.*

   The Facts: Ukraine's interim government has acted with restraint and sought dialogue. Russian troops, on the other hand, have moved beyond their bases to seize political objectives and infrastructure in Crimea. The government in Kyiv immediately sent the former Chief of Defense to defuse the situation. Petro Poroshenko, the latest government emissary to pursue dialogue in Crimea, was prevented from entering the Crimean Rada.

10. **Mr. Putin says:** *The Rada is under the influence of extremists or terrorists.*

    The Facts: The Rada is the most representative institution in Ukraine. Recent legislation has passed with large majorities, including from representatives of eastern Ukraine. Far-right wing ultranationalist groups, some of which were involved in open clashes with security forces during the EuroMaidan protests, are not represented in the Rada. There is no indication that the Ukrainian government would pursue discriminatory policies; on the contrary, they have publicly stated exactly the opposite.

Endnotes: Essay Two

[1] This essay is a newly revised version of an invited paper first presented in shorter form at the International Conference on "*Reflections on Global Political Theory with Special Reference to Caritas in Veritate*," held in Lviv 13-15 March 2014, and first published in *Eco-ethica* 4 (2015), 93-106.

[2] Pope Benedict XVI, *L'Amour dans la vérité* (*Caritas in Veritate*) (Paris: Salvator, 2009), 80, par. 41.

[3] Bishop Borys Gudziak, *The Kyiv Post*, (6 January 2014), translation slightly modified. I thank V. Turchynovskyy for this reference. Despite the Ukrainian spelling of the daily Ukrainian newspaper, *The Kyiv Post,* I use throughout the more familiar English spelling "Kyiv."

[4] Note that in the light of my brief comments on philosophy and ethics in the Preface, the angle of vision here, and throughout, is the complex situation in Europe generally in 2017, and in the European Union in particular (cf. T. Garton Ash's recent overview, "Is Europe Disintegrating?" in *The New York Review of Books*, [19 January 2017]). Below, Part One's two chapters are largely devoted to practical ethical philosophical issues arising from recent historical events in Ukraine, which stimulated this work, and which I try to narrate in some detail.

[5] See, however, M. B. Steger, *Globalization*, 4th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2017), with up to date lists for further reading.

[6] Benedict XVI 2009, 80, par. 41.

[7] Gudziak 2014, translation slightly modified.

[8] The numbers here are from the distinguished historian, N. Werth, "*Comment Staline décida d'affamer son peuple*," *Histoire*, 384 (December 2013), 8-18. For a selection of the key texts, see *L'Etat soviétique contre les paysans*, ed. N. Werth and B. Berelowitch (Paris: Talandier, 2011). For the pioneer historical investigations, see R. Conquest, *The Great Terror*, first published in 1968, substantially revised in 1990 with the help of newly accessible sources, and then reissued as *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* in 2007 with a substantial new Preface (New York: OUP). See also J. E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918-1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983). Cf. especially T. Snyder, *Bloodlines: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 187-223. An extraordinary exhibition of the Ukrainian famines was held in Kyiv in January 2013.

[9] See the Appendix for Russia's attempted justification for its annexation of Crimea. Note that according to the 2001 Ukrainian census, the population of Ukraine comprises: Ethnic Russians - 58.5%, Ethnic Ukrainians - 24.4%, and Crimean Tatars - 12.1%. The BBC feature, which the Appendix cites extensively, reads: "Russia says it is acting in Ukraine to protect the human rights of its citizens."

[10] This is an edited and somewhat abbreviated version of a BBC chronology, 4 March 2014.

[11] Cf. the Appendix for the US State Department's 5 March 2014 attempt to counter widely publicized Russian claims.

[12] See, for example, the analyses of the larger issues at stake by the Kyiv philosopher, Constantin Sigov, in his article "*Surmonter le défi de la peur à Kyiv*," *Le Monde* (4 February 2014). And see also the concerns of T. Judah, the regular Eastern European online columnist for *The Economist*, in his article, "Fighting for the Soul of Ukraine," in *The New York Review of Books* (9 January 2014, dated 11 December 2013), 16-20. For backgrounds on contemporary Ukrainian society, see the analysis on BBC World (5 February 2014), of the Ukrainian writer A. Kurkov (author of the 2001 popular satirical novel, *Death and the Penguin*). For the history of Ukraine, see three excellent books: P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, 2nd rev. ed. (Toronto: UT Press, 2010); O. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 4th ed. (Toronto: UT Press, 2009); and A. Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation*, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale UP, 2009). I owe these references on the history of Ukraine to Bishop Borys Gudziak, himself an historian and the author of *Crisis and Reform: the Kyivan Metropolate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001).

[13] Generally, regarding value, see N. Dent, "Value," in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. T. Honderich, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 941; and regarding normativity, see D. Parfit, *On What Matters* (Oxford: OUP, 2011), vol. 2, 263-463. Cf. however H. Thome, "Value Change in Europe from the Perspective of Empirical Social Research," in *The Cultural Values of Europe*, ed. H. Joas and K. Wiegandt, tr. A. Skinner (Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2008), 277-319.

[14] The SOED (2007) defines "Aesopian language" as ". . . Russian or Communist language or writing which (esp. political) dissent is expressed ambiguously or allegorically, to avoid official censorship etc."

[15] Such external reflections from EU political leaders (or even from religious authorities) are what Russian Foreign Affairs Minister S. Lavrov, in Geneva for the Syria negotiations, first repeatedly called "indecent," and then what President Putin on 28 January 2014, in Brussels for difficult talks with EU leaders, went on to call external interference in national sovereignty. For a very well informed analysis, see T. Snyder, "Don't Let Putin Grab Ukraine!" in the opinion-editorial section ("Op-Ed") of *The New York Times* (4 February 2014). (I thank V. Turchynovskyy for this reference.)

[16] Note that by advocating an understanding of political sovereignty as "limited," I will be insisting mainly on a conceptual issue concerning all political, national sovereignty as essentially bounded, and not on any notion of sovereignty such as L. Brezhnev's notorious idea of sovereignty as "limited" in the sense of forcefully restricted through mainly military means. Cf. the disquieting article in Moscow's business news-

paper, *Vedomosti* (29 January 2014), cited by *Le Monde's* regular Russia correspondent at the time, M. Jégo, on 4 February 2014.

17 Recall George Weigel's recent observation: "The long term strategy of the New Authoritarians, in Ukraine as in Russia, is to strangle nascent civil societies in their cradles, using draconian regulations supported by prosecutorial power, all of it masquerading as the rule of law and the defense of national sovereignty against 'foreign agents' " ("Gutting Democracy in Ukraine," *National Review Online* [16 January 2014]). I thank V. Turchynovskyy for this reference.

18 The problem is what Paul Ricoeur memorably called the obscurity and opacity of our present times. Think of the obscurity and opacity of the tragic events in Kyiv. And think of the still burning yet obscure and opaque question of Ukraine's true political sovereignty.

19 Sovereignty, of course, as an idea, is much misused in global political theory as well as in the continuing blockage of the UN's Security Council's discussions of the still worsening political situations in Syria and elsewhere. And sovereignty is also an expression that is very often misused to condemn any external concerns (except apparently those of Russia) regarding the continuing Ukrainian crises. On the larger-than-merely-political ideas of sovereignty that include social and individual sovereignty, see P. McCormick, *Restraint's Rewards: Limited Sovereignties, Ancient Values, and the Preamble for A European Constitution* (Cracow and New York: The Jagiellonian UP and Columbia UP, 2014).

20 For a fuller presentation of the views here on globalization, see my invited plenary session symposium paper from the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea (30 July-5 August 2008). See especially Steger 2017; and R. Baldwin, *The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2016), esp. 142-176.

21 I rely here and throughout on the two-volume SOED (2007). The English word "globalization" is relatively recent, for despite the long history of its content, the word itself goes back no farther than to the mid-twentieth century. Thus, some cultural activities are now to be found almost everywhere, such as the dominance of certain forms of popular Western music. Similarly, certain industrial practices are also now to be found almost anywhere, such as the dominance of East Asian just-in-time manufacturing and warehousing techniques. Still another example of globalization can be found in the accounting practices of the World Trade Organization, which now uses widely harmonized methods for primary, secondary, and tertiary goods and services. So, far from being just one thing, globalization includes different scientific, technological, financial, industrial, political, and cultural forms—to give a partial list only.

[22] For a recent critical discussion of "globalization" and geopolitics today, see R. Haass, *A World in Disarray* (New York: Penguin, 2017), esp. ch. 1. See the review of J. Matthews, "What Trump is Throwing Out the Window," *The New York Review of Books* (9 February 2017, dated 12 January 2017).

[23] If globalization today is neither unique nor uniform in kind, can we briefly specify globalization further in terms of several of its most striking properties? Recall for now several elements from just one of many contemporary analytic attempts to do so. Thus, we might reasonably characterize globalization thematically as a set of at least six theoretical issues. (Among many others, see notably M. Waters, *Globalisation*, 2nd ed. [London: Routledge, 2001], 15-16. I owe this reference to C. M. Gueye.) That is, at the worldwide level, globalization would seem to exhibit the systematization and generalization first (1) of economic realities, then second (2) of social relationships, and third (3) of political unions. And, similarly at the worldwide level, globalization would also seem to exhibit, fourth (4), the generalized contraction of diversity, fifth (5) the collapse of various dichotomies between the particular and the universal, and finally (6) a generalized mixture of trust and risk. Very schematic characterizations like these of course call for careful qualifications. Nonetheless, something like this thematic characterization of globalization is highly representative of contemporary expert opinion.

Note that many world historians today appear to have reached provisional consensus on at least two aspects of globalization. Thus, many agree, first, that the most important period of extensive and truly pervasive globalization is the present era. And they also seem largely to agree, second, that the most salient kind of globalization is the globalization of today's science and technology. In this second respect, we may speak of globalization as "the technological conjuncture," that is, as the now historically most important era of the global interconnectedness of informational and communicational technologies. Think of the roles of Twitter and Facebook in Kyiv's EuroMaidan events.

[24] See, for example, C. Emmerson, *In Search of the World Before the Great War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013).

[25] To take but one example, recall that at the end of the nineteenth-century and up until the outbreak of the twentieth-century's ominously entitled First World War, the industrial revolution had already spread—at least in theory—across the entire world. This movement has been called the first modern globalization. That is, countries around the world were already beginning to profit everywhere from the application of efficient manufacturing practices that previously had been confined to one part of the world only. Contemporary world historians point to many other examples in the ancient, the medieval, and modern eras across

the globe, such as the spread of Alexander the Great's Hellenistic culture across the ancient world, or, in the medieval period, the spread of Chinese maritime trade, and so on.

26 See R. Jackson, *Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007); and the relevant chapters in *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, ed. R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, 5th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2013).

27 See P. H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: Europe's Tragedy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP/Belnap, 2009); and D. Philpott, "Sovereignty," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Political Philosophy,* ed. G. Klosko (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 561-572.

28 Jackson 2007, 144. See Jackson's summary historical sketch of the developments of the notion of sovereignty from the Tudor monarch Henry VIII's 1534 Act of Supremacy to the 2005 French and Dutch rejection of the European Constitution (2-5) which he details on 24-113.

29 Re-reading some modern European history today shows that most dictionary definitions of "sovereignty" often obscure at least four quite important distinctions. The first is between sovereignty in general and political or state sovereignty in particular. The second is between absolute or unlimited sovereignty and relative or limited sovereignty. The third is between constitutional sovereignty and personal sovereignty. And the fourth, and perhaps most important, is between sovereignty and autonomy. Besides recalling such distinctions, we also need to keep in mind the variety within different distinct kinds of sovereignties themselves, whether political, social, or individual. Thus, with regard to political sovereignties alone, we may distinguish here at least three separate groups. Among other groups, we have in general international and national kinds of sovereignty, constitutional and parliamentary sovereignties, and popular sovereignties. Further, we may distinguish among social, cultural, and individual sovereignties. And we may perhaps even distinguish such philosophical varieties as normative and value sovereignties. With the exception of the last group, however, the main, although not always exclusive, usages today of "sovereignty" are political.

30 On "the technological conjuncture," see P. McCormick, *Eco-Ethics and an Ethics of Suffering: Ethical Innovation and the Situation of the Destitute* (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2008), 43-63.

31 J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, tr. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), 444. See also the interview with Habermas in *Le Monde* (14 August 2013). Cf. his opinion piece, "*Repolitisons le débat européén*," *Le Monde* (25 February 2014).

32 Jackson 2007, 144. Even brief reviews of modern European history from the perspective of the history of political ideas show the rather constant development of democracies from monarchies. Although many

stages have intervened between the early modern dominance of monarchical forms of government and contemporary forms of democracy, the number of sovereign states has continued to multiply. Moreover, increasing sovereignty has brought with it increasing homogeneity among different populations.

33 Thus, "populations have been shaped into peoples, knitted together by transportation and communications networks, political and military mobilization, public education and the like. . . . [Some might add: by the technological conjuncture also.] Parliaments have been elected by an ever widening and now universal franchise. [And] Aristocratic and oligarchic political factions have become political parties" (*Ibid.,* 148-149).

34 See, for example, A. Ryan, *On Politics: A History of Political Thought* (London: Liveright, 2012); and R. Forst, "Civil Society," in *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*› ed. R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit, and T. 0W. Pogge, 2nd ed.(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 452-462.

35 The evolving relations, however, between EU law and the law of EU member states remain vexed. Cf. S. Hix and B. Hyland, *The Political System of the European Union*, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2011), 75-101; and, concerning immigration in particular, A. Bhalla and P. McCormick, *Poverty Among Immigrant Children in Europe* (London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009), esp. 49-64.

36 Note however that critical discussion of so-called "constitutionalism" remains contentious. See, for example, the debate between J. Waldron (*contra*) and L. Alexander (*pro*) in *Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy,* ed. T. Christiano and J. Christman (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 267-282 and 283-299, respectively.

37 Thus, European states "continue to possess constitutional independence, which is the liberty to enact their own laws, to organize and control their own armed forces and police, to tax themselves, to create and manage their own currencies, to make their own domestic and foreign policies, to conduct diplomatic relations with foreign governments, to organize and join international organizations, and in short to govern themselves according to their own ideas, interests, and values" (Jackson 2007, 149).

38 Strikingly, the apparent necessity for the restriction of any claimed absolute political sovereignty would seem to appear at the very origins of European polities in Mycenaean elite polities. Here, any polity that would claim some form of strictly absolute political sovereignty comes up against both strong internal and external resistances of different kinds.

39 Cf. the remarks on Ukraine and Russia of the distinguished Bulgarian political theorist, Ivan Krastev, in his 25 January 2014 interview with *Le Monde's* Eastern European editor at the time, Piotr Smolar.

[40] Cited in J. Rupnik, "*Une intervention russe qui fait penser à Prague in 1968*," *Le Monde* (5 March 2014).

[41] See, for example, J. Gert, *Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons* (Oxford: OUP, 2012); and the essays in *Naturalism and Normativity,* ed. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (NY: Columbia UP, 2015).

[42] Wedgwood, *The Nature of Normativity*, 2007, 1. In the various differences in contemporary understandings of the difficult notion of "ought," see Schroeder 2012, esp. 8-23.

[43] See McCormick 2014.

[44] Cf. D. Kennedy, *A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy* (Princeton: PUP, 2016), esp. 1-20.

[45] Malakhov 2013, 48. Here, the citation (cited in full as one of the epigrams) is cited in abbreviated and slightly edited form.

[46] This Appendix is based on edited versions of extensive background reports of the BBC and of the American State Department, which I cite directly throughout.