

## FOUR

# Migrations and Ethical Values<sup>1</sup>

On est à un carrefour: il faut décider si le problème de la Méditerranée est l'affaire de tous ou seulement des pays limitrophes. Si la solidarité et la responsabilité l'emportent, on trouvera des solutions. . . . Mais si, au contraire, ce sont l'égoïsme et la peur qui prévalent, c'est l'idée même de l'Europe qui risque de se perdre.<sup>2</sup>

### ORIENTATIONS<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes current events may force some people to remove their philosophical glasses and, however briefly, look around the European cultural environment in which they still choose to live. What can be surprising is catching glimpses of a gradual abandoning of informed commonsense views about the fundamental ethical value of persons in favor of insufficiently critical naturalistic views. In this and in the following essay, I try to detail some of those surprising actions.

In some parts of at least the European cultural environment, specifically in the European Union, what continues to surprise some reflective persons is a growing moral naturalism. Moral naturalism is the philosophical view that only the natural sciences can satisfactorily analyze fundamental ethical concepts.<sup>4</sup> These concepts include the ethical value of persons.<sup>5</sup> Many informed people appear to believe that the natural sciences can ultimately reduce the distinctive ethical value of persons to microphysical terms. Such an apparently widespread belief, however, raises serious questions, for exclusively scientific,

naturalistic views about the ethical value of persons contradict even informed commonsense intuitions about the irreducibility of some distinctive ethical features of persons. And, as G. E. Moore (1873-1958) memorably held regarding ethical conflicts between philosophical arguments and commonsense intuitions,<sup>6</sup> the ultimate rightness of commonsense views is usually more likely than that of philosophical arguments.

Here I would like to offer two sets of critical observations on the cultural and philosophical environment in the EU today regarding the ethical value of persons in the newly critical contexts of deeply serious problems about international migration.<sup>7</sup> The first set of critical observations comprises reasons why some impressive contemporary forms of exclusively scientific, ethical naturalisms continue to be surprising. And the second, briefer set comprises suggestions only of what a non-naturalistic ethics might require. I begin with reminders about some current actions in today's seriously troubled EU that may occasion such observations.<sup>8</sup>

## I. EU Democracies and Migration Problems

On Thursday evening, 25 June 2015, in Brussels, yet another "summit meeting" of the EU's 28 heads of state ended quite bitterly. This time the thorny question was whether member states could agree to divide obligatorily among themselves just 60,000 of the many hundreds of thousands of illegal refugees already landed at the time in EU states, especially in Italy. This number did not seem especially large; after all, the EU has a population of about 500 million persons. The then President of the EU Council, Poland's Donald Tusk, reported, however, that the Council was finally unable either to agree or even to compromise. A major reason for that failure was the pronounced resistance of democratic majority oppositions in many Eastern European countries to any such agreements.

Surprisingly, and only shortly afterwards, the President of the EU Commission at the time, Luxembourg's Jean-Claude Juncker, admonished the 28 Council members with unusually

harsh words. Mr. Juncker then repeated his words before the international press. “If you are unable to reach agreement about the refugees,” he said memorably to his eminent colleagues, “you do not deserve to call yourselves ‘Europeans.’”<sup>9</sup> But why would such an extraordinarily experienced diplomat repeat publicly such extraordinarily undiplomatic words?

Later, on Wednesday 1 July 2015, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees reported that a new record number of 137,000 refugees and migrants had arrived illegally in Europe in the first six months of 2015.<sup>10</sup> Compared to the similar period in 2014, when already 75,000 refugees and migrants had arrived illegally in Europe, the 137,000 survivors in the first six months of 2015 accounted for an 83% increase. Notably, according to the current UNHCR Director, “most” of these persons were not economic migrants but refugees.<sup>11</sup> They had barely survived their crossing of the Mediterranean; in fact, 1,867 persons had drowned. Of course, since 2015, the numbers of refugees and migrants are now very much greater than then.

Were Mr. Juncker’s harsh words veiled accusations of ethical irresponsibility—ethical irresponsibility not just on the part of individual heads of state, but also on that of the EU states themselves? How so? For whether EU states and/or the EU have ethical responsibilities towards illegal refugees is not evident.<sup>12</sup> But if so, could they have such ethical responsibilities in spite of opposed majority views of their citizens?

Now, one of the several striking events in 2015’s vast summer that has lasting significance for the European cultural environment is the rapidly accelerating movements into the EU of unmanageably large numbers of refugees and migrants. Not for the first time in its long history, the massive movement of peoples into Europe is once again transforming the general European cultural environment.<sup>13</sup> That is, the current demographic, economic, financial, political, social, and even philosophical markers of Europe’s multi-cultural environment seem to be substantially changing. And a fundamental part of that substantial change is, unexpectedly, whatever many Europeans have previously meant by “persons.”<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps most at issue philosophically is an increasingly controversial basic ethical intuition. The intuition is that all persons bear an irreducible objective and intrinsic ethical value as living human beings, and that, accordingly, individuals and states have a fundamental ethical responsibility to safeguard the lives of persons as far as possible. But many Europeans, it appears,<sup>15</sup> do not agree today on what and who persons basically are,<sup>16</sup> on whether, for example, all persons bear intrinsic objective ethical value.<sup>17</sup> No wonder then that Europeans do not agree on whether the EU has ethical responsibilities towards refugees and migrants seeking entry into Europe. After all, as contemporary events and actions demonstrate almost daily, the ethical value of the lives of refugees and of many other human beings seems rather relative.<sup>18</sup>

## II. Naturalizing Human Beings<sup>19</sup>

Rationally justifying claims that collective entities like the EU have ethical responsibilities to provide proper humanitarian care for arriving refugees and migrants depends finally on how the basic ethical value of the human person is to be understood.<sup>20</sup> Major elements of such an understanding, however, remain controversial. This is largely the case because whether persons can be “naturalized” is problematic. Philosophical controversy arises here, especially from scientific naturalistic claims.

Standardly, scientific naturalism is the metaphysical view that “everything (objects and events) is a part of nature, an all-encompassing world of space and time.”<sup>21</sup> Roughly speaking, there are three main forms of scientific naturalism, what we may call here strong, moderate, and modest scientific naturalisms.<sup>22</sup> Although each has several kinds, we may note each main form in general respects only.

Regarding strong scientific naturalisms, some contemporary philosophers argue that persons are to be understood, rationally<sup>23</sup> and ultimately, in the only legitimate terms there are. These terms are all and only the cardinal ones of what is called “micro-

physics.” Microphysics is the “branch of physics that deals with bodies and phenomena on a microscopic or on a smaller scale, esp. with atoms, molecules, and subatomic particles.”<sup>24</sup> Hence, persons can be rationally understood in terms of microphysics only.<sup>25</sup> As Nobel laureate in Physics Steven Weinberg has written recently, “We want to understand the relation of humans to nature, not just assuming the character of this relation by incorporating it in what we suppose are nature’s fundamental laws, but rather by deduction from laws that make no explicit reference to humans.”<sup>26</sup>

But many reflective commonsensical people, among others, often object. They claim that strong scientific naturalisms fail to account adequately for certain quite fundamental characteristics of persons’ lives. For example, strong scientific naturalisms seem unable to say anything substantive about such centrally important phenomena as persons’ distinctive sense of themselves. (Think of an adult refugee’s distinctive sense of himself or herself.) Their naturalist opponents often retort that such apparently important phenomena as persons’ so-called distinctive sense of themselves are commonsense illusions. After all, scientific research has repeatedly demonstrated that chimpanzees, bonobos, and some other familiar animals, too, like some dolphins and some whales, apparently have a “distinctive sense of self.”<sup>27</sup> Hence, such commonsense illusions are properly to be ignored. Thus, whether there is some truly distinctive ethical value about persons that might sufficiently warrant ascribing to collective entities like the EU ethical responsibility to safeguard refugees and migrants, despite opposed citizen majorities, is, at best, merely hypothetical.<sup>28</sup>

Other contemporary philosophers are more moderate scientific naturalists. They often agree that persons are ultimately to be understood in microphysical terms only. They deny, however, that all the sciences can be reduced to microphysics. Many are philosophers of biology<sup>29</sup> rather than philosophers of physics. Further, many moderate scientific naturalists often agree with informed commonsense parties that some important issues about persons, like their distinctive sense of themselves,

are not illusions. They argue, however, that, although scientific naturalism cannot definitively settle such non-illusory issues, only scientific naturalism can properly formulate them.<sup>30</sup> Hence, whether persons are bearers of truly distinctive ethical values that might sufficiently warrant ascribing certain ethical responsibilities to collective entities like the EU cannot be conclusively determined. And whether the EU has the ethical responsibility to safeguard refugees and migrants, whatever the opinions of EU's constitutive member states and their citizens, is not hypothetical but indeterminable.

Besides various strong and moderate scientific naturalists, a third and also various group has adopted more modest positions. What perhaps most characterizes the more modest scientific naturalists is their common commitment to reconciling certain tensions. Those tensions are between major informed commonsense accounts of what and who persons are and the main strong and moderate scientific naturalist accounts. Briefly, some of these philosophers believe that some forms of a scientific naturalism may be reconcilable with some informed, commonsense insights about the significance of the nature of persons. Achieving any such reconciliation, however, requires cogent second thoughts about the proper scope of microphysics, about the proper nature of the sciences themselves, and about what the sciences can and cannot rationally naturalize. Given the difficulties with accomplishing these tasks, problems of incoherence continually threaten more modest forms of scientific naturalism. Thus, the question as to whether the EU has the ethical responsibility to safeguard refugees and migrants, whatever the opinions of EU's constitutive member states and their citizens, is neither hypothetical nor indeterminable. Rather, such a question may finally not allow of any fully coherent answer. For the underlying issues of whether persons are bearers of truly distinctive ethical values that might sufficiently warrant ascribing certain ethical responsibilities to collective entities like the EU may not be well formed.

### III. Nearly Naturalizing Persons

Looking more closely at one version of a “nearly naturalist” scientific account of the person is instructive. Echoing G. E. Moore on commonsense and philosophy, Lynne Baker reminds her readers that “We should not embrace a metaphysics that makes mundane but significant phenomena unintelligible.”<sup>31</sup> What still calls for proper metaphysical understanding, she argues, is the “mundane and significant” everyday experience of oneself using the first-person expression “I.” But what exactly is this experience? Here is a striking verbal rendering of that experience, almost a phenomenological one.<sup>32</sup> The words are from a late nineteenth-century English poet’s notebooks.

When I consider my selfbeing [*sic*]: my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of *I* and *me* above and in all things, which is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum [a double salt], more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf [*sic*] or camphor [an aromatic oil], and is incommunicable by any means to another man . . . nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, dis-tinctiveness [*sic*], and selving [*sic*], this selving of my own.<sup>33</sup>

Now, whether in the refugees’ and migrants’ utterances of “I” (“I must get into Europe”) or in the poet’s (“what I do is me; for that I came”), this everyday, yet deeply significant, experience makes, in fact, a deep problem for many scientific naturalists. The trouble comes from the apparently insoluble difficulty of properly naturalizing such an evident, omnipresent, and significantly central human phenomenon. This phenomenon is not any individual person’s consciousness; it is the individual’s unique<sup>34</sup> self-consciousness, the capacity to think of oneself in any variety of ways as the subject of “I” thoughts.

One way to describe this experience of being able to have thoughts of oneself as oneself is by denominating it “the first-person perspective.”<sup>35</sup> And to develop this idea of the first person perspective philosophically, “the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself in the first person,”<sup>36</sup> one may build on a quite basic claim. That claim runs, “a human person is constituted

by a human body, but a human person is not identical to the body that constitutes him or her.”<sup>37</sup>

Defending such a controversial claim requires distinguishing between a “rudimentary” first-person perspective on the person and a “robust” one. A rudimentary first person account is one that ascribes to persons certain conscious dispositions. But it does not require any occurrent linguistic capacity. (Think of some persons like newborn infants.) By contrast, a robust first person account ascribes to the person occurrent linguistic capacity. (Think again of the refugee repeating “I must get into Europe.”) Further, unlike the rudimentary first person account of the person comprising consciousness only, the robust first person account necessarily comprises self-consciousness, For without such a capacity a person is unable to exercise normal human intentionality, deliberation, and ethical responsibility.

A nearly naturalist first-person account of the person is a robust first-person account. What distinguishes this “nearly naturalist” robust first-person perspective on the person from its moderate and strong scientific naturalist ones is its quite forcefully argued positioning between the two poles of naturalism and supernaturalism. That is, while remaining open with respect to scientific naturalistic understandings of the world, a nearly naturalist account nevertheless denies that such an understanding can now be known to be all-encompassing. Perhaps a scientific naturalism will turn out to be the case; but that it is actually the case is not now known certainly. As to whether scientific naturalism will turn out to be ultimately the case, a modest naturalism remains neutral: maybe so, maybe not.

Similarly, while not rejecting any fundamental supernatural understanding of the world, a modest naturalism nevertheless also denies that such an understanding can now be known to be all-encompassing. Perhaps the world is fundamentally a supernatural reality; but this is also not known certainly to be the case. And, again, as to whether a supernatural realism will turn out to be the case, a nearly naturalist account also remains neutral: maybe so, maybe not.



Consequently, a nearly naturalist account is committed to elaborating a metaphysics of the person, which, while open to scientific naturalisms, and, if not open, at least not closed to religious supernaturalisms, focuses sharply on a multi-level reconciliation project. That project involves reconciling informed commonsense views about the centrality of such essentially human phenomena as persons' self-consciousness with informed scientific views about such essentially human phenomena as the materiality of persons' bodies.<sup>38</sup> Such a metaphysical project, however, turns especially on such disputed notions, among others, as the emergence of self-consciousness and the supervenience of higher levels of conscious organization on lower ones. We need to look briefly at each.

#### IV. Consciousness Supervening

Just what kind of a property of the person, then, is the property of the robust first-person perspective? The nearly naturalist account of the person describes this property as an emergent one.<sup>39</sup> That is, “. . . the robust first-person perspective is an emergent property that may globally supervene on the physical properties of the world, but can neither be explained by science nor explained away.”<sup>40</sup> Consequently, any strictly third-person scientific naturalistic account of the person cannot be right. “Well, maybe,” some might rejoin. For much depends on just how we are to understand the two still-controversial philosophical expressions: “emergence” and “supervenience.”

Take supervenience first.<sup>41</sup> The ordinary use of this polyvalent expression can be found in the *SOED*'s example from Ernst Jones' biography of Sigmund Freud. The phrase goes, “Next morning a harder mood supervened.”<sup>42</sup> The ordinary sense here is that a different mood “came directly or shortly after as a consequence or a contrast” with some antecedent mood.<sup>43</sup> And the general point is that something that supervenes on something else is a subsequent occurrence. In contemporary metaphysics, however, this key point about supervenience is more particular. Thus, when something is said philosophically

to supervene on something else, the particular point is that what supervenes, while certainly a subsequent occurrence, is more; it is one kind of property that some underlying thing also possesses. Consequently, anything else already possessing the properties of the underlying thing must also possess the resultant property. A common example of this philosophical usage is the case where a mental property is said to supervene on a physical one, in the sense that the mental property is strongly related to some underlying physical property.

Note that proper talk of supervenience, while difficult,<sup>44</sup> is philosophically convenient. For, among other things, such talk enables one to talk of different descriptive levels without reducing one to the other.<sup>45</sup> But proper talk of supervenience requires specifying the particular “realization” of the underlying property in at least one of the variously different ways this property may be realized.<sup>46</sup> Thus, a person’s particular psychological state “could be realized by a variety of different configurations at the neural level,” similar to the way a computer running a particular program could be realized by a variety of different configurations at the circuitry level.<sup>47</sup>

Accordingly, a metaphysics of the person that would be neutral with respect both to scientific naturalisms and religious supernaturalisms needs to specify not just that some ineradicable properties of self-conscious persons may be understood otherwise than as supervening on the material states of that person’s brain.<sup>48</sup> Further, a metaphysics of the person must also plausibly answer at least two difficult questions. The first is: what exactly is the nature of the relation or relations between the higher orders and the lowest order of empirical description? And the second is: what exactly are the specific realizations among the many possible ones in the supervening properties of personal self-consciousness on the underlying properties of personal brain states? All this looks, however, like a very big task indeed.

## V. Self-Consciousness Emerging

But now consider briefly the controversial expression “emergence.”<sup>49</sup> Ordinarily, something is said to “emerge” in the way, to take again an *SOED* example, a certain greatness emerged in Renaissance Florence. Thus, J. R. Green writes in a book on the development of Renaissance Florence, “Florence emerged into communal greatness.”<sup>50</sup> Here, “emerge,” in its ordinary sense, means that something has “come out of a situation in a specified state,” or, more basically, that “something has come into being with the passage of events.” Florence’s communal greatness simply did not exist when Florence was founded; rather, its communal greatness came into existence much later. This is the point in considering the ordinary use of “emerge”; something that did not previously exist has come into existence subsequently.

A philosophical use of this crucial expression in any metaphysics of the person is, again, more particular. Thus, a metaphysician may claim that, although persons’ self-conscious mental states have developed evolutionarily into ever more complex neural states, at least some self-conscious states cannot be reduced microphysically to persons’ still evolving neural states. Note that the metaphysician may concede that properties of some self-conscious mental states may well be realizations of some underlying microphysical neural properties. But, typically, such a philosopher will argue that self-conscious states “make a contribution to the causal explanation of persons’ behaviors over and above any explanation that can be provided by neurological states alone.”<sup>51</sup>

What complicates things further, however, is still another standard sense of the cardinal expression “emergence.” Thus, besides the ordinary and philosophical usages of “emergence,” we also find a specifically scientific usage. Recall that some complex physical systems, for example, crystals, exhibit levels of self-organization. In such cases, whole systems seem to develop the capacity to transit from one physical level to another similarly to the ways, to take another example, some liquids,

like water, may transit from a gaseous phase to a liquid, and then to a solid state. Physicists think of such phase transitions as comprising certain properties of a complex system arising from the system's so-called "collective behavior."<sup>52</sup> Some such properties, for instance, the transparency of water, may be called "emergent properties."<sup>53</sup> Emergent properties are to be contrasted with so-called "resultant" ones, like the mass of an object understood as the measure of an object's inertia or resistance to acceleration.<sup>54</sup> The mass of an object is a resultant property of the whole object.<sup>55</sup> That is, someone can infer a resultant property from the properties of the object's individual parts. By contrast, no one can infer an emergent property of water as a whole, for instance its transparency, from the properties of its atomic parts, hydrogen and oxygen. Further, no one can either reduce water's emergent property of transparency to the properties of its atomic components, or predict its transparency from those properties.<sup>56</sup>

This idea of emergent properties is important not just in the philosophy of mind but also in the metaphysics of persons. For the claim here is that, even though some properties of persons' self-conscious states can "occur only under appropriate physical-biological conditions," these emergent properties of persons' self-conscious mental states are "irreducibly distinct" from those antecedent conditions.<sup>57</sup> Note that the idea of emergent properties is compatible with certain reductionist accounts of physical systems.<sup>58</sup> For compatibility, however, the material underpinning of these emergent properties needs to be grounded both in the fundamental elements of the neurophysical networks and in their higher-level structures. If the grounding is restricted to the higher levels only, then a near naturalism based on emergent properties is, interestingly, no longer a naturalism at all.

Emergence, however, may be understood differently. For instance, instead of construing the nature of emergence—as philosophers characteristically do—very largely in terms of emergent properties, some may perhaps fruitfully understand the emergence of linguistically self-conscious entities both in terms of relationals ("entities discernable by relations and not by prop-

erties”<sup>59</sup>), and in terms of the necessary limitations of rule-governed general behaviors. Thus, Nobel laureate R. B. Loughlin describes how an interdisciplinary elucidation of emergence precipitated from difficult discussions among various specialists in different fields. “Emergence,” the particle physicist summarizes (perhaps somewhat lyrically?), “means complex organizational structure growing out of simple rules. Emergence means stable inevitability in the way certain things are. Emergence means unpredictability, in the sense of small events causing great and qualitative changes in larger ones. Emergence means the fundamental impossibility of control.”<sup>60</sup> In a word, “. . . organization can cause laws rather than the reverse.”<sup>61</sup> That is, “A collective state of matter [think of a mind] is unambiguously identified by one or more behaviors that are exact in a large aggregation of the matter but inexact, or nonexistent, in a small one.”<sup>62</sup> Emergence on this contemporary interdisciplinary, and not exclusively scientifically, naturalist view, then, may be taken as something sometimes more basic than either mathematical exactness or physical monism.

Here, emergence can accommodate many of the features of the everyday experience of persons’ self-consciousness, like fallibility, vulnerability, entropy, and inexorable limitation. Thus, the most basic elements may be properly explained naturalistically, that is by microphysical reduction. But what may not be properly explained naturalistically are all the higher-order connections with those basic elements, for example, the higher order levels of an individual refugee’s or migrant’s distinctive sense of his or her ethical value as a self-conscious person.

## VI. A Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics of Persons?

An alternative account of the nature of persons to those already before us, whether strong or moderate or modest scientific naturalistic accounts or nearly naturalistic only, is a non-naturalistic metaphysics of persons. A nuanced understanding, not especially of supervenience, but of emergence in its contemporary, non-exclusively physical understandings needs to inform a non-naturalistic metaphysics of persons.<sup>63</sup> Here are what, for

now, can only be but three programmatic suggestions for critical discussion.

First, I think that the recent “nearly naturalist” metaphysics of persons is an important step towards an entirely non-naturalist position *tout court*. That is, a not rationally unsatisfactory contemporary metaphysics of the person may do well to move beyond any misleading talk of naturalism altogether. This does not mean side-stepping the continually changing issues of ongoing microphysical reductionisms. Rather, dispensing with talk of a naturalist metaphysics of the person sharpens the central task for any non-naturalist one.<sup>64</sup> But that central task is fundamentally not a reconciliatory one between microphysics and the human body. Rather, it is a task of reconfiguration. What needs doing is philosophically reconfiguring just what the physical is<sup>65</sup> and what the nature of science is<sup>66</sup> in the relation between cascading empirical data, especially from the neurosciences, and the endless experiences of linguistic self-consciousness.

Second, a less naturalistically encumbered metaphysics of the person also does well to move beyond puzzlements over supervenience. Good work on supervenience has certainly moved on since perhaps its most important proponent delivered his verdict that the notion of supervenience remains a work in progress.<sup>67</sup> But the nature and the kinds of dependence that supervenience entails have grown shadowy in the bright light of even more and newer work on the varieties of causation in the different physical sciences themselves.<sup>68</sup> Something quite basic presumably lies somewhere in the midst of the shadowy world of supervenience. For example, just what kind of causation can be properly attributed to higher-level neuronal networks with respect to the most fundamental level of these networks is an essential question for any metaphysics of the person. But just how which kinds of causation and which kinds of supervenience are to be correlated may perhaps be dealt with more economically by dispensing, at least in this particular metaphysical domain, with still further talk of supervenience altogether.<sup>69</sup>

Third, perhaps a non-natural and non-supervenient metaphysics of the person that relies on some contemporary criti-

cal reflection among physicists on the understanding of emergence<sup>70</sup> may make a substantial philosophical contribution. Metaphysicians need neither neglect particle physicists and physical chemists nor espouse them. But building a non-naturalist metaphysics certainly would seem to call for much more attention, wherever possible, on the part of philosophers to continuing developments in microphysics. The practical difficulties in articulating such a metaphysics not unsatisfactorily are, however, substantial. For the unfortunate truth is that most philosophers lack the essential mathematical and experimental training to understand in the proliferating professional literature the most relevant and rapidly accelerating reports on the nature of emergence in the expanding breakthroughs in particle physics. Perhaps equally important, most philosophers have virtually no bench experience of microphysics and its key experiments. Sadly, I have neither. Consequently, my concluding remarks on but three elements for a non-naturalistic metaphysics of the person must be largely programmatic ones only.

#### ENVOI: MORE METAPHYSICS?

When Mr. Juncker publicly admonished his eminent colleagues by saying, “If you are unable to reach agreement about the refugees, you do not deserve to call yourselves ‘Europeans,’ ” he unwittingly underlined, among other things, the urgent need today for a non-naturalistic metaphysics of the persons. For without a rationally satisfactory non-naturalistic metaphysical understanding of persons, I do not think that the basic ethical responsibility of collective entities, like the EU, towards refugees and persons can be properly justified.

Perhaps only such a metaphysics of the person may provide the ultimate warrant for the EU’s being morally obligated to care humanely for the vast numbers of persons—men and women, children and the aged, the able-bodied and the handicapped—who continue and will continue desperately to seek refuge in the EU from the inhumanity of warfare, killing,

mutilation, destitution, dislocation, debilitation, disease, starvation, dehydration, and premature death.

### Endnotes: Essay Four

- <sup>1</sup> This essay is a newly revised version of an invited paper first presented in shorter form at the XXXIV International Symposium of Eco-ethica on “Ethics and Environment,” held at the *Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici* in the *Palazzo Serra di Cassano* in Naples, 28 September to 2 October 2015, and first published in *Eco-ethica* 5 (2016), 133-151.
- <sup>2</sup> Matteo Renzi, “*L’Europe tout entière doit se saisir du problème des migrants*,” *Le Monde* (28-29 June 2015). Mr. Renzi is a former Italian Prime Minister.
- <sup>3</sup> Note that Part Two’s two chapters are centered on actions rather than on events. While remaining strongly empirical, these chapters are more thoroughly philosophical than narrative in approach.
- <sup>4</sup> For “moral naturalism,” see J. Lenman, “Moral Naturalism,” in Zalta (Spring 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/naturalism-moral/>. Cf. the more general reflections on the questionable status today of naturalisms in T. Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (New York: Oxford, OUP, 2012), esp. 13-34.
- <sup>5</sup> See Q. Cassam, “Persons,” in Honderich 2005, 692-693; and E. Johnson, “Personhood,” Audi 2015, 775.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. J. Bengson, “The Intellectual Given,” *Mind* 124 (2015), 707-760.
- <sup>7</sup> On key aspects of the general phenomenon today, see K. Koser, *International Migration*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2016). For recent essays, see *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al. (Oxford: OUP, 2016). And for an extended essay on ethics, see C. Heath Wellman and P. Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?* (New York: OUP, 2011).
- <sup>8</sup> A culture comprises “the distinctive customs, achievements, products, outlook, etc., of a society or group; the way of life of a society or group” (SOED 2007). Or, a culture is “a shared collection of socially transmitted knowledge and behavior” (B. J. King, “Review of H. Whitehead and L. Rendell’s *The Cultural Life of Whales and Dolphins*,” *TLS* (26 June 2015), 25. Regarding European culture, cf. the discussions in C. Renfrew and P. Bahn, *Archeology: Theories, Methods, Practices*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 2012), 40-48 and 477-492.
- <sup>9</sup> Cited in J.-P. Stroobants, “*Rupture entre l’est et l’ouest de l’Europe sur l’accueil des migrants*,” *Le Monde* (30 June 2015), 4.
- <sup>10</sup> N. Larson, *AFP* (*Agence France Presse*) (1 July 2015).
- <sup>11</sup> A. Gutierrez, cited in Larson 2015.



- <sup>12</sup> On the ethics of immigration in general, see J. H. Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), esp. 1-19 and 225-254. For a particular, especially problematic case, cf. the situation in Nigeria as set out in J. Hammer, "The Rule of Boko Haram," *The New York Review of Books* (9 July 2015), 22-26.
- <sup>13</sup> For social theory and international migration, see K. O'Reilly, *International Migration and Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 2012), esp. 39-65; and S. Fine, *Immigration and the Right to Exclude* (Oxford: OUP, 2016). See also *Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership*, ed. S. Fine and L. Ypi (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
- <sup>14</sup> On the economic effects of immigration on nations and nationalisms, see P. Collier, *Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (London: Penguin, 2014), 231-244.
- <sup>15</sup> For the empirical data, see *Les Valeurs des Européens*, ed. P. Bréchon and F. Gonthier (Paris: Colin, 2014), esp. 241-270.
- <sup>16</sup> Cf. the discussion of the what and the who of persons in McCormick 2015. On the significance in this distinction between the what and who of persons, cf. the papers in *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. B. P. McLaughlin, A. Bekerman, and S. Walter (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
- <sup>17</sup> For the US, see the debate following Ian Morris's 2012 Princeton Tanner Lectures on Human Values between C. Korsgaard and I. Morris, "My Correct Views on Everything," in his *Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve*, ed. S. Macedo (Princeton: PUP, 2015), 208-266; and esp. Korsgaard's "Eternal Values, Evolving Values, and the Value of the Self," 184-201. On some of the human evolutionary elements involved in these debates, see F. de Waal, *Primates and Philosophers* (Princeton: PUP, 2005).
- <sup>18</sup> On "the right to exclude," cf. Wellman and Cole 2011, esp. 13-56 and 293-308.
- <sup>19</sup> The expression "naturalizing persons" is especially interesting in the context of refugees and migrants to the EU, for in ordinary English parlance, although not in philosophical uses, naturalizing persons means admitting "aliens to the position and rights of citizenship" (cf. SOED 2017).
- <sup>20</sup> See P. Quinn, "On the Intrinsic Value of Human Persons," in *Persons: Human and Divine*, ed. P. van Inwagen and D. Simmerman (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 237-260.
- <sup>21</sup> T. Mautner, *The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Penguin, 1997), 411. This description (and others below) is "standard" merely in the sense that it comes from a reputable contemporary philosophical dictionary. Note that Mautner details ten different kinds of "naturalism." For the metaphysics of space-time, see B. Dainton, *Space and Time*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Montréal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2010), 368-386.

- <sup>22</sup> For examples of specific contemporary philosophers holding such views, see De Caro and Macarthur 2010, *passim*; and L. R. Baker, *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective* (Oxford, OUP, 2013), 48-101; and the review by M. De Caro, "Review of L. R. Baker, *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective*," *The Philosophical Review*, 124 (2015), 156-158. See also L. R. Baker, *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).
- <sup>23</sup> On rationality in the sciences, see P. Suppes, *Probabilistic Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwells, 1984), 184-221; and, more generally, Saint-Sernin 2005, esp. 102-133.
- <sup>24</sup> SOED 2007.
- <sup>25</sup> On the foundations of physics, see D. Albert, "The Foundations of Physics," in *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, ed. F. Jackson and M. Smith (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 848-880; and T. Maudlin, *Philosophy of Physics: Space and Time* (Princeton: PUP, 2012), esp. 47-66.
- <sup>26</sup> S. Weinberg, "The Trouble with Quantum Mechanics," *The New York Review of Books* (19 January 2017).
- <sup>27</sup> On genetics, cf., for example, K. Prüfer *et al.*, "The Bonobo Genome Compared with the Chimpanzee and Human Genomes," *Nature* 486 (28 June 2012), 527-531. For recent ethnological research, see also M. Hogenboom, "Why Humans Are Unique," BBC Nature (6 July 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150706-the-small-list-of-things-that-make-humans-unique>.
- <sup>28</sup> See, however, A. Fagot-Largeault, *Médecine et philosophie* (Paris: PUF, 2010), 41-44, for a different understanding of the hypothetical in the philosophy of medicine.
- <sup>29</sup> On philosophies of biology, see P. Kitcher, "The Philosophy of Biology," in Jackson and Smith 2005, 819-847; and on the problem of individuality in the philosophy of biology, see P. Godfrey-Smith, *The Philosophy of Biology* (Princeton: PUP, 2014), 66-80.
- <sup>30</sup> De Caro 2015, 156-158.
- <sup>31</sup> Baker 2013, 73; cited in De Caro 2015, 156.
- <sup>32</sup> For phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness, see S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, "Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness," in Zalta, (Spring 2015), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>; for contrasting analytic accounts, see articles in *Consciousness and the Self*, ed. J. Liu and J. Perry (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). esp. the essays by Shoemaker and O'Brien, 198-203 and 101-122, respectively.
- <sup>33</sup> G. M. Hopkins, cited in D. Chiasso, "Comic, Ironic, Grieving," *The New York Review of Books* (9 July 2015), 70.
- <sup>34</sup> Regarding individual persons as haecceities, see T. Williamson, *Modal Logic as Metaphysics* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 267-276.

- <sup>35</sup> See Baker 2013, reviewed in J. Berger, “Review of L. R. Baker, *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective*,” *Mind* 124 (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 317-321. For a review of Baker 2000, see E. Olson, “Review of Baker, *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View*,” *Mind* 110 (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 427-430.
- <sup>36</sup> Baker 2013, 32. It also requires elucidating the expression “constitution” (for example, in Baker 2000, xi). For an explanation of what Baker means by the expressions “the first-person perspective” and “constitution,” see respectively Baker 2013, 59-88 and 27-58. For the larger contexts of analytic notions of “constitution,” see M. Johnston, “Constitution,” in Jackson and Smith 2005, 636-680. On Husserl’s notion of “constitution,” see R. Bernet, I. Kern, and E. Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1993), 195-204.
- <sup>37</sup> Baker 2000.
- <sup>38</sup> I try to take some first steps towards the elaborations of such metaphysics in the forthcoming companion volume to these essays, *Relationals: On the Nature and Ground of Persons*.
- <sup>39</sup> On emergence, see E. J. Lowe, “Emergence,” in Honderich 2005, 239. On emergent properties, see Kim 2003, 573-576; and J. Kim, “Emergent Properties,” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. T. Honderich, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 239-240. Note that the idea of emergent properties is compatible with certain reductionist accounts of physical systems. For compatibility, however, the material underpinning of these emergent properties needs to be grounded both in the fundamental elements of the neurophysical networks as well as in their higher-level structures. If the grounding is restricted to the higher levels only, then a near naturalism based on emergent properties is, interestingly, no longer a naturalism at all. One instructive way to put this matter goes as follows: “. . . it is possible for a [partly] antireductionist theory [like a modest scientific naturalism] to be reductive, provided that the elements to which it reduces higher-level phenomena are not exclusively physical. . . . The difference from a [fully] reductive account is that, while the principles do not reduce the mental to the physical, the connections that they specify between the mental and the physical are all higher-order. They concern only complex organisms, and do not require any change in the exclusively physical conception of the elements of which those organisms are composed” (Nagel 2012, 54n14 and 55, my underlines).
- <sup>40</sup> De Caro 2015, 158, my underlines.
- <sup>41</sup> For a standard view on supervenience, see B. McLaughlin and K. Bennett, “Supervenience,” in Zalta (Spring 2014), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/>. To clarify, consider

- a standard way of describing supervenience: “One set of properties is supervenient on a second set when they are so related that there could not be a difference in the first without there being a difference in the second, though there could be a difference in the second with no difference in the first” (O. R. Jones, “Supervenience,” in Honderich 2005, 903).
- <sup>42</sup> Cited in SOED 2007. As one philosopher writes, “. . . to say that each mental event or state supervenes on the complex physical state of the organism in which it occurs . . . would be the kind of brute fact that does not constitute an explanation but rather calls for an explanation” (Nagel 2012, 55). Perhaps too much depends here on how modest naturalists are to understand the shifting senses of that mercurial expression, “supervenience.”
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>44</sup> On the supervenience of the modal on the non-modal, see Williamson 2013, 380-391. See also Jones 2005.
- <sup>45</sup> Blackburn 2016, 466.
- <sup>46</sup> See J. Kim, “Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction,” in *The Oxford Handbook to Metaphysics*, ed. M. J. Loux and D. W. Zimmerman (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 556-584, esp. 576-579.
- <sup>47</sup> Blackburn 2016, 466.
- <sup>48</sup> Cf. R. Swinburne, *Mind, Brain, and Free Will* (Oxford: OUP, 2013), esp. 21-22 and 179-180.
- <sup>49</sup> The now standard view is that of T. O’Connor and H. Y. Wong, “Emergent Properties,” in Zalta (Summer 2015), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/>.
- <sup>50</sup> SOED 2007.
- <sup>51</sup> E. J. Lowe, *A Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 239.
- <sup>52</sup> Standard accounts are in *The Oxford Dictionary of Science*, ed. J. Daintith and E. Martin (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 286.
- <sup>53</sup> See Kim 2006, 239-240.
- <sup>54</sup> Daintith and Martin 2010, 507.
- <sup>55</sup> On contemporary notions of mass, see F. Wilczek, *The Lightness of Being: Mass, Ether, and the Unification of Forces* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 8-10.
- <sup>56</sup> Note, however, that, as Kim (2005) points out, “the ultimate coherence of the notion of an emergent property remains controversial. . . .” (240).
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>58</sup> On metaphysics and natural science, see Lowe 2006, esp. 87-100.
- <sup>59</sup> See F. A. Muller, “The Rise of Relationals,” *Mind* 124 (2015), 202.
- <sup>60</sup> R. B. Laughlin, *A Different Universe* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 200.

- <sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, esp. 200-218.
- <sup>64</sup> On the primacy of metaphysical inquiry, see, for example, the essays in M. Devitt, *Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
- <sup>65</sup> See S. Shoemaker, "Physicalism," in Audi 2015, 829; K. Montero, "What is the Physical?," in McLaughlin, Beckerman, and Walter 2009, esp. 185-186; and A. Beckerman, "What is Property Physicalism?," in Loux and Zimmerman 2009, esp. 169-171.
- <sup>66</sup> Cf. P. Hoyningen-Huene, *Systematicity: The Nature of Science* (New York: OUP, 2013), esp. 14-34.
- <sup>67</sup> See Kim 2003, esp. 558-565.
- <sup>68</sup> For example, see the newer essays on causation in *The Oxford Handbook of Causation*, ed. H. Beebe, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (Oxford: OUP, 2009), esp. 649-770.
- <sup>69</sup> Cf. Proudfoot and Lacey 2010, 396-399.
- <sup>70</sup> See C. List and M. Pivato, "Emergent Chance," *The Philosophical Review* 124 (2015), esp. 131-133.