

## SEVEN

# Just Persons: Oneness and Twoness<sup>1</sup>

I suggest . . . that a new environment calls for the development of new virtues. Yet is it really possible to create virtues? Can the meaning of existing virtues truly undergo a transformation?<sup>2</sup>

Never shall you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us. If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be also? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn't both of us? . . . You Socrates think there's some attribute of being that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. And how could that be Socrates? That when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be—which belongs to neither—could belong to both? . . . whatever both are, each is as well; and whatever each is, both are.<sup>3</sup>

### INTRODUCTIONS

My purpose here is to invite further critical reflection on fundamental metaphysical elements of the person in non-naturalistic terms.<sup>4</sup> I develop this invitation by trying to elucidate the idea of the justice of just persons. The general idea is not so much to transform the meaning of any existing virtue. Rather, the purpose is to consider closely the traditional virtue of personal rather than social justice as a means for inviting cogent alternative accounts of the just person in other than exclusively naturalistic terms. Suppose then we try to particularize one of distinguished Japanese philosopher Tomonobu Imamichi's

still challenging general questions. That question goes, “Can the meaning of existing virtues truly undergo transformation?” Thus, we might ask, “Can the meaning of existing virtues accommodate substantive changes today?”

Coming to understand justice in new terms, however, may seem not very likely. An initial difficulty is trying to make good enough sense of just what it might mean to talk of virtues like justice in, as Imamichi was suggesting, truly transformational terms. But even were that talk clearer and the task possible, would such a truly transformational understanding of justice enhance our understanding of what makes some persons? And would that greater awareness of what and who the just person is be of a sufficiently practical character that the great numbers of persons suffering unjustly today might plausibly fall drastically? Answers to such very general questions are not evident.

Consider the justice of the just person. Most philosophers today who work mainly in English think of what justice is in rather definite ways. Most often, these philosophers take the English word “justice” to denote each person receiving “what he or she is due.”<sup>5</sup> Many then proceed to distinguish formal from substantive justice, commutative from distributive justice, and corrective from retributive justice. Formal justice, these philosophers argue, is mainly a matter of “the impartial and consistent application of principles, whether or not the principles themselves are just.” Substantive justice, however, is mainly a matter of what persons “can legitimately demand of one another or [of] . . . their government.” Moreover, when the matter is the particular case of the fairness of salaries and so on, philosophers talk of commutative justice. When the matter is one of the fairness of the distribution of resources, they talk of distributive justice. When the matter at issue is the demand for civil damages, they talk of corrective justice. And when the matter is one of punishment, they talk of retributive justice. Of course, this proliferation of kinds of justice strikes some reflective persons as a whole lot of justice indeed.

To focus more sharply, I would first like to recall what Plato in the *Republic* called “justice in the soul,” or psychic justice.

My emphasis, however, will be not on what persons can legitimately demand of their governments or of others. Rather, I will stress what persons ought, justly, to require of themselves. Unlike, however, apparently similar discussions today of “what we owe to each other,”<sup>6</sup> my concern will not take reasons as primary. Instead, I will try to assume as primordial a certain sovereign notion of the good and of value.<sup>7</sup> With these accents in place, I will then go on to suggest for critical discussion a certain speculative conception of persons. That conception is a non-naturalistic metaphysical understanding of persons<sup>8</sup> as pre-eminently relational entities rather than as complex substances. The main implication will be that such a conception may render a cogent and fruitful account of what is meant not just by psychic justice but by personal justice, by persons being just, by the just person.

### I. Justice in Plato’s *Republic*

Recall that at the beginning of Book I of his *Republic* (originally subtitled “On Justice”), Plato represents Socrates as rejecting the conception of justice of his first interlocutor, Cephalus.<sup>9</sup> On this “traditionalist” conception, justice is “speaking the truth and paying your debts.” Socrates then proceeds to distinguish his own so far unspecified account<sup>10</sup> from a Sophist conception, roughly that justice is “what is advantageous to the stronger,”<sup>11</sup> and then from a conventionalist conception, roughly that justice is forbearing to prey “on others in exchange for not being preyed on by them.”<sup>12</sup> At the end of Book I, Socrates concludes his long discussion with Thrasymachus by conceding that he had gone off track. “[B]efore finding the first thing we inquired about—namely, what justice is,” Socrates says, “I let that go, and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a kind of wisdom and virtue.”<sup>13</sup>

In the later books, Socrates devotes most of the protracted discussions mainly to arguing negatively that we would not be better off even if we could get away with being unjust. More positively, Socrates elaborates both his psychological account

of justice as psychic harmony and his metaphysical account of justice as the intellectual grasp of the Form of justice itself.<sup>14</sup> Throughout, Socrates distinguishes between, on the one hand, justice in the psyche, justice with respect to oneself, justice as a self-regarding virtue; and, on the other, justice outside the psyche, justice with respect to others, justice as an other-regarding virtue. Justice with respect to oneself Socrates construes non-instrumentally as justice in itself, whereas justice with respect to others he takes consequentially as justice in the *polis*. Anachronistically, I will talk hereafter of justice in the psyche as “personal justice” (what Socrates himself calls at 368e162 “the justice that belongs to a single man” (or the justice with regards to oneself as a person), and justice in the *polis* as “interpersonal justice” (the justice with regards to other persons, social and political justice).

Now one recurring problem for Socrates is that, while disagreeing with his successive interlocutors and promising that he will shortly offer his own views about why “justice in the psyche,” or what I am calling personal justice, is worthy of choice in itself and not solely for its consequences, Socrates delays. More precisely, Socrates does talk of why justice is worthy of choice because of its consequences. But he never gets around to saying why justice is worthy of choice solely because of itself and hence non-instrumentally until Book IX. From Book II to Books IX and part of X, Socrates seems to digress repeatedly from the topic of personal or psychic justice in itself to talk about interpersonal or social and political justice. In Book III, however, Socrates had already specified what would be the gist of his eventual account of justice. There he claimed that he would try to account finally for “. . . what sort of thing justice is, and how, given its nature, it profits the one who has it, whether he is believed to be just or not.”<sup>15</sup> For Socrates, the first of these two points is the most important, namely, saying just what sort of thing justice is in itself. In Book IX, however, Socrates finally gets back to this main point. He goes through three complex arguments to reach three conclusions. Unfortunately, each of these arguments turns out to be besides his main point.

In summary, Socrates's first conclusion here is that "a philosopher king is the happiest and most just of people. . . ." The second is that "a philosopher's assessment of the relative pleasantness of his life and those of money-lovers and honor-lovers is more reliable than their assessments of the relative pleasantness of his life and theirs." And the third is that "a philosopher's pleasures are truer and purer than those of a money-lover or an honor-lover."<sup>16</sup> But none of these three conclusions tells us what Socrates himself had specified as just "what sort of thing justice is."

Still, at the very end of Book X, the *Republic's* last book, Socrates does try to complete his protracted response to Glaucon from Book II. Without exactly saying what sort of thing justice itself is, he argues that justice is worthy of choice both because of its consequences and also because of itself. He is able to argue this major point, however, only by appealing to a myth, the myth of Er. Here is the key transitional passage.

Glaucon and the others begged me not to abandon the argument but to help in every way to track down what justice and injustice each is, and the truth about their respective benefits. So I told them what I had in mind. . . . We say, don't we, that there is a justice that belongs to a single man, and also one that belongs to a whole city?—Certainly.—And a city is larger than a single man?—Yes, it is larger.—Perhaps then there will be more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in cities, and afterward look for it in the individual, to see if the larger entity is similar in form to the smaller one.<sup>17</sup>

Understanding the key points here will require recalling Socrates' discussions with Crito in Plato's eponymous dialogue, *Crito*.

## II. Socrates on Justice in Plato's *Crito*

Some have argued that Plato's views on justice, whether justice in the individual or in the state, are overly restrictive. Thus, "the Socratic determination of justice," one Plato scholar writes

recently, “leaves its acquisition open to anyone. . . . [By contrast,] the Platonic comparison of the well-organized individual . . . soul with the closed society of the traditionally constituted Greek *polis* is historically conservative, limiting the breadth of the concept’s application in all its spheres. . . . That is why the Socratic view cannot properly prepare for the Platonic: their true relation as historically revealed shows them to be opposed to each other.”<sup>18</sup> Some support for this view, particularly with respect to individual justice, may be found, I think, not just in an often overlooked moment in the *Republic*, but also in a similarly often overlooked moment in *Crito*.<sup>19</sup>

We probably remember that Crito’s protracted discussion with Socrates occurs just after Socrates has sat up early in the morning in his prison cell. Waking from his night’s dreams, Socrates finds his close friend sitting by him quietly. Crito has brought news that the roughly one month official delay in the application of Socrates’ death sentence shall end the next day. Crito then argues that, before it’s too late, Socrates should accept his friends’ plans for him to escape that very day. Memorably, however, Socrates claims that, in all good reason, he cannot accept. Interpersonal justice (not personal justice) demands that he must “abide by the laws’ final judgment and accept his death sentence.”<sup>20</sup> Most of the ensuing dialogue goes on to center on Socrates’ attempts to justify his decision not to accept the final chance to escape his fate. One by one, Socrates refutes the various arguments that Crito uses to support his main claim that Socrates must escape. And, while maintaining some doubts, Plato scholars generally have held that Socrates manages largely, but perhaps not completely, to refute Crito’s arguments.<sup>21</sup>

In the guise of Socrates, Plato first argues that the just life is to be associated with the good life, “the life Socrates has most reason to live.”<sup>22</sup> Then, Plato argues that justice “requires not only not inflicting wrong or injury on others, even in response to wrongs from them, but fulfilling one’s agreements, and—in particular—abiding by one’s (tacit or explicit) agreement to abide by the laws of the city unless one can persuade it to change

them.”<sup>23</sup> Consequently, justice requires of Socrates that he accept the laws’ final judgment.

At the very beginning of their exchanges, however, Crito makes a different claim. Rather than asserting barely that Socrates must escape, Crito claims, shockingly, that in refusing to escape Socrates is acting unjustly. In fact, Socrates is unjust. But perhaps even more striking is that Socrates does not try to refute this second claim at all.<sup>24</sup> Here is the passage.

. . . Socrates, I do not think that what you are doing is just, to give up your life when you can save it, and to hasten your fate as your enemies would hasten it, and indeed have hastened it in their wish to destroy you. Moreover, I think you are betraying your sons by going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educate them. You thus show no concern for what their fate may be. They will probably have the usual fate of orphans. Either one should not have children, or one should share with them to the end the toil of upbringing and education. You seem to choose the easiest path, whereas one should choose the path a good and courageous man would choose, particularly when one claims throughout one’s life to care for virtue.<sup>25</sup>

Crito, here, is claiming not just one thing but three things. First, he is claiming that Socrates is unjust; second, that Socrates is betraying his own sons; and third, that Socrates has failed to choose the virtuous path that his whole life advocating virtue has indicated. Socrates tries to refute the second and third charges. He fails, however, to address adequately the first charge.

But why does Crito claim that Socrates is not just? Crito gives three reasons. The first reason is that Socrates is giving up his life when he could save it. And this is not to be just. The second is that Socrates is allowing his enemies to hasten his fate instead of determining that timing himself. And this also is not to be just. And the final reason is that in allowing his enemies to hasten his fate Socrates has acquiesced in his enemies’ wish to kill him. This, too, is not to be just. With these reminders in hand, we are now in position to return to the *Republic*.

### III. Socrates and Personal Justice<sup>26</sup>

Perhaps Plato's fullest description of what I am calling here personal justice occurs at the end of *Republic IV*.<sup>27</sup> There, Plato represents Socrates returning to each of the four cardinal virtues and discussing justice in the psyche or personal justice.<sup>28</sup> Socrates begins by saying to Glaucon that "it is right for someone who is, by nature, a shoemaker to practice shoemaking and nothing else, for a carpenter to practice carpentry, and the same for all others."<sup>29</sup> He then continues more fully.

And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone's doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own,<sup>[30]</sup> rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave—lowest, highest, and middle—as well as any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the acquisition of wealth or concerning the care of his body, or even something political, or concerning private contracts. In all these areas, he considers and calls just and fine the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it<sup>[31]</sup>, and wisdom the *knowledge* that oversees such action; and he considers and calls unjust any action that destroys this harmony, and ignorance the *belief* that oversees it.<sup>32</sup>

As to how one is to produce justice in the psyche, Socrates immediately adds the question, "Doesn't it follow, then, that to produce justice is to establish the elements in the psyche in a natural relation of mastering and being mastered by one another, while to produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled by one another that is contrary to nature?"<sup>33</sup> Now, many of the extraordinarily numerous discussions of such passages have preferred to leave rather undeveloped the critical interpretation of Plato's own conception of personal justice.



Instead, most discussions have privileged the examination of Plato's complex arguments for interpersonal justice. But even when taken summarily, what more does the Socratic conception of personal justice in the *Republic* encompass than the already rejected traditional conception of justice as "speaking the truth and paying your debts"?

Here is a rather standard description of Socrates' fuller views on personal justice. Socrates' proposal about personal justice is

that reason should rule over the non-rational desires—regulating, limiting, and sometimes eliminating them altogether. But when one turns to the political analogue [that is, to the analogy between justice in the personal domain of the *psyche* and justice in the interpersonal domain of the *polis*], one runs straight into one of the less attractive aspects of the work [i. e., of the *Republic*]: its authoritarianism, the idea that it is equally appropriate for the guardian to regulate, restrain, and "remove" awkward citizens when necessary.<sup>34</sup>

But we need to remind ourselves here of several key issues. First, the three-part soul.<sup>35</sup> It is not clear that reason alone can bring harmony to the psyche from any psychic conflict among its three major elements.<sup>36</sup> Some persons may be free of such conflicts without reason being finally responsible for the control of the psyche's tensions, for reason may sometimes be at the bid and call of appetite. Further, the rational part of the psyche controls a just person "if and only if the rational part has formed desires resting on wise deliberation about what is good for the whole soul and it uses these desires to guide the whole soul"<sup>37</sup> Even if someone's non-rational parts accept the instructions of the rational part, it does not follow that he also acts on wise deliberation about what is good for the whole soul."<sup>38</sup> Third, the city-soul analogy.<sup>39</sup> Plato's analogy between the three-part structure of the state and the three-part structure of psyche, while genial, is also notoriously vague. The analogy itself is helpfully described as follows.

. . . just as he argues that justice for an individual consists in the harmony of the three parts of the individual's psyche [appetite, spirit, and reason], so he argues that justice for a state

consists in the proper harmony of its three parts . . . [producers or workers for the polity's material needs, auxiliaries or soldiers for the polity's defence, and guardians for the polity's rule] with each part (class) fulfilling its function.<sup>40</sup>

Fourth, we remember that Plato himself goes from the triple structure of the state back to the triple structure of the psyche. But the movement could just as well go from the psyche to the state. If so, then both the tripartite structures of the psyche and of the state may come into fresh question. Moreover, Plato's analogy between the two triple structures themselves does not clearly hold between the ordering within each of the two triple structures. For example, Plato does not make it clear enough whether the structural analogy between the two triples generally reaches down into the relations between the first items in each triple (workers or producers and appetite), the second (auxiliaries or soldiers and spirit), and the third (guardians or philosophers and reason). Auxiliaries certainly have just as much appetite as workers. Fifth—and this is where some recent Plato scholarship has been innovative—such a movement needs to be understood as a dynamic one, perhaps even as an oscillating movement.

Still more, the important philosophical task is not so much to rid Plato's analogy of its unhappy consequences by further characterizing the movement between the two triple structures. Rather, that task is to elucidate how these two opposed poles may be bridged or, better, reconciled. For as several philosophers have recently argued, "Plato's method involves the provocative idea that justice in the city (*polis*) [interpersonal justice] is the same thing as justice in the individual [personal justice], just 'writ large.' There are good reasons to worry about that assumption."<sup>41</sup> That is, individual justice and political justice need not be analogies of one another; they may be but mutual dimensions of one another. No individual justice without a polity in which to exercise that justice, and no such just polity without individuals who act justly.<sup>42</sup> In our terms here, no personal justice without interpersonal justice, and no interpersonal justice without the personal justice of just persons.

#### IV. Individual Justice as Personal Justice

With these Socratic and Platonic reflections on justice freshly in mind, I would like now to argue that Plato's idea of individual justice as "psychic justice" suggests the need for a non-naturalistic metaphysical account of the justice of the just person (personal justice). That is, persons may not be understood exclusively in contemporary terms today as non-reducible, but scientifically naturalistic, entities,<sup>43</sup> but rather, as fundamentally relational entities. The key to this idea of persons as most basically not individual but relational entities, I will be arguing, is the notion of a necessarily shared mutuality between persons.<sup>44</sup> This shared mutuality indicates that each person is most properly understood not as either a static or dynamic "I", but as a dynamic "We."<sup>45</sup> The just person is the person who, between the I and the We, does not so much hold the scale of justice impartially with blindfolded eyes. Rather, the just person keeps "the balance of justice" oscillating towards an always receding equilibrium with eyes fully open.<sup>46</sup>

One way to grasp this idea of the just person acting impartially while dynamically oscillating between the different interests of at least two persons is to recall Watsuji Tetsurō's (1889-1960) speculative notion of *aidagara* or "betweenness," what I will call here "relationality." As already noted before, *aidagara* does not designate personal relationships. *Aidagara*, rather, denotes persons' "betweenness," where "betweenness" is to be understood as "relationality among people."<sup>47</sup> For Watsuji, the central focus of philosophical ethics is not the relationships but the relationality among persons, their "betweenness." And the just person is someone who comprehends persons not as autonomous individuals but always in their essential relationality with other persons. This essential relationality of persons is a crucial element in any normative ethics of persons.

In general, the expression "normativity"<sup>48</sup> designates naturalistic normativity only. Naturalistic normativity, however, is but one of several kinds of normativity. It is the property of those facts, statements, or claims on view mainly in the natural and social sciences.<sup>49</sup> In particular, "normative ethics" desig-

nates here two matters. A normative ethics is, first, a rather narrow philosophical inquiry into both the nature of moral goodness and the nature of morally right action. And a normative ethics is, second, the prescription of ethical standards about what is right and good with respect to persons' actions and characters. When a normative ethics takes up the ethical rightness and goodness of persons' actions, then the contexts of ethical inquiry are of fundamental importance. "The context of ethical problems," Watsuji writes, "is not to be found within the consciousness of the isolated individual, but rather within the mediating space or 'betweenness' that exists between one person and another. . . . Without seeing ethics as the study of this dynamic mediating space which exists between one person and another, we will not be able to unravel the nature of virtue, responsibility, obligations, and of the good and the [and of personal justice] and of the bad within human actions. . . . This space of relationships, or *nakama*, can refer to a group serving as a *relational system* for a given set of people as well as to the individuals that comprise it" (my emphasis).<sup>50</sup>

## V. Socrates and Hippias on Relationality

Now the further question is just how we are to make proper statements about such an apparently vague matter as the relationality of persons. Some indications may be found in Plato's dialogue, *Hippias Major*,<sup>51</sup> where the sophist denies that one may predicate the same thing of two other things, say *f*, only if each of the other things is *f* and not both are *f*. That is, we may say that both Socrates and Hippias are two only if Socrates is a person and Hippias is a person; predication here is singular. But in his counter to Hippias, Socrates holds that properly predicating the twoness of Socrates and of Hippias is predicating twoness of some one thing "being two persons"; predication is plural rather than singular.<sup>52</sup> Here is Hippias.

Never shall you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to both of us. If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be also? Or if each of us were unjust, wouldn't both of us? . . . You Socrates think there's some attribute of being

that is true of these both but not of each, or of each but not of both. And how could that be Socrates? That when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be—which belongs to neither—could belong to both? . . . whatever both are, each is as well; and whatever each is, both are.<sup>53</sup>

The passage I've underlined in this citation is what may be called "The Problem of Plural Predication," namely, how could a predicated attribute be true of two entities but not true of each? In different forms, this problem returned in the medieval period as the problem of polyadic accidents (accidents with two or more subjects)<sup>54</sup> in Aquinas, Alfred the Great, and in Suárez, as well as in the modern period, especially in Leibniz. Today the problem has attracted the critical attention of contemporary analytic metaphysicians.<sup>55</sup> Now here is Socrates.

We were so foolish, my friend, before you said what you did, that we had an opinion about me and you that each of us is one, but that we would not both be one (which is what each of us would be) because we are not one but two. But now, we have been instructed by you that if two is what we both are, two is what each of us must be as well; and if each is one, then both must be one as well. . . . Then it's not entirely necessary, as you said it was a moment ago, that whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also true of both.<sup>56</sup>

Perhaps a recent attempt to summarize this debate may be taken as a helpful starting point for still further reflection. "Each of Socrates and Hippias," one philosopher recently writes, "is a human being, while *they* are two human beings. The attribute of being 'two' belongs to them, but not to each of them; it is instantiated only in Socrates and Hippias together. [But we may ask, what then makes them two?] It is the context that makes them two, the context of considering Hippias and Socrates and no other. In this context they, no more and no fewer, are two."<sup>57</sup>

## ENVOI: THE TWONESS OF PERSONS?

With so much before us, may we properly say, in conclusion, that, at the very least, two questions call for further critical investigation. The first question for such discussion might go:

May we say of personhood what Socrates is saying here of twoness?

And, if we can, then a second question might go:

Would such a non-naturalistic conception of just persons count as a “transformation” of the meaning of the virtue of at least psychic or personal justice as Imamichi Tomonobu repeatedly and memorably called for?

### Endnotes: Essay Seven

- <sup>1</sup> This newly revised essay was first prepared for presentation as an invited paper for the XXXV<sup>th</sup> International Symposium in Eco-Ethics held in Istanbul, 3-8 September 2016, and is in *Eco-ethica* 6 (2017).
- <sup>2</sup> T. Imamichi, *An Introduction to Eco-Ethica*, tr. J. Wakabayashi (New York: University Press of America, 2009), 37.
- <sup>3</sup> Plato, *Greater Hippias*, 300d7-301e, tr. P. Woodruff, in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997.
- <sup>4</sup> I take naturalism here in the contemporary metaphysical sense “that it is within science itself that reality is to be identified and described” (Ney 2014, 286).
- <sup>5</sup> This initial working definition of justice, together with the distinctions that immediately follow, are from B. W. Hooker, “Justice,” in Audi 2015, 547.
- <sup>6</sup> See T. W. Scanlon, *What We Owe To Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998), 55-64; and T. W. Scanlon, *Being Realistic About Reasons* (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 105-123. Cf. S. Freeman, “Scanlon,” in Audi 2015, 954.
- <sup>7</sup> For the first, see I. Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of the Good* (London: Routledge, 1971), esp. 75-102; and for the second, see Findlay 1970, esp. 6-15.
- <sup>8</sup> On strong, moderate, and modest versions of scientifically naturalist accounts of the person, see P. McCormick, “Ethics and the European Cultural Environment: Emerging Collective Ethical Values Today,” *Eco-ethica* 5 (2016), 133-151.
- <sup>9</sup> For the current standard English translation, see Plato, *Republic*, tr. C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004). Note that Reeve’s translation is based on the new Greek text of S. R. Slings, *Platonis Rempublicam*, tr. S. R. Slings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). Hereafter, Plato’s texts are cited using the Stephanus numbers, while the page numbers refer to Reeve’s own discussions. Note throughout the roughly consensus view of the development of Plato’s thought. “The dialogues of Plato’s Socratic period, called ‘elenctic dialogues’ for Socrates’s preferred method of questioning, are *Apology*, *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Gorgias*, *Hippias Minor*, *Ion*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, and

book 1 of the *Republic*. The developmentalists' Platonic dialogues are potentially a discrete sequence, the order of which enables the analyst to separate Socrates from Plato on the basis of different periods in Plato's intellectual evolution" (D. Nails, "Socrates," in Zalta (Spring 2014), [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr\\_2014/entries/socrates/](http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr_2014/entries/socrates/)). Cf. C. D. Nails, "The Trial and Death of Socrates," in *A Companion to Socrates*, ed. S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 5-20. See also L.-A. Dorion, "The Rise and Fall of the Socratic Problem," in *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, D. R. Morrison (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 1-23.

- <sup>10</sup> Cf. T. H. Irwin, *Plato's Ethics* (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 74: "He seems to be sympathetic to Simonides' account of justice as 'rendering what is due to each person' (331e3-4). . . . [For Plato in the *Republic*,] justice involves 'doing one's own,' one's proper function, and thereby 'having one's own,' what is due to one (433e6-434a1)."
- <sup>11</sup> Reeve 2004, xxx.
- <sup>12</sup> M. LeBar and M. Slote, "Justice as a Virtue," in Zalta (Spring 2016), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/justice-virtue/>.
- <sup>13</sup> 354b2-5. Cf. the helpful summary discussion in N. Pappas, *Plato and the Republic*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 77-82.
- <sup>14</sup> For recent work with bibliographies on both Plato's psychology and his metaphysics, see, respectively, Lorenz 2008, 243-266; and V. Harte "Plato's Metaphysics," in Fine 2008, 191-216.
- <sup>15</sup> 392c1-3.
- <sup>16</sup> Reeve 2004, xxxiii.
- <sup>17</sup> 368c4-369a2; Reeve 2004, 46.
- <sup>18</sup> H. W. Ausland, "Socrates' Definitional Inquiries and the History of Philosophy," in Abbel-Rappe and Kamtekar 2006, 498.
- <sup>19</sup> For critical essays on the *Crito*, see *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito: Critical Essays*, R. Kamtekar (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), esp. 210-228.
- <sup>20</sup> Cooper and Hutchinson 1997, 38.
- <sup>21</sup> For a succinct account, see Nails 2006, 15-16. For a longer, more nuanced account, see, among others, J. M. Cooper, *Pursuits of Wisdom* (Princeton: PUP, 2012), 24-69.
- <sup>22</sup> LeBar and Slote 2016, 3.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>24</sup> Socrates ". . . seems not to hear the larger claim of injustice that *Crito* lodges" (Cooper and Hutchinson 1997, 37).
- <sup>25</sup> *Crito* 45c-d; tr. Grube, in Cooper and Hutchinson 1997.
- <sup>26</sup> The word "justice" here generally translates "*dikaioSunē*." This basic topic is "the topic of the *Republic*. [Justice here is] often broader in scope than our notion of justice and more nearly equivalent to ethical rightness in general. Its opposite, *adikia*, then has the sense of general wrongdoing" (Reeve 2004, "Glossary of Terms," 328). For complete references to

all textual occurrences of *dikaiosunē* and *dikaion*, see Reeve's "General Index," 349. Cf. M. F. Burnyeat, "Justice Written Large and Small in *Republic* 4," in V. Harte and M. Lane, *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 212-230; and R. Kraut, "The Defense of Justice in *Plato's Republic*," in R. Kraut, *Plato's Republic: Critical Essays* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 197-223.

- <sup>27</sup> For Plato's general defense of justice in the *Republic*, see N. O. Dahl, "Plato's Defence of Justice," in Fine 2009, 207-234.
- <sup>28</sup> The passages are roughly from 442a-445a; Reeve 2004, 130-134. Note that T. H. Irwin, in his *The Development of Ethics*, vol. 1 (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 72, calls attention to passages in *Phaedo* (65d4-5, 74a11, 75c10-d3, 76d7-9) where there is talk about the essence of the just as for Socrates "the just itself."
- <sup>29</sup> 443c.
- <sup>30</sup> See the discussion of this notion in Irwin 1995, §158.
- <sup>31</sup> Cf. 432d2-433b4.
- <sup>32</sup> 443c8-444a1; Reeve 2004, 132-133; his emphases. Reeve notes that Plato discusses the difference between knowledge and belief at 475d1-480a13.
- <sup>33</sup> 444d6-10; Reeve 2004, 134.
- <sup>34</sup> D. Scott, "The *Republic*," in Fine 2008, 369.
- <sup>35</sup> See G. R. F. Ferrari, "The Three-Part Soul," in Ferrari 2007, 165-201; C. Shields, "Plato's Divided Soul," in *Plato's Republic: A Critical Guide*, ed. M. McPherran (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 147-170.
- <sup>36</sup> Contrast Plato's story about the psyche with Aristotle's as set out in Miller 2012, 306-339.
- <sup>37</sup> 442c5-d8.
- <sup>38</sup> Irwin 2007, 103.
- <sup>39</sup> See Lorenz 2006, 146-165; and Blössner 2007, 345-385.
- <sup>40</sup> Fine 2008, 28; reading "psyche" for "soul" and "state" for "city."
- <sup>41</sup> LeBar and Slote 2016, 2. They refer to B. Williams, "The Analogy of Soul and State in Plato's *Republic*," in *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), 196-206; and D. Keyt, "Plato on Justice," in *A Companion to Plato*, ed. H. Benson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 341-355.
- <sup>42</sup> See R. G. K. Singpurwalla, "Plato's Definition of Justice in *Republic*," in Santas 2006, 263-282.
- <sup>43</sup> Cf. McCormick 2016.
- <sup>44</sup> For the notion of "mutuality," see P. McCormick, *Moments of Mutuality* (Cracow and New York: Jagiellonian UP and Columbia UP, 2012), 147-150.
- <sup>45</sup> See T. Watsuji, *A Phenomenology of the Cold*, excerpted in Heisig, Kasulis, and Maraldo 2011, 858-859. For backgrounds see H. Nara's "Introduction" to T. Watsuji, *Pilgrimages to the Ancient Temples in Nara*, tr. N. Hiroshi (Portland, ME: Merwin Asia, 2012), ix-xxxiii. *Pilgrimages* was first published in 1919.



- <sup>46</sup> Some related empirical considerations may be found in A. Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford: OUP, 1998), cited in S. Greenblatt, "How Shakespeare Lives Now," *The New York Review of Books* (21 April 2016).
- <sup>47</sup> Note that Watsuji talks of "betweenness" (*aidagara*) not as a relation but as an "interrelation," that is what he calls expressly a "relationship" between people, between "more strictly," he writes obscurely, "I when I am 'we' and we when we are each an 'I.'" See also T. Watsuji, *Ningengaku toshite no rinrigaku*, tr. Y. Seisaku and R. E. Carter as *Watsuji Tetsurō's "Rinrigaku": Ethics in Japan* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996) in the former SUNY series, *Modern Japanese Philosophy*, ed. P. McCormick. *Rinrigaku* was first published in 1931.
- <sup>48</sup> In most English language philosophical contexts today, and standardly, "a term or sentence, etc., is normative if its basic uses involve prescribing norms or standards, explicitly or implicitly." For example, "'ought' is normative, and so is 'good' for anyone holding that . . . 'Piety is good' either means or entails 'One ought to be pious'" (Cf. Proudfoot and Lacey 2010).
- <sup>49</sup> See the discussions in Parfit 2011, vol. 1, 31-42 on normative concepts, and 150-174 on normative moral concepts; vol. 2, 290-294 on normative beliefs, 384-389 on normative disagreements, and 401-410 on A. Gibbard's highly nuanced expressivist views. S. Sheffler provides a general overview of this huge work in his "Introduction" (vol. 1, xix-xxx-ii), and S. Freeman offers a critical appreciation in his "Why Be Good?" in *The New York Review of Books* (26 April 2012), 52-54. In his *Meaning and Normativity* (New York: OUP, 2012), Gibbard replies in part to Parfit's criticisms.
- <sup>50</sup> T. Watsuji, *Ethics*, excerpted and tr. G. Bownas in Heisig, Kasulis, and Maraldo 2011, 859-869, esp. 860-861.
- <sup>51</sup> On the chronological situation of *Greater Hippias* as what may be called loosely a "middle dialogue," see the detailed discussion in T. H. Irwin, "The Platonic Corpus," in Fine 2008, 63-87, esp. 78-79.
- <sup>52</sup> See T. Scaltsas, "Relations as Plural Predications in Plato," in *The Metaphysics of Relations*, ed. A. Marmodoro and D. Yates (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 19-35, esp. 20-22.
- <sup>53</sup> 300d7-301e.
- <sup>54</sup> Cf. S. Penner, "Why Do Medieval Philosophers Reject Polyadic Accidents?," in Marmodoro and Yates 2016, 55-79, for references, especially his discussion of the multiple ambiguities of this problem on 67-68. For Penner's general views, see his "Socratic Ethics and the Socratic Psychology of Action," in Morrison 2011, 260-292.
- <sup>55</sup> Cf. several papers and their references in Marmodoro and Yates 2016.
- <sup>56</sup> 301d5-302b3.
- <sup>57</sup> Scaltsas 2016, 22.